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This thesis examines how a state’s domestic legal framework interprets 
international law to create legal authority when deciding to use force or 
not for humanitarian reasons.  It argues that neoclassical realism, with its 
emphasis on the domestic level of analysis, can explain the role of legal 
interpretation during the legal-political process which leads to different 
interpretations and applications of international law at the domestic level.  
The value of this undertaking is that by focusing on the importance of 
legal interpretation and its ability to justify or affect legal change, the 
research identifies points of interaction between different legal regimes 
and the interpretive role of law during foreign policy formation.  
Interaction is essential when there is a need to integrate different legal 
norms related to the contestation over the protection of human rights 
during regional conflict.   
 
To demonstrate this the research comparatively analyses the United 
States and France’s legal institutions, in contrast to international law, 
when deliberating foreign policy, using four civil conflicts as a case 
study of humanitarian intervention – the Liberian civil war (1989), 
Operation Restore Hope (1992 Somalia), Opération Turquoise (1994 
Rwanda) and the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-present).  The conflicts 
provide varying examples of interventions to human rights abuses that 
proliferated following the end of the Cold War to the emergence of the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (“R2P”).  Each conflict relates directly 
to legal-political challenges involved in the formation of foreign policy 
with state legal strategies and international law during this period. 
 
This approach also considers a variation in the traditional meaning of 
power and rule structures inherent in realist theory, which has 
traditionally measured power in terms of military capabilities or 
economic strength.  It considers that the allocation of power can also be 
witnessed in a state’s legal framework, which in turn challenges the 
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Although written within the framework of twentieth century thought on 
international legal study and foreign policy analysis concerning human 
rights, this thesis deals with issues which have a wider relevance for 
humanitarian concerns today - issues such as the distinction between 
universal moral and legal duties as well as the role of the state 
concerning intervention decisions.  There are significant methodological 
considerations that this thesis examines to address the current gap 
between theoretical and empirical research in legal study and foreign 
policy analysis.  This explanation is necessary to reconcile different 
institutional processes – law and politics.  The study of this under-
researched area allows for an original interdisciplinary perspective which 
helps to inform and develop an understanding of how a state interprets 
international law within the context of a state’s domestic legal 
framework, and therefore how state and international law interact 
simultaneously in foreign policy to effect humanitarian concerns. 
 
During the 1990s the use of force for humanitarian concerns in Liberia, 
Somalia and, with qualification Rwanda, proved to be controversial both 
when intervention happened and when it failed to happen.1  International 
                                                          
1 For instance see: Gershoni Yekutiel ‘War Without End – The Prolonged Wars in 
Liberia’ (1997) Vol 40, No. 3 African Studies Review 55, 63-64 (discusses the 
ineffectiveness of the international community and why the United States should have 
intervened in Liberia). Walter H. Kansteiner, ‘Africa in the 1990s’  in Azrael, Jeremy 
R. and Emil A. Payin (eds) U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of 
Force Rand Publications 2009 (Kansteiner was Director for African Affairs at the 
National Security Council during the Liberia and Somalia conflicts); Jeffrey Clark, 
‘Debacle in Somalia.’ (1993) 72 (1) Foreign Affairs 109; as well as the 1992 United 




covenants on civil and political rights2 and economic, social and cultural 
rights3 introduced as part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948)4 attempted to address this controversy.  Whilst these covenants 
emerged as quasi-legal international mechanisms for enforcing and 
protecting human rights within the international system, at the state level 
there were no formal legal guidelines or legal mechanisms for 
humanitarian intervention decisions in place.5  Following the emergence 
of the Danish Institute Report (1999) and the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine (2001),6 there was agreed international acceptance that human 
rights violations should be protected by a responsible international 
                                                                                                                                             
political and humanitarian situation in Somalia at the time.  Michael Barnett, ´The UN 
Security Council, Indifference and Genocide in Rwanda’ (1997) 12(4) Culture 
Anthropology 551; Romeo Dallaire Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of 
Humanity in Rwanda De Copa Press 2004; Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: 
Humanitarian Intervention in International Society Oxford University Press 2000. The 
empirical chapters in Section Four discuss these humanitarian concerns in detail.  Of 
note Bosnia was also considered problematic during this period (United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 770 adopted on 13 August 1992 (S/RES/770), wherein the 
Security Council recognised the humanitarian situation in Bosnia, as well as Sarajevo 
and Herzegovina. 
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted 16 December 
1966 by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XX) http://www.ohchr.org accessed 15 
July 2015. 
3 International on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) adopted 16 December 
1966 by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) http://www.ohchr.org accessed 15 
July 2015 
4 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 (A/RES/3/217 A) was adopted on 
December 10, 1948, to promote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://un-
documents.net/a3r217a.htm accessed 15 July 2015.  Other covenants include the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide adopted 9 December 1948 
as General Assembly Resolution 260 (III) A (www.legal.un.org accessed 15 July 2015) 
and the Geneva Conventions which bans torture (www.icrc.org accessed 15 July 2015)  
5 This remains a contemporary problem. For example see Amos N. Guiora, 
‘Humanitarian Intervention and Sovereignty Under the Umbrella of Geopolitics’ 2013 
34 (2) U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 410, 422 “a lack of clear criteria as to when intervention is 
justified, if not required, suggests that the question is one of interpretation, subject to 
specific circumstances and particular interests.” 
6 Danish Institute of International Affairs, December 7, 1999, Humanitarian 
Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects; submitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Denmark (hereafter The Danish Report).  Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun (Co-
Chairs) The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty December 2001 (frequently known as R2P and 




community.7   During this period, respectfully however, there are further 
discussions of the need for human rights protection but the international 
community does not identify an effective legal mechanism for how that 
need was to be met.8   
 
Even today the formulation and implementation of decisions to use force 
based in human rights have a place in foreign policy.9  Yet consensus 
among states remains elusive and identifying the most effective 
mechanisms to meet the goals of foreign policy for humanitarian 
intervention is still a challenge.10  For instance, how can states agree that 
                                                          
7 Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006), reaffirms the 2005 World Summit regarding 
“the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity.”  Alex Bellamy ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? 
Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit’ (2006) 20(2) Ethics & 
International Affairs 143; Alex Bellamy and Paul D. Williams Protecting Civilians in 
Uncivil Wars (2009) Working Paper Working Paper No. Program on the Protection of 
Civilians, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect; Ramesh Thakur 
‘Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from ICISS’ 
2002 33, no. 3 Security Dialogue, 323. 
8 Ibid; Simon Chesterman Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law Oxford University Press 2001; Jack Donnelly ‘The Social 
Construction of International Human Rights’ in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler 
(eds) Human Rights in Global Politics Cambridge University Press 1999; Martha 
Finnemore The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. 
Cornell University Press 2003; Peter J. Katzenstein The Culture of National Security: 
Norms and Identity in World Politics Columbia Press 1996; Ramesh Thakur ‘No more 
Rwandas’: intervention, sovereignty and the responsibility to protect’ (2004) 
Humanitarian Exchange Magazine.  Issue 26, 4; Stephen D. Krasner Problematic 
Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities Columbia University Press 
2001; Alex, J. Bellamy ‘Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2008) 
14(2) Global Governance 135. 
9 Bern, PRNewswire Farewell to Neutrality and Human Rights Protection? (February 
25,2014) http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/farewell-to-neutrality-and-human-
rights-protection-247029111.html assessed 15 October2014; Samantha Besson 
‘Justifications’ in International Human Rights Law Oxford University Press 2014; 
Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and 
Rule of Law in Foreign Policy Cambridge University Press 2014; Bruno Charbonneau, 
‘The Imperial Legacy of International Peacebuilding: The case of Francophone Africa’ 
(2014) 40 Review of International Studies 607; Peter Certo ‘Military Intervention in 
Syria Is the Problem, Not the Solution’ November 18, 2015 Foreign Policy in Focus  
http://otherwords.org/military-intervention-is-the-problem-not-the-solution/accessed 
November 18, 2015; Aryn Baker ‘War and Rape’ April 18 2016 Time 36. 
10  The Danish Report 1999; ICISS Report 2001, Bellamy 2006,143; Bellamy 2009; 




an international legal rule exists, but then understand the rights or 
obligations of that rule in different ways - particularly when it involves 
the simultaneous application of laws on the use of force and human 
rights?   
 
The thesis suggests that the underlying problem is not whether a rule of 
international law is legally binding but rather how states translate into 
practice a rule of international law that simultaneously claims the 
protection of human rights and permits the use of military force for that 
protection.  As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, while the legitimacy 
or legality of an action may enter into the decision-making process of 
states, it is the contention here that states pursue actions that are 
determined by their interpretation of an international rule at the domestic 
level.11  Since most claims in international law must be made by a state 
as established by the principle of state sovereignty,12 which gives the 
                                                                                                                                             
Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press 2003; Katharina P. 
Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement, The Poliwalttics of 
International Legitimacy Cambridge University Press 2007; Stephen M. Walt, ‘The 
Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations’ (2005) 8 Annual 
Review of Political Science 23. 
11 Chapter 7.b. discusses the distinction between legality and legitimacy of actions for 
humanitarian intervention which are generically criss-crossed by the interplay between 
law and policy.  Hans J. Morgenthau ‘To Intervene or Not to Intervene’ (1967) 45 
Foreign Affairs 425; Hans J. Morgenthau Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 
1979vLecture and Symposium with Hans J, Morgenthau, The Carnegie Council 
Archives, www.cceia.org/resources/publications/ accessed 9 July 2015; Jean-François 
Revel Democracy Against Itself New York Free Press 1992; Jeremy Levitt ‘The Law on 
Intervention: Africa’s Pathbreaking Model’ (Winter/Spring 2005) Global Dialogue; 
J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal 
and Political Dilemmas Cambridge University Press 2003; Jules Coleman, PhD., JD. 
Moral Force of Legal Directives Paper presented at the Hart-Fuller Conference, New 
York University 30 January 2008; Katharina P.  Coleman International Organisations 
and Peace Enforcement, The Politics of International Legitimacy Cambridge University 
Press 2007; Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope Legitimacy and Legality in International 
Law: An Interactional Account Cambridge University Press 2010. 
12 The state is the primary actor in the international system.  The concept of state 




state the ultimate authority in the decision-making process, legalising 
moral standards for intervention at the international level in future 
decisions are inevitably limited.13  This is because a state’s legal culture 
directly engages the legitimacy of human rights through its legal sources 
during the decision-making process and will define state perceptions of 
what is considered correct and valid for each individual legal 
institution.14 
 
This is further complicated by the reality that international law, like all 
law, is open to multiple interpretations at both state and international 
levels during any decision-making process.15 Therefore any or all 
interpretations could be considered reasonable and valid.  Thus, it is 
                                                                                                                                             
Nations Charter and customary international law UN Charter, articles 2(1) (4) (7) 
reprinted in Malcolm D. Evans (ed) Blackstone’s International Law Documents 7th 
Edition Oxford University Press 2006:9.  The “basic international legal status of a 
state's ability to independently, without external interference, determine its internal and 
external policies …” ‘Sovereignty’ Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. 2014 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/sovereignty accessed 15 January 2018.  See also J.M. 
Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory Oxford University Press 2000. 
13 In the United States this is established in Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. 
Constitution, the Supremacy Clause “provides that the Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States … must prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent state exercise of 
power” and as noted in the Preamble of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic 1958 of 
France (Journal Officiel de la République Française 5 October 1958 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution accessed 29 October 2015. 
14 Institutions are defined herein as the sets of rules and codes for governing that form 
policy and customs that produce foreign policy. As is discussed in Chapter Two, due to 
different legal systems found in different countries, the laws addressing international 
law will include both common law (case law in the United States) and civil law 
(statutes in France).  Jack Donnelly, ‘The Social Construction of International Human 
Rights’ in Human Rights in Global Politics Cambridge University Press. 1999; 
Christian Reus-Smit, The Politics of International Law Cambridge University Press 
2004; Gilbert Guillaume, ‘Droit international et action diplomatique - Le cas de la 
France’ (1991) 2 European Journal of International Law 1 136; Françoise Bouchet-
Saulnier, The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
2001 
15 ‘General Principles of International Law’ International Judicial Monitor, American 
Society of International Law and the International Judicial Academy; September 2006, 
Volume 1, Issue 4.  See also Mary Ellen O’Connell ‘The UN, NATO, and International 
Law after Kosovo’ (2000) 22, no.1 Human Rights Quarterly 57, 89; Timothy Endicott, 




argued that the interpretation of international law, and its effectiveness at 
the domestic level, are both crucial to understanding the relationship 
between different legal regimes and the process of legal interpretation 
when considering how a state should legally respond to humanitarian 
concerns relating to regional conflict in the formulation of foreign policy.  
For purposes of this thesis, interpretation produces a justification 
mechanism for legal change, particularly when there is a need to 
integrate different legal norms and regulations within an existing legal 
framework. 
 
With this in mind the focus of the research is on the comparative analysis 
of the United States and France’s legal institutions, concerning their 
interaction with, and interpretation of international law, when 
deliberating foreign policy, using four civil conflicts as a case study of 
humanitarian intervention – the Liberian civil war (1989), Operation 
Restore Hope (1992 Somalia), Opération Turquoise (1994 Rwanda) and 
the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-present).  The timeline presents 
varying responses of intervention to human rights abuses in Africa that 
proliferated following the end of the Cold War16 to the emergence of the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (“R2P”) which obligated states to 
                                                          
16 During the Cold War humanitarian intervention was based upon the ideological 
objectives between communism and capitalism.  Michael Ignatieff 2003; Katharina P. 
Coleman 2007; Peter R. Baehr & Monique Castermans-Holleman The Role of Human 
Rights in Foreign Policy Third Edition Palgrave MacMillian 2004; Chris Abbott 
‘Humanitarian Intervention Rights and Responsibilities: The Dilemma of Humanitarian 
Intervention’ 2005 7, No. 1-2 Global Dialogue; Donald Rothchild Managing Ethnic 
Conflict in Africa The Brookings Institution 1997; Thomas J. Callahan ‘Some 
Observations on Somalia’s Past and Future’ March 1994 CSIS Africa Notes 158; 
Herman J. Cohen Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled 
Continent Palgrave Macmillan 2000; Kansteiner 2009.  The literature is discussed more 




protect their citizens.17  Each conflict relates directly to legal-political 
challenges and significant legal differences involved in the formation of 
foreign policy relating to human rights, which challenged decades of 
United States and French foreign policy in the African region.   
 
The aim of the thesis is to generate a greater understanding of how 
decision-makers in the United States and France identify points of 
interaction between different legal regimes and the interpretive role of 
law during foreign policy formation.  Specifically when there is a need to 
integrate different legal norms and policy within a state’s existing legal 
framework.  Because international law requires a state to carry out its 
international obligations,18 the state’s domestic legal framework becomes 
the legitimating function which positions how the interpretative process 
is established between international principles and foreign policy during 
decision-making.19  Whilst state law will include the international legal 
                                                          
17 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun (Co-Chairs) The Responsibility to Protect 
(December 2001) Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty.  International Development Research Group (“ICISS Report 2001”).  For 
a discussion on Africa and sovereign responsibility see: Kansteiner 2009; Alex J. 
Bellamy ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 
2005 World Summit’ (2006) 20(2) Ethics & International Affairs 143; Alex J. Bellamy 
‘Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2008) 14(2) Global 
Governance 135; Francis M. Deng ‘’From ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ to the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’’ (2010)  2 Global Responsibility to Protect 353, 370; Francis 
M Deng, Donald Rothchild and I. William Zartmann Sovereignty as Responsibility: 
Conflict Management in Africa Washington Brookings Institution 1996. 
18 Peter Malanczuk Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law 7th Edition 
Routledge 1997; Malcolm N. Shaw International Law Fifth Edition Cambridge 
University Press 2008. 
19 Christian Tomuschat argues that international law is dependent upon the state for 
legitimacy (Christian Tomuschat International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind 
on the Eve of a New Century, General Course on Public International Law, 1999 281 
Recueil des Cours 10, 25.  See also Michael Byers (ed.) The Role of Law in 
International Politics Oxford University Press 2000, Beyers examines the role that 
international law plays in international politics and state practice in the twenty-first 
century; Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink ‘The Socialization of International Human 




principles and standards germane to the situation at issue, the applicable 
foreign policy, a function of domestic law, will be state specific.  This 
will allow the thesis an analytical focus which centres more on what 
international law does on a particular issue in foreign policy and less on 
what international law is.  In doing so, the research attempts to foster 
interdisciplinary dialogue between legal study and foreign policy 
analysis which currently remains fragmented and undermines issues 
concerning the protection of human rights during regional conflict.20   
 
To achieve this an interdisciplinary methodology is needed that can 
identify where humanitarian intervention and its interests interact with 
foreign policy formulation.21  The research therefore locates itself at the 
                                                                                                                                             
and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.) The Power of Human Rights Cambridge University Press 
1999; Grigorii, I. Tunkin The Influence of International Law on Foreign Policy Harvard 
University Press 1984. 
20 Joel Westra argues on the few interdisciplinary connections between the study of 
international law and foreign policy decision-making, further work is necessary to 
develop these connections (Joel Westra ‘International Law and Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making’ The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis Oxford 
University Press 2017.  Ian Hurd challenges the assumptions about the separation of 
specialized fields in international relations in Globalization and International Relations 
Theory Oxford University Press 1999; Martha Nussbaum argues for an interdisciplinary 
approach and against various kinds of separations between disciplines (Martha 
Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach Harvard 
University Press 2011; “basic problems appear to have impeded the development of an 
integrative understanding of international legal study and foreign policy,” Benjamin A. 
Most & Harvey Starr, ‘International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, 
and "Nice" Laws’ (1984) 36(3) World Politics 383,384); Charlotte Ku maintains that 
continued fragmentation presents a barrier to research (Charlotte Ku, et al., ‘Exploring 
International Law: Opportunities and Challenges for Political Science Research’ 
(Spring 2001) 3, No. 1 International Studies Review 3). 
21 It is this author belief that humanitarian intervention is an area of study that requires 
an interdisciplinary methodology because both law and policy are used in decision-
making.  As such, an interdisciplinary methodology draws from two or more disciplines 
to discover something new by thinking across boundaries or for further coherence on a 
discipline which cannot be adequately understood from a single perspective, see: Britt 
J. Holbrook, ‘What is interdisciplinary communication? Reflections on the very idea of 
disciplinary integration” July 2013 11 Synthese 1865; Fred Grünfeld, ‘International 
Law and International Relations: Norm and reality or viceversa’ 2011 3, n. 3 
Amsterdam Law Forum, [S.l.] 3; http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/233/411 




intersection of two established fields, international legal study and 
foreign policy, using humanitarian intervention as the case study.  
Humanitarian intervention is used as a case study because it captures the 
tension in domestic foreign policy decisions between levels of 
intervention such as whether to use force, or whether not to intervene 
concerning the protection of human rights.22   
 
The methodology must also be able to analyse both the role and 
interpretive process of international law at the domestic level during 
policy-making and the underpinning rationale of the decision-makers. 
Consequently, the research combines comparative foreign policy 
analysis23 and neoclassical realism in its innovative theoretical approach, 
with empirical research.24  This approach is able to guide this research 
because it builds on comparative foreign policy’s25 premise of the 
                                                          
22 International law includes customary international law that develops through a 
process of state practice and actions Black’s Law Dictionary, West’s Encyclopedia of 
American Law The Gale Group, Inc. 2008 available from: Westlaw.com.; Malanczuk 
1997. 
23 A subfield of international relations theory: Valerie Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making: A Touchstone for International Relations Theory in the Twenty-First 
Century’ (2002) Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited) 1; Laura Neack, Jeanne 
Hey & Patrick Haney (eds.) Foreign policy analysis Prentice Hall 1995; James D. 
Fearon, ‘Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and Theories of International Relations’ 
(1998) 1 Annual Review of Political Science 289.  See chapters four and five of this 
thesis. 
24 There has been an “historical disconnect between FPA [foreign policy analysis] and 
“mainstream” IR [international relations] resulting in contemporary IR [international 
relations] theories that are considerably underdeveloped” Juliet Kaarbo ‘A foreign 
policy analysis perspective on the domestic politics turn in IR theory’ (2015) 17(2) 
International Studies Review 189, 215. 
25 James N. Rosenau ‘Pre theories and theories of foreign policy in R. B. Farrell (ed.), 
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics Northwestern University Press 
1966, 115; James N. Rosenau ‘The External Environment as a Variable in Foreign 
Policy Analysis’ The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy Nichols Publishing 1980.  
[Comparative] foreign policy analysis links the way states relate to each other in 
international politics to the study of domestic politics Jeffrey S. Lantis & Ryan Beasley 
‘Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis’ Oxford Research Encyclopedia: World Politics 
Oxford University Press 2017:4. See also Valerie M. Hudson  ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: 




necessity of analysing an occurrence in terms of independent, 
intervening and dependent variables which is compatible with the basic 
theoretical structure from neoclassical realism.26  The fundamental tenets 
of neoclassical realism are that foreign policy is an outcome of both 
international structure and domestic factors, as well as of a complex 
interaction between the two.27  With this methodology in place it is 
argued that in allocating space to the interpretative process though the 
state’s unit-level variables, neoclassical realism identifies the way a state 
manages systemic information (humanitarian concerns) and how 
systemic information influences the state’s ability to interpret societal 
demands and respond to them effectively.  This  can therefore explain 
how similarly structured states respond in different ways to similar 
international concerns of peace and security.28  Accordingly, a legal-
theoretical framework is created that focuses on how humanitarian 
pressures are translated through a state’s legal structure and its decision-
makers which ultimately affects the course of action a state may be 
willing to take in humanitarian intervention decisions. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
Issue 1 Foreign Policy Analysis 1; Steven Smith ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and 
International Relations’ (1987) 16(2) Millennium: Journal of International Studies 345. 
26 Gideon Rose ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’ (October 1998) 
51 World Politics 1. “A policy paradigm is internalised by decision-makers and policy 
experts, and acts as a source of guidance for conducting and evaluating policies, which 
defines the range of legitimate methods available in the international system (Colin Hay 
Political Analysis Palgrave 2002:197).  Randall L. Schweller discusses neoclassical 
realism and this policy paradigm in ‘The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism’ in 
Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds) Progress in International Relations 
Theory: Appraising the Field Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 2003; 
John F. Clark ‘Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa's International Relations in the Post 
Cold War Era’ in Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw (eds) Africa's Challenge to 
International Relations Theory  Palgrave 2001. 
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The decision to employ this theoretical approach is motivated by two 
observations.  First, analysis is generally represented as a failure of the 
international system to solve problems of compliance with international 
law or of the refining of accepted norms and standards,29 instead of 
investigating the ways in which foreign policy decisions concerning 
international rules are legitimated and constructed for authorization 
within the domestic legal framework.  This is puzzling since, as this 
thesis argues, humanitarian intervention or non-intervention and the 
decision to use force are fundamentally domestic legal-political decisions 
determined by state law.  If one considers that law (domestic and 
international in the context of this thesis) is dealt with through the state’s 
legal institutions (the way law is created and sources of law), examining 
the role of domestic law in the state’s decision-making process provides 
the framework through which decision-makers interpret international law 
and human rights.30   
                                                          
29 In ‘The Responsibility to Protect-Five Years On’, Alex Bellamy discusses the failure 
of the United Nations Security Council and other international organisations to fulfill its 
obligation of norm expansion with regard to the Responsibility to Protect (Alex 
Bellamy (2010) 24(2) Ethics & International Affairs 143.  Criticisms are numerous, for 
example: Secretary-General Ban Kimoon’s Report entitled Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect developed with Special Advisors Francis Deng and Edward C. 
Luck (UN document A/63/677 January 2009); Early Warning, Assessment, and the 
Responsibility to Protect (UN document A/64/864) 14 July 2010; Martha Finnemore 
and Kathryn Sikkink ‘International norm dynamics and political change’ (Autumn 
1998) 52, No. 4 International Organization 887:888, 891; Ramesh Thakur 2009; Rainer 
Forst ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A 
Reflexive Approach’ (July 2010) 20, No. 4 Ethics 711:712; Samantha Beeson 
‘Justifications’ in Moeckli, Daniel, Sangeeta Shah &Sandesh Sivakumaran 
International Human Rights Law Oxford University Press 2014.   
30 Jack Donnelly ‘The Social Construction of International Human Rights’ in Tim 
Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds) Human Rights in Global Politics Cambridge 
University Press 1999; Christian Reus-Smit 2004; Guillaume 1991:136; Michael P. 
Scharf and Paul R. Williams Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of 
International Law and the State Department Legal Advisor Cambridge University Press 
2010; Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law Rowman 





To examine this, France and the United States have been selected for this 
comparative analysis because whilst they both have long standing 
relations with Africa,31 they also have two very distinct legal systems.  
This makes them particularly suitable for this discussion because 
domestic legal-political processes affect the ability of the state to act in 
international politics.32  Structurally both states are democracies with 
constitutional legal systems despite this the differences between the two 
states’ legal institutions and the sources are pronounced.33  By comparing 
how the legal systems of France and the United States function, the 
research is able to consider the conceptual differences and approaches 
encountered when interpreting international law within different legal 
regimes.  Although human rights are part of foreign policy for both 
countries, each state’s legal structure and its perception of a security 
situation will ultimately determine the course of the state’s foreign 
policy; even when facing the same international pressures.34   
 
Second, since policymakers must make decisions in specific cases based 
on what is happening and what they expect will continue to happen,35 the 
process and mechanisms by which international law becomes applicable 
                                                          
31 Section Four discusses both France’s and the United States’ relationship to Africa. 
32 The Legal Systems of France and the United States are discussed in Section One, 
Chapter 2. 
33 Footnote 23. 
34 Scharf and Williams 2010; Bouchet-Saulnier 2001; Friedrich Kratochwil The Status 
of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law in Foreign Policy 
Cambridge University Press 2014. 
35 Christopher Hill The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy Palgrave MacMillan 2003; 
Juliet Kaarbo, Lantis, Jonathan S., & Beasley, Ryan ‘The Analysis of Contemporary 
Comparative Foreign Policies’ in Beasley, Kaarbo, Lantis, & Snarr (Eds.) 





in foreign policy needs to be more clearly identified to create a greater 
understanding of each state’s interpretive process.  Neoclassical realism36 
is introduced to unpick the relationship between international law and 
foreign policy.37  It is used because analysing the formation of foreign 
policy with state strategies and international law requires a theory that 
fulfils different requirements.  It must integrate humanitarian concerns, 
specifically the use of force and human rights (systemic 
pressures/independent variables) with the domestic structures or legal 
institutions (unit level/intervening variables) to establish foreign policy 
(dependent variable).38  This specific underlying mechanism, which 
positions the domestic legal decision-making environment between the 
international system and foreign policy, constitutes how decision-makers 
interpret and understand the role and purpose of law and how this 
regulates foreign policy decisions.39  In that state law will mediate the 
tension between the rules of international law and foreign policy and as 
                                                          
36  Rose 1998. 
37 Critique towards neoclassical realism typically comes from within the school of 
Realism itself.  For instance see Adam Quinn ‘Kenneth Waltz, Adam Smith and the 
Limits of Science; or ‘Hard choices for neoclassical realism’ (2013) 50 Issue 2 
International Politics 159. ‘Randall Schweller also offers an interesting position in ‘A 
Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate’ (April 1997) 41 in Mershon 
International Studies Review 2. 
38 Neo-classical realism suggests that “the impact of power capabilities on foreign 
policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through 
intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers' perceptions and state 
structures” (Steven E. Lobell, Ripsman, Norrin M., and Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 
Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy Cambridge University Press 2009, 
7). See also: Gideon Rose ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’ 
(October 1998) 51, No. 1 World Politics 144; Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009:97; 
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the 
Resource-Extractive State’ (July–September 2006) 15 no. 3 Security Studies 464; 
Fareed Zakaria From Wealth to Power Princeton University Press 1997. 
39“Foreign policy decision-making takes place in an increasingly legalized 




such will fuse with international law to effect policy within an individual 
state.  Something other theoretical approaches are unable to do.40 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter Five, for the realist the international 
system is defined the absence of a central authority (anarchy).41  “In such 
an anarchic system, State power is the key—indeed, the only—variable 
of interest.”42  The “overriding emphasis on anarchy and power leads 
them [realists] to a dim view of international law and international 
institutions. International law is thus a symptom of State behaviour, not a 
cause.”43  Liberalism is “challenging because international law has few 
mechanisms for taking the nature of domestic preferences.”44  Liberal 
theories would also ignore significant legal differences between states 
and situations given its focus on cooperation between states.45  The 
English School emphasises the centrality of international society to the 
study of international politics. It maintains the international system 
functions in the absence of a central authority and questions the state-
                                                          
40 Chapter Five, the Schools of International Relations Theory, critiques the literature of 
four mainstream theories of international relations that the thesis considers dominate the 
foreign policies of France and the United States: realism, liberalism, English School 
and constructivism.  The chapter establishes why other international relations theories 
are unable to provide a viable enforcement mechanism to assist systemic information 
through foreign policy. 
41 “Anarchy is the term used in international relations to describe a social system that 
lacks legitimated institutions of authority” (Helen Milner ‘The assumption of anarchy in 
international relations theory: a critique’ (1991) 17 Review of International Studies 67; 
Kenneth N Waltz Theory of International Politics McGraw Hill 1979.  
42 Anne-Marie Slaughter ‘International Relations, Principal Theories’ in E. Wolfrum 
(editor) Max Plank Encyclopedia of Public International Law Oxford University Press 
2011:2; M. Beavis The IR Theory Homepage 2017 http://www.irtheory. com/  accessed 
1 August 2017. 
43 John Mearsheimer ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ (1994) 19(3) 
International Security 5 32. 
44 Slaughter 2011:14; Beavis 2017. 
45 Andrew Moravcsik ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics’ (1997) 51 Internatinoal Organisations 513; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. 




centric framing in international relations.46  Thus the English School’s 
authority is established from the systemic level with little insight given to 
the domestic level of analysis.47  Moreover “it does not seek to create 
testable hypotheses about State behaviour as the other theories do.”48  
“Constructivists argue that the norm of state sovereignty has profoundly 
influenced international relations, creating a predisposition for non-
interference that precedes any cost-benefit analysis states may undertake 
based on constructed attitudes rather than the rational pursuit of objective 
interests.”49  Constructivist’s, like Wendt, further argue that anarchy is a 
construct of the state in the international system.50  Waltz opposes this, 
he argues the conception of international relations as lacking authority. 
Since there is no duly constituted legal authority above the state, there 
can be no authority between states.51  “The commitment to systemic 
theorizing leads him [Wendt] to incorrectly assume states act in a unified 
                                                          
46 Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics Macmillan 
London 1977. 
47 Tim Dunne Inventing International Society: A History of the English School St 
Martin’s Press 1998; Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the 
Intellect and Solidarism of the Will’ (1996) 72 International Affairs 91; Andrew 
Linklater The English School of International Relations:A Contemporary Reassessment. 
Cambridge University Press 2006. 
48 Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley Understanding International Relations Palgrave 
Macmillian 2009:11; Chris Brown ‘The development of international relations theory in 
the United Kingdom: traditions, contemporary perspectives and trajectories’ 2009 46 
(1-2) International Studies 221; Barry Buzan From International to World Society: 
English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization Cambridge University 
Press 2004. 
49 Slaughter 2011:22. 
50 Alexander Wendt ‘Anarchy is what States Make of It: the Social Construction of 
Power Politics’ (Spring 1992) 46, no. 2  International Organization 391; and Alexander 
Wendt ‘Constructing International Politics’ (1995) 20(1) International Security 71.   
51 Kenneth Waltz 1979.  Waltz is a founder of the neorealist school of thought, Ole 




way;52 whilst Hidemi Suganami critiques constructivism’s ‘complex 
philosophical argumentation’,53 to which this author agrees.  
 
By undertaking this approach in neoclassical realism, the interaction 
between international law, state law and foreign policy is analysed from 
the domestic legal perspective, not the systemic level of law.  This adds 
value to the current literature at both a theoretical and an empirical level, 
since research has been biased toward processes at the international 
system level.54   
 
Consequently, when interpreting international law through the domestic 
legal framework, a state theoretically provides an enforcement 
mechanism for international authority at the state level.  In that the 
domestic legal framework will identify the legal scope and/or limitations 
when establishing international principles for humanitarian concerns 
within foreign policy.  Given this, the thesis posits that if international 
law is legally and politically constructed within a state’s foreign policy, 
via the intervening variables operative at that level, international law 
attains political authority through the domestic process. This then 
challenges the traditional constructivist understanding of anarchy in 
                                                          
52 Pauline Rouillon Questioning Alexander Wendt’s critique of IR theory  London 
School of Economics Publishing 2016. 
53 Hidemi Suganami ‘On Wendt’s philosophy: a critique’ (2002) 28 Review of 
International Studies 2002:23, 25.   
54 The literature is extensive but for instance see, footnote 40 of this thesis; Jeremy 
Moses ‘Sovereignty as irresponsibility? A Realist critique of the Responsibility to 
Protect’ (2013) 39 Review of International Studies 113; Edward Luck  Limitations and 
Responsibilities: Prof. Edward Luck Discusses R2P (9 November 2011) 
Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention http://www.parliamentarians 
forconflictprevention.net/meeting/limitations-and-responsibilities-prof-edward-luck-
discusses-r2p accessed 15 July 2016; Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect—




international relations,55 which argues that unlike domestic situations 
there is an absence of a central government to enforce international law, 
even if, anarchy is what states make of it.56   
 
In its application of neoclassical realism, the research considers a 
variation in the traditional meaning of power and rule structures inherent 
in realist theory,57 which has traditionally measured power in terms of 
military capabilities or economic strength.58  In rejecting any obscure 
versions of law as resting on ideational factors, the research stresses that 
law, as a state’s internal resource, is important in the domestic decision-
making environment because legal institutions exert power and as a 
result domestic legal institutions shape foreign policy and may exert 
power in the international environment.  The originality behind this 
approach is that it recognises that state power is not limited to its 
material factors such as its external military or economic recourses, but 
also draws upon its internal resources, such as sources of law (which re-
enforce a state’s normative power structures) and the strategic 
capabilities involved in the interpretation, application and execution of 
the rules of international law.   
                                                          
55 Wendt 1995; Slaughter 2011, amongst others. 
56 Constructivism argues that anarchy is a construct of the state in the international 
system Wendt 1992.   Wendt repeats this discussion in Alexander Wendt  Social Theory 
of International Politics Cambridge University Press 1999.  
57 Evidence of  power and rule structures were apparent in the Cold War, wherein the 
United States and Soviet Union sought allies for protection and to increase their 
political and military influence abroad. John F. Clark ‘Realism, Neo-Realism and 
Africa's International Relations in the Post Cold War Era in Africa's Challenge to 
International Relations Theory Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw (eds) Palgrave 
2001; Brown and Ainley 2009; Slaughter 2011. 
58 Ibid., also Kenneth Waltz Realism and International Politics Routledge Publishers 
2008; Robert Jervis ‘Realism in the Study of World Politics’ (Autumn 1998) 52, 4 
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In utilising the interdisciplinary framework as outlined above, the thesis 
seeks to provide answers to these three inter-related research questions: 
• Do states interpret international law differently to support their 
foreign policy decisions to use force or not intervene for 
humanitarian reasons?   
• How do we understand the sources and process of the strategic 
use of interpretation and legal reasoning for policy purposes, 
particularly since decision-makers tend to interpret potential 
security threats differently? 
• If international law is politically constructed within a state’s 
foreign policy through unit-level/intervening variables does 
international law attain political authority?   
 
These questions are important to answer on several levels.  First the 
comparative findings provide a deeper understanding of the domestic 
legal process and mechanisms by which international law regulates the 
interaction between the state and its position in the international system.  
Second, critical analysis illustrates how essential differences in the 
interpretation and application of international law at the domestic level, 
through a state’s legal-political framework, affect how states shape the 
structure of authority and legitimacy in their foreign policy around 
humanitarian concerns.  This is particularly useful when considering that 
the globalization of rules and procedures, at both the international and 
domestic level, will affect the scope of legal interpretation which may be 
considered unprecedented given the ongoing debate on human rights 
protection.  Third, given that there have been few interdisciplinary 




analysis,59 the findings from this thesis make it necessary to consider the 
existing analytical framework for addressing inherent problems in the 
international system which arise in the continuation of separate 
specialised fields of study, particularly if adequate international 
responses are to be achieved. 
 
To answer the research questions this thesis has four distinct sections.  
Section One is comprised of three chapters and presents the legal 
framework for the basis of the study of humanitarian intervention in 
post-Cold War French and United States’ foreign policy.  To establish 
the importance of interpretation, the Section begins by reviewing the 
literature on two legal approaches - interpretivist60 and positive law,61 
before critiquing Ronald Dworkin’s views on the interpretative nature of 
law and the role of legal sources62 together with a critique of Christian 
Tomuschat’s assertions on international law’s dependent characteristics, 
to support the thesis’ position.63  Both communicate legal obligations 
about how authority is constituted and maintained.  Dworkin argues 
                                                          
59 Westra 2017; Dickovick and Eastwood 2015; David Forsythe The Politics of 
International Law: U.S. Foreign Policy Reconsidered Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
1990; Most and Starr 1984. 
60 Nicos Stavropoulos ‘On Interpretivist Law’ (2013) Stanford Encyclopedia: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist/ accessed 13 October 2016; Joseph 
Raz ‘Why Interpret’ (1996) Ratio Juris, 9: 349–63; Julie Dickson, ‘Interpretation and 
Coherence in Legal Reasoning’ (2010) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://www.seop. leeds. ac.uk; Louis Fisher Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as 
Political Process Princeton University Press 1988. 
61 Black’s Law Dictionary 2008; H.L.A Hart The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, edited 
by Penelope Bulloch and Joseph Raz Clarendon Press 1994 (first edition 1961); Jules L. 
Coleman ‘Negative and Positive Positivism’ (1983) (1983) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 
139. 
62 Ronald Dworkin ‘Is There Truth in Interpretation? Law, Literature and History’ 
2009; Ronald Dworkin ‘A New Philosophy for International Law’ (2013) 41 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 2.  
63 Christian Tomuschat  ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the 
Eve of a New Century, General Course on Public International Law’ (1999) in 281 




because law is interpretive it must provide relevance that coheres with a 
state’s legal system,64 whilst Tomuschat advocates that international law 
credentials rest on a state’s democratic process.65  Next the question of 
how legal behaviour shapes policy towards international law will be 
explained with the legal systems of France and the United States in 
Chapter Two to illustrate the arguments made.  This is followed by 
Chapter Three, which discusses the necessity of interdisciplinary work, 
in establishing the relationship between legal study and foreign policy, 
along with barriers to research.66  This chapter concludes with a legal 
framework consisting of neoclassical realism to illustrate how a theory of 
international relations functions in both domestic and international legal 
study for this research.67   
 
To elucidate the methodology that underpins this research, Section Two 
presents the components of the theoretical framework.  Chapter Four 
begins by identifying the rationale for the use of comparative foreign 
policy analysis, which will allow the thesis to explain the various 
differentials that led the United States and France to adopt specific 
positions and approaches on intervention as official policy.  To assert the 
position that neoclassical realism is the theoretical concept most 
applicable to this thesis, Chapter Five briefly reviews and critiques the 
literature of four mainstream theories of international relations that it 
                                                          
64 Dworkin 1986:190. 
65 Tomuschat 1999:25. 
66 For example Francis Boyle has argued that the retention of a “power-law dichotomy 
has effectively blocked moves towards a more sophisticated conceptualization of the 
significance of the interpretation of international law to international politics” (Francis 
A. Boyle World Politics and International Law  Duke University Press 1989 198). 




considers to be dominant in the foreign policies of France and the United 
States: realism, liberalism, English School and constructivism.68  It will 
be argued that these theories do not provide a viable enforcement 
mechanism to assist systemic information through foreign policy given 
that authority is situated at the systemic level of analysis. Additional 
consideration is given to constructivism in view of its traditional 
understanding of anarchy in international relations, which this thesis 
seeks to challenge69 because constructivism does not account for unit 
level factors in foreign policy decisions in the same way neoclassical 
realism does.    
 
Together these two chapters and the legal framework presented in 
Section One create an explicit legal-theoretical framework that focuses 
on the role of legal interpretation at both the state and international levels 
when formulating policy.  Such a framework will prove germane when 
theorising the relationship between the rules of international law and 
foreign policy analysis since “foreign policy is guided by theoretical 
ideas” 70 and both share an interdependency with international politics.71  
                                                          
68 Slaughter 2011:3-15. 
69 Wendt 1992. Adriana Sinclair International Relations Theory and International Law: 
A Critical Approach Cambridge University Press 2010:1; Onuf, Nicholas World of Our 
Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations Rutledge 
Publications 1989, reissued 2013; Friedrich Kratochwil ‘Constructing a New 
Orthodoxy? Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International Politics’ and the Constructivist 
Challenge’ (2000) 29, no. 1 Millennium 73; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andre S. 
Tulumello, Stepan Wood ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’ (1998) 92 American Journal of 
International Law 367; Slaughter 2011; Patrick Jackson The Conduct of Inquiry in 
International Relations: The Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of 
World Politics Routledge 2011. 
70  Walt 2005:23.   
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Lastly, Chapter Six outlines the methodology, the specifics of the 
research and further determines the formulation of the hypotheses that 
this research will test in the form of comparative studies between France 
and the United States. 
 
To advance the legal and theoretical positions outlined in Sections One 
and Two, Section Three links their relevance to the development of 
humanitarian intervention.  Chapter seven considers the development of 
the principles underpinning intervention.  In line with this historical 
analytical objective, this chapter also covers the distinction between 
legitimacy and legality of actions and makes use of the 1999 NATO 
intervention in Kosovo and the recent crisis in Syria as examples of the 
ongoing legal-political dilemma over humanitarian intervention. 
 
Section Four presents the empirical part of the thesis – the case study of 
humanitarian intervention in the four African conflicts.  In applying 
neoclassical realism, the chapters illustrate how the United States and 
France responded to each humanitarian crisis as they constructed the case 
to intervene or not to intervene.  In demonstrating this, the research 
draws attention to how limitations inherent to any state’s legal institution 
cause the state’s conduct to differ from the expectations of the 
international system.  Chapter Eight analyses the United States’ foreign 
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policy decisions concerning the Liberian civil war (1989) and Chapter 
Nine is an analysis of Operation Restore Hope (1992, Somalia) while 
Chapter Ten analyses the foreign policy decisions of France in Opération 
Turquoise (1994, Rwanda) and the ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire 
(2002, present) are considered in Chapter Eleven.  There are many 
elements involved in decision-making.72  The empirical section identifies 
three causal factors which are proposed to make the argument that affect 
the principles of international law on the policy process of each conflict: 
1) the decision-makers’ arguments for foreign policy reasoning; 2) the 
domestic legal framework, which includes legal tradition and sources of 
law; and 3) the actions of the United Nations. 
 
After the presentation of the case studies, Chapter Twelve reflects on the 
implications of the analysis in the preceding four chapters by comparing 
the factors that are proposed as affecting foreign policy in the United 
States and France to evaluate the variances between each state’s 
decision-makers in light of the empirical evidence provided.  The 
comparative analysis will reinforce the thesis’ position that essential 
differences in a state’s legal framework, its sources of law and strategic 
use of interpretation, affect how each state shapes the structure of 
authority and legitimacy in its foreign policy. 
 
Finally, the concluding chapter draws together the key themes of the 
thesis and reflects on the research by returning to the research questions 
                                                          




and the claims set out in the arguments and addresses the study’s 
findings.  It then considers the application of the theoretical framework 
and the possibilities that exist for further research. 
 
In summary, although written within the framework of twentieth century 
thought on legal study and human rights many aspects of humanitarian 
intervention currently remain litigious.  The author found that the four 
cases in this study of humanitarian intervention illustrate not only that 
differences in legal interpretation exist, but that the conceptualisation of 
international law at the state’s domestic level is crucial to understanding 
a state’s legal behaviour concerning humanitarian intervention.  By 
employing comparative foreign policy and neoclassical realism in its 
theoretical approach, the research was able to focus on the domestic 
decision-making environment, of France and United States, between the 
international system and foreign policy, and then analyse how 
humanitarian pressures were translated through each state’s legal 
structures and its decision-makers.  This theoretical application illustrates 
that state power is not limited to military or economic recourses, but also 
draws upon internal resources, such as sources of law (which re-enforce 
a state’s normative power structures) and the strategic capabilities 
involved in the interpretation, application and execution of the rules of 
international law.  In this way the state, by utilizing its domestic legal 
and political structures as a mechanism for constructing international 
authority, allows for structures of hierarchy absent in the international 




meaning of power and rule structures inherent in realist theory, which 
has traditionally measured power in terms of military capabilities or 
economic strength.  It considers that the allocation of power can also be 
witnessed in a state’s legal framework, which in turn questions the 
constructivist theory of ‘anarchy is what states make of it’.73 
                                                          














Why Interpretation Matters and  
the Legal Framework       
 
“Through interpretation, the uncertain and 
unpredictable legal rule becomes more certain and 
more predictable.”  





I. The Legal Framework 
 
This thesis examines the role of international law in the domestic 
decision-making process as it relates to humanitarian concerns between 
1989 and 2002.  Although written within the framework of twentieth 
century thought, the thesis deals with issues which have a wider 
relevance for humanitarian concerns today.  Given that the legality of 
humanitarian intervention is as unclear now as it was in the late twentieth 
century, it is necessary to identify the domestic structures that underpin 
how international law determines the course of a state’s foreign policy.74  
Thus it identifies how state decision-makers relate their foreign policy to 
principles of international law through the process of interpretation at the 
domestic level of analysis; and how the process of interpretation reflects 
the normative legal and political systems of the two countries under 
study: France and the United States.  The implication of which may 
prove significant concerning differing issues of authority and the legality 
of enforcement for foreign policy decisions about human rights and the 
protection of those rights.75   
 
To the extent that the thesis discusses issues of interpretation through 
sources of law and precedent, it is a legal study of the interaction 
                                                          
74 The legality of humanitarian intervention is one of the most controversial issues in 
international law (Ibid at footnote 17). Yvonne Lodico ‘The Justification for 
Humanitarian Intervention: Will the Continent Matter?’ International Lawyer 3 (2001) 
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Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1996. 
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between domestic law and international law76  Where it analyses the 
legal aspects of the decision-making process and foreign policy it is a 
legal study of comparative foreign policy analysis.  The research 
attempts to obtain an understanding of the legal reasoning and 
justifications behind the enforcement and effect of prescribed laws which 
initiate authority in foreign policy.  In locating itself between the fields 
of international legal study and comparative foreign policy analysis the 
thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach to explain how law is used by 
decision-makers in the formation of foreign policy.  This approach can 
prove empirical and conceptual links, as well as difficulties, which may 
otherwise become lost in separate specialized fields of study. 77   
  
This problem, the gap between theoretical and empirical research in legal 
study and foreign policy analysis, is reflected in most debates on this 
subject.78  Debates which tend to read either toward those who focus on 
the study of international law or toward those who focus on foreign 
                                                          
76 Raz 2009; Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood 1998:367; Shirley V. Scott ‘International 
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Onuf World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations Rutledge Publications 1989, reissued 2013; Joseph Raz The Concept of a 
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(with Kenneth Abbott) in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack and (eds.) 
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policy.79  It is evident in traditional issues and ambiguities relating to the 
effectiveness of the rules of international law, as well as in debates 
centring on questions of legality and legitimacy around the protection of 
human rights and the use of force for that protection.80  Noortmann has 
concluded that the concept of international law itself has become 
problematic, which may indicate that the traditional divisions of study, 
which provide the boundaries for research, may no longer be 
appropriate.81  Producing interdisciplinary work allows the research to 
focus on the effectiveness of international law in shaping authority and 
legitimacy within the state’s domestic decision-making process and the 
policy dimensions associated with the application and enforcement of 
state law.   
 
                                                          
79 Footnote 76; also see for instance Most and Starr 1984. 
80 Simon Chesterman ‘Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the 
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concerns the effectiveness of international law in foreign policy.  The realist approach 
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thought of international law.  They argue that breaking international law brings about 
consequences and that international organizations have a measurable impact on global 
relations (Slaughter 2011:3-15); Grünfeld 2011; Brown and Ainley 2009. 
Constructivists scholars reject both assumptions.  “Constructivist focus on the building 
of social norms through interaction, and on the pathways through which they come to 
influence actors.  Claiming that identity formation is relational and occurs before, or at 
least concurrently with, interest formation” (Brunnée & Toope 2012:27);  Martin 
Griffiths, (ed.) Encyclopaedia of International Relations and Global Politics Routledge 
2007; Adriana Sinclair, International Relations Theory and International Law: A 
Critical Approach Cambridge University Press 2010; Friedrich Kratochwil The Status 
of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law in Foreign Policy 
Cambridge University Press 2014. 
81 Math Noortmann ‘International Law and International Relations: Lost in 
Translation?‘ (October 2012) 2 Issue 1 International Studies Today 6.  Martha 
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As a result, this thesis will achieve an understanding of how a rule of 
international law is legally interpreted and applied within a state’s 
domestic legal context utilizing neoclassical realism, so that new 
perspectives are developed to help inform and develop an understanding 
of how state and international law interact simultaneously in foreign 
policy to effect humanitarian concerns.82 
 
The value of this undertaking is that by focusing on the importance of 
legal interpretation and its ability to justify or affect legal change, the 
research identifies points of interaction between different legal regimes 
and the interpretive role of law during foreign policy formation.  
Interaction at several stages of decision-making is essential when there is 
a need to integrate different legal norms related to the contestation over 
the protection of human rights during regional conflict.83   
 
Since the concept of interpretation is central to the argument of this 
thesis, this section begins with an analysis of the importance of 
interpretivist law (interpretation) and the limitations associated with 
positivist law.  Whilst the author recognises that international legal 
theory includes various theoretical and methodological approaches to 
                                                          
82 “Rather than assuming that there need be a single law that accounts for a given 
phenomenon whenever and wherever it has occurred or will occur, it may be more 
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because those conditions do not always hold in the empirical world” (Most & Starr 
1984:402). 
83 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin ‘The Decision-Making Approach 
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explain and analyse the subject of public international law,84 
interpretivist and positivist law have been selected to illustrate the thesis’ 
position given their opposite points of view to the application of law.85  
How legal behaviour shapes policy towards international law follows on 
from this analysis and the legal systems of France and the United States 
are discussed in Chapter Two to provide illustration for this critique.  
This is followed by Chapter Three, which considers the necessity of 
interdisciplinary work, in establishing the relationship between 
international law, domestic law, foreign policy, and the implications of 
the relationship.  This section discusses the reasons why this relationship 
needs to be examined in greater detail, along with the barriers to 
research, and concludes with a legal framework consisting of 
neoclassical realism. 
 
1. Why Interpretation Matters 
The concept of interpretation is key to the argument of this thesis, and as 
such is discussed throughout the thesis by either direct reference or 
analytical inference.86  Interpretation, in the context of this thesis, is a 
legal mechanism that allows the rules of international law to be adapted 
to unforeseen situations, such as humanitarian intervention.  The 
interpretation of which lies between the identification of existing 
                                                          
84 See for instance: Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood 1998; Scott 1994; Onuf 1989; Raz 
1970.  
85 William Neuman Social Science Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (4th Ed.) Allyn and Bacon 2000; Ole Holsti, Robert C. North and Richard 
A. Brody ‘International Relations as a Social Science: A Research Approach’ (1966) 
International Social Science Journal, vol. XVII.  
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international and domestic law and the development and modification of 
that law.87  As stated previously, for purposes of this thesis, 
interpretation produces a justification mechanism for legal change, 
particularly when there is a need to integrate different legal norms and 
regulations within an existing legal framework.   
 
In law, norms describe the way something ought to be done according to 
an interest position.  Dworkin has noted that in the most general terms, 
norms are standards of behaviour created through mutual expectation in 
a social setting.88  “For legal theorists called pluralists, there may be no 
significant distinction, for example, between law produced by state 
authorities and norms created by voluntary associations: each may or 
may not be effective in shaping behavior.”89  Stavropoulos notes for 
pluralists, “it is about the fundamental or constitutive explanation of 
legal rights and obligations (powers, privileges, and related notions.”90  
For others, like Hart or Marmor who are  often termed positivists, “legal 
norms can only exist when they are produced through fixed hierarchies, 
usually state hierarchies.”91   Thus, legal theorists may agree to a norms 
importance but then disagree as to where that importance lies. 
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As a result, the interpretations of these norms can be conflicting because 
different interests can be inconsistent with one another.  This is 
particularly evident when the same issue is under consideration and 
involves the simultaneous application of laws associated with 
humanitarian intervention, such as the protection of human rights and the 
use of military force for that protection.  It is Sartor’s belief that the 
interpretive process of legal reasoning is an application in the ability to 
process information in order to come to appropriate determinations.92 In 
this way interpretation will allow for essential change within a broader 
framework of continuity,93 since the interpretation of legal concepts may 
require change to the rules defining them.  Stavropoulos’s comments 
clarify for this research that “interpretation purports to identify the 
principles in question and thereby the normative impact of the practice 
on citizens' rights and responsibilities,”94 whilst Dworkin argues that 
interpretation “is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in 
order to make it the best possible example of the form or genre to which 
it is taken to belong.”95   
 
In this same regard, Andrei Marmor states “if the formulation of a 
particular rule is inadequate for purposes of determining a particular 
                                                          
92 Giovanni Sartor Legal reasoning: A cognitive approach to the law Springer 2005. 
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result in certain circumstances, then there is nothing more to explain or 
understand about its meaning; what is required is a new formulation of 
the rule – one which would remove the doubt – and this is what the term 
‘interpretation’ properly designates.”96  This would certainly hold true 
when contemplating laws associated with humanitarian intervention, 
given that interpretation will identify the principles in question and their  
normative impact.  In this same regard, Joseph Raz argues, 
“interpretation is considered a necessary step for the understanding of the 
exact meaning and purpose of a legal rule.  Through interpretation, the 
uncertain and unpredictable legal rule becomes more certain and more 
predictable”97  ,,, “it is the revealing or presumption of the real meaning 
of the legal norm,”98 with which this study agrees.   As a result, and as 
Coleman iterates, interpretation is an account of how the “determinants 
of legal content as authorized fix legal rules.”99  Therefore, while the 
fixed content of the rules of international law (sovereignty or the use of 
force or attention to human rights) is the same, the underlying difference 
is whether the rule meets the criteria of effective legality from within the 
relevant state (unfixed) and how that criterion is interpreted for 
application. 
 
Ronald Dworkin advances the idea that law is an interpretive concept.  
He advocates the validity of a legal principle as deriving from a 
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combination of facts and moral considerations which then takes an 
interpretivist approach to law and morality.100  His position is that 
because law is interpretive it must provide relevance that coheres with a 
state’s legal system (its statutes, precedents, constitution, etc.).101  
Dworkin’s approach represents the status of legal sources in both 
domestic and international law.102  Dworkin’s position is that legal 
interpretation is primarily the interpretation not of the law, but of its 
sources, and that to understand why interpretation is central to legal 
practice requires an understanding of the role of sources in the law; that 
is, of the reasons for the sources.103  Endicott concurs with Dworkin, he 
argues that legal interpretation is a reasoning process. “It is needed 
whenever reasoning is needed in order to decide what a legal instrument 
means and when the law is indeterminate.”104  This rationale would 
explain the controversy regarding humanitarian intervention decisions 
following the end of the Cold War,105 in that there were no formal legal 
sources in place at the time.  Subsequently decision-makers would have 
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been unclear about where to focus their strategies in the case of decisions 
to use force for human rights protection or to not intervene.    
 
In this same regard, Robert Summers and Michele Taruffo conducted 
surveys on the practice of interpretation in civil and common law in the 
United States and Europe in the period between 1990 and 2000.106  The 
surveys revealed that under modern legal systems, there were numerous 
ways of interpreting law.  Relevant to this thesis are three.   
1. Interpreting the legal text on the grounds of precedents 
set at the time when the given law was previously 
enforced; 
2. Interpretation on the grounds of legal dogmas and 
doctrines; and 
3. Contextual interpretation:  interpretation of the legal text 
where the words of each provision are construed in 
adherence with the meaning attributed to them when 
fitted into the entirety of the law or a complete body of 
related laws.107 
 
Their research seeks to advance the understanding of the interpretation of 
law through comparative and international legal context analysis in civil 
and common law legal systems.108 
 
Legal Study: Sources of Interest in Interpretative & Positivist Law  
As the above illustrates, theorists of international legal study109 approach 
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 the subject of interpretation with very different questions and concerns, 
to which they give very different answers.  O’Connell suggests they 
argue about how “international law is applied to, and functions within 
international policy [and] how international legal rules are used by the 
makers of foreign policy.”110  However, most of the theorists agree on 
one principal characteristic, that:   
[A]n interpretation of something is an interpretation of 
something – it presupposes that there is a something, or an 
original, there to be interpreted, and to which any valid 
interpretation must be faithful to some extent.  Thus, this 
differentiates interpretation from pure invention and looks to 
interpretation as an attempt not merely to reproduce but to 
make something of or bring something out of an original. 111   
 
 
Interpretivist law suggests an explanation of how the legally significant 
action and practices of political institutions adapts legal rights and 
obligations. “Its core claim is that the way in which institutional practice 
affects the law is determined by certain principles that explain why the 
practice should have that role. Interpretation of the practice purports to 
identify the principles in question and thereby the normative impact of 
the practice on citizens' rights and responsibilities.”112 
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It is the aim of legal interpretation to “constructively interpret the social 
practice of law, by imposing purpose upon it such as, to make of it the 
best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to 
belong.”113 Interpretivism about law implies the possibility of 
disagreement about the grounds of law, because it makes law's 
constitutive explanation a matter of substance, “a matter of the moral 
justification of the role of institutional history in the determination of 
rights and obligations.  If the question of grounds is substantive, we can 
disagree about what they are without changing the subject.”114 
 
Positivist law disagrees, however, with the interpretative concept 
proposed in law.  Bașak Çali  posits, “a central concern of positivist takes 
on interpretivism is that it will lead to the imposition of values by 
individual actors rather than telling us anything about the very meaning 
of international law.”115  Legal positivism “advocates believe that the 
only legitimate sources of law are those written rules, regulations, and 
principles that have been expressly enacted, adopted, or recognised by a 
governmental entity or political institution, including administrative, 
executive, legislative, and judicial bodies.”116   
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One of the defining features of the legal positivist understanding of law 
is the insistence on the separation of law and morality, which 
interpretivist law is not in agreement with.117  In other words, a state or 
private action may be legal, and yet immoral, and vice versa, depending 
on the extent to which it is based on legal rules recognised as valid 
within the legal system in question.118   Jules Coleman has argued that 
the core of the separability thesis “is given by what he calls negative 
positivism: the claim that there is no necessary connection between law 
and morality. This does not preclude a rule of recognition from 
incorporating morality into law. It only precludes positivism from 
claiming that law must necessarily incorporate morality into law 
everywhere, in all possible legal systems.”119 
 
Contrary to Coleman, Andrei Marmor has stated “that one of the noted 
problems with the separability thesis is that one can read it as asserting a 
claim about constraints on the conditions of legal validity or as making a 
claim about the existence conditions of legal systems.”120  This problem 
is reflected in the positivist approach to human rights in international law 
which remains impeded by the concept of state sovereignty. This is 
contrary to the interpretive approach where there is no separation 
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between law and morality, although there are differences.121  Positivist 
law consequently rejects liberal approaches to law in general.   
 
An example of positivist law is expressed in the United Nations Charter 
Articles 2(4), 42 and 51 which prohibit states from using force “against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, except in 
two circumstances: self-defence or Security Council approval for the use 
of force ‘to maintain or restore international peace and security’.”122    
 
Simon Chesterman argues that “positivist approaches to international law 
strongly uphold the principles of sovereignty and non‐intervention and 
would therefore reject the right of humanitarian intervention unless 
authorized by the United Nations.”123  He explains that these approaches 
conclude that as a legal concept humanitarian intervention is incoherent.  
He does note however that “humanitarian intervention may be justified 
not as a valid use of force against a sovereign state, but because certain 
actions by a governing regime may invalidate that state’s 
sovereignty.”124  Arguments such as this bring to the forefront the 
tensions between humanitarian needs and sovereignty, which the 
Responsibly to Protect attempted to reconcile.125   
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Fernando Tesón regards the positivist concept of international law as 
mistaken and believes that an alternative conception of international law 
operates to meet the needs of citizens; not their governments.126  “Legal 
rules and processes should be interpreted in the light of human values, 
not state values, and are integral to the debate on what action is 
justifiable in the event of a humanitarian crisis.”127  On the objections 
concerning human rights protection and the use of force for that 
protection Tesón contends that “Security Council authorized actions are 
evidence of a customary international law norm sanctioning unilateral 
intervention.”128 
 
Those critics that challenge legal positivism argue that “not only is law, 
as a social practice, a profoundly interpretative evaluative in nature, but 
that any theory about the nature of law is also interpretative in a similar 
way, and thus, equally evaluative.”129  It is Dworkin’s belief that 
“propositions of law ... provide the best constructive interpretation of the 
community's legal practice.”130  It is contended here that Dworkin is 
correct. 
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To counter these challenges many legal positivism theorists now claim 
that positivism has always been a normative theory and could only be 
defended as such.131  Nonetheless, while they may have emphasized the 
role of law in guiding human conduct,  
[W]hat legal positivists have not done is to meet the 
challenge of interpretation directly. [W]hile 
interpretation is an account of how the determinants 
of legal content as authorized fix law’s content 
[rules] ... What [legal positivists] have been less 
good at is providing theories of how the content of 
law is fixed by those factors that are its 
determinants.132   
 
 
Therefore, while acknowledging legal positivism’s tenets, this thesis 
shares Dworkin’s views on the interpretative nature of law.  In that, 
interpretation will define state perceptions of what is considered correct 
and valid for each individual legal institution and will develop an 
understanding of how state and international law interact simultaneously 
in foreign policy to effect humanitarian concerns.   
 
International Law’s Dependent Characteristics 
Christian Tomuschat argues that, since international law has “no source 
of democratic legitimacy on its own, its democratic [autonomous] 
credentials therefore rest on the democratic processes within a state.”133  
According to Tomuschat, there is no way to overcome this 
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dependency.134  Tomuschat also notes that the enforcement mechanism, 
through which the international community seeks to implement its core 
legal values, does not correspond to the typical understanding held in 
legal scholarship regarding the state, because international organizations 
do not have a mechanism for enforcement capacity, but instead rely upon 
those of their sovereign members and would thus have no capacity to 
enforce law without domestic state support.135  This thesis concurs with 
Tomuschat’s position on international law’s dependency.  As will be 
demonstrated in the empirical chapters, this dependency matters since in 
the case of both France and the United States, their legal structures and 
perceptions of humanitarian pressures and security will ultimately 
determine whether or not to use military force in the course of decision-
making. 
 
This enforcement mechanism (legitimacy) therefore is what gives a 
state’s government its authority and the standards for that legitimacy are 
grounded in the state’s domestic legal framework.  These domestic legal 
(normative) standards reflect cultural values and define perceptions of 
what is right and proper for a government and its military forces, 
including limits and/or justification for the protection of human rights 
and the use of military force for that protection. 
 
This domestic legal framework is the legitimating function which 
positions how the interpretative process is established and operates 
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between humanitarian concerns and foreign policy during the course of 
decision-making.136  It is the process in which the rules of international 
law are interpreted with reference to policy choice, and how a state 
legally constructs international law in the course of decision-making 
concerning decisions to intervene or not.  This policy process is 
“internalised by decision-makers and policy experts, and acts as a source 
of guidance for conducting and evaluating policies, which defines the 
range of legitimate methods available in the international system.137  This 
matters because states will always have other issues to consider and 
conflict may develop between the justification of human rights and other 
foreign policy objectives which may prove incompatible, and can often 
lead to difficulty in the course of decision-making.138   
 
To the extent that decision-makers must make decisions in specific cases 
based on what is happening and what they expect will continue to 
happen, there may be differing opinions by decision-makers as to what 
should be done.  This is based on the fact that the application of the rules 
of international law requires legal interpretation according to state 
decision-makers’ expectations of what best constitutes an appropriate 
process and how most effectively to control foreign policy behaviour.139   
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This process can be understood only by comprehending the objectives 
and legal status of interests as conceived by those involved in the 
decision-making process.140 There will inevitably be different 
understandings between states when identifying the appropriate degree 
of state and international dialogue when foreign policy is composed.  By 
reason of the legal systems instituted in most states, there is a 
dependency upon a dominant set of practices and institutions which 
provides rules for the effective construction of authorized state 
institutions.  Because of this, the interpretation of international legal 
principles is dependent on a state’s legal interpretation of those 
principles for application.   
 
Human rights are a specific example of international law’s dependency 
on a state’s interpretation for application.  In that the justification of 
human rights alone does not explain the sources of law used to legitimate 
action in foreign policy.  The failure to understand this dependency may 
obstruct the effectiveness of the international legal principle, since 
different interests, such as sovereignty and human rights on decisions to 
use force or not intervene, can be inconsistent with one another.141   
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It is this contestation over the meaning and justification of human rights,   
as evidenced in the current crisis in Syria142 and the ongoing conflict in 
Côte d’Ivoire,143 that provides the rationale for state legal structures to 
legitimate authority, which in turn has the effect of strengthening or 
weakening the influence of systemic factors; subsequently becoming an 
essential element to realize state interests.144  A specific example of this 
was France’s perceived legal obligations towards the Habyarimana 
regime during the Rwanda genocide145 or even the United States initial 
failure to intervene in Somalia, despite State Department reports of the 
human rights situation.146   
 
This would indicate, as Tomuschat asserts, that states utilize this 
dependency to construct international law and its principles legally and 
politically, within foreign policy during the course of decision-making.   
 
Samantha Besson corroborates Tomuschat’s dependent legitimacy theory 
on international law.  She suggests “this so-called dependence condition 
of legitimacy implies that the law’s content be also justified morally, not 
so much to be valid law but for the authority it claims ever to be 
                                                          
142 ‘Syria: The story of the conflict’ (2016) BBC News 
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justifiable.”147  Further writing “human rights law is itself of no avail” 
inasmuch as human rights “cannot provide justification external to the 
law.”148  Besson’s position gives support to this research in that it is 
argued, the need for human rights will have to be identified and codified 
into the state’s domestic legal system149 for justification prior to the 
construction of the rules of human rights and/or humanitarian invention 
within the domestic legal-policy process. 
 
Furthermore, while there may be agreement upon which international 
legal principles to use in the course of decision-making, the application 
is always open to interpretation, because effectiveness rests upon 
interpretation.  Thus the way facts are legally interpreted and how the 
legal arguments are presented will provide a basic understanding of the 
conflict situation at issue and consequently have an impact on the 
decision-making process.150  As will be determined in the empirical 
chapters, whether international law could authorise use of force for 
humanitarian concerns can only be decided by the state concerned on 
issues that support or negate that decision regarding international law’s 
effectiveness during decision-making.  This combination of domestic and 
international factors will vary from state to state. 
 
This thesis agrees with Tomuschat’s assertions regarding international 
law’s dependent characteristic and contends that states utilize this 
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dependency to establish international law’s presence within foreign 
policy, producing a synthesis that is used to regulate the foreign policy 
objectives of states.151   
 
Is Interpretation a Barrier to Research? 
For any state, the observance or the violation of international law is seen 
largely within the context of its foreign policy; but to what extent do 
states observe international law and in what ways might this influence 
foreign policy decisions?152  International law has long been part of the 
international system, although it is a common view that the norms of 
international law are so widely disregarded as to be largely irrelevant to 
the behaviour of nations.153  However, in almost every instance in which 
states have resorted to the use of force, they have explained or justified 
their actions by reference to the law of the United Nations Charter and 
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the exceptions provided therein.154  Thus as Dworkin noted, the problem 
is not that international law is irrelevant, but rather it lies in the 
interpretation of the principles of international law because interpretation 
is believed to be the right of a state.155   
 
Despite the seeming relevance of international law, minimal 
consideration has been given to how states interpret international law and 
even less consideration has been given to the methods states use to make 
those interpretations.156  Without interpretation there can be no state 
action, and therefore, interpretation must be regarded as a preliminary 
step to foreign policy decisions, indicative of the behaviour of a state in 
its relationship to international law.    
 
To understand how international law determines the course of a state’s 
foreign policy, it is necessary to understand how states arrive at different 
interpretations of the same rule of international law.  In law, rules 
describe the way something ought to be done according to an interest 
position.157  Interpretations of these rules (or norms) can be conflicting 
                                                          
154 For example, the majority of interventions after 1990 were authorised.  This includes 
the landmark decision for intervention in Somalia (Security Council Summit Statement 
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because different interests can be inconsistent with one another, such as 
laws on the use of force and human rights.  Therefore, how can states 
agree that a particular international legal rule exists, but then understand 
the rights or obligations of that rule in different ways?  Although states 
may agree that the principle of human rights exists (as well as laws on 
the use of force) the obligations under this principle are interpreted 
differently and will affect the protection of civilians.158  This is 
particularly accurate when civilians are caught within intra-state conflict. 
 
Such contestation over the meaning and interpretation of human rights is 
based on external normative grounds which state and international legal 
systems find difficult to reconcile relative to legal authority.159  This 
raises complex questions as to the implementation of human rights in 
both state and international legal systems and how the function of human 
rights may or may not effect legal change at both levels.160  Onuf 
highlights that this is particularly seen when one takes into account there 
are differences between the domestic level and the international level, 
“as the latter lacks the formalization of the former and as we can find, 
therefore more self-referential rules.”161  However, Onuf further notes 
that “law they are, whatever damage this does to the positivist 
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conception of proper legal order” and concludes “that the international 
legal order, although lacking a constitutional template for extrusion of 
legal rules, is very much a legal order,”162 despite the process of 
argumentation that produces legal decisions. 
 
Kratochwil concurs with Onuf with regard to the interpretation of 
international law as being quite different from that of domestic law.  
Kratochwil argues however, “law in international society exists simply 
by virtue of its role in defining the game of international relations.  It 
informs the respective decision makers about the nature of their 
interaction and determines who is an actor; it sets the steps necessary to 
insure the validity of their official acts and assigns weight and priority to 
different claims.”163  Of significance, particularly for this research, 
Kratochwil argues that the international legal process is inextricably 
linked to domestic politics.164   
 
In adopting this perspective, this thesis theorises that, as Tomuschat 
suggests, based upon international law’s “lack of basic democratic 
[autonomous] credentials”,165 resolution of this issue will not be found in 
the framework of the international system but rather in the domestic legal 
framework of the state, since states develop their own legal 
interpretations through state norms and by means of the legal-political 
bodies applying those norms.  This includes the legal beliefs held by 
                                                          
162 Onuf 1985:410. 
163 Kratochwil 1989: 56. 
164 Kratochwil 1989:10-11; Sinclair 2010. 




states and the domestic legal institutions and written sources which 
protect those beliefs.  It is this domestic legal framework which is 
positioned between humanitarian concerns and foreign policy that 
constitutes how decision-makers understand the role and purpose of 
domestic and international law and how this determines foreign policy 
decisions.166  Given that similar factors could plausibly be expected to 
cause different foreign policy actions.  As Most and Starr summarise, in 
other words, policy decisions are significant not only because of their 
substantive outcomes but because of the way those decisions are 
composed by way of legislative and legal text during the course of 
decision-making.167   
  
The Absence of Prescribed Mechanisms 
Based on the fact that there are no prescribed mechanisms in place to 
address interpretation, the assumption that states prescribe a single 
meaning to international law would seem inaccurate since each state 
composes foreign policy with its own approaches and understandings to 
the international environment and would therefore look to different legal 
interpretations and methods toward international law to legitimate its 
foreign policy. 168   
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This interpretive position is strengthened given international law’s 
vagueness, its under-enforced character and its focus on state practice, 
which gives the state a significant advantage in the application stage 
during the formation of foreign policy (as noted in the prior section).169  
These are essential elements when contrasted to other international rules 
with agreed upon mechanisms.  For instance, treaty rules and obligations 
and especially rules in multilateral treaties are prescribed with 
institutional mechanisms for supervision and enforcement.  These 
mechanisms include authority.  Avoidance would therefore be clearly 
visible during implementation of the treaty.170  Nevertheless, since the 
interpretation of the law and its rules are based upon the state and its 
domestic legal framework, the treaty may be limited in its application 
since compliance with the treaty is not the same as enforcement of the 
treaty.171  This is germane to this thesis in light of the fact that no treaty 
implements itself and implementation occurs primarily at the state level. 
 
Adding to the importance of a state’s legal interpretation of international 
law is the flexibility afforded the law-making processes in the late 
twentieth century under the dominance of the West wherein formal 
sources diminished in importance, while at the same time the ‘nterests of 
the international community or humanitarian pressures increasingly 
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gained in status as elements in the development of new international 
legal norms.  This is observed in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.172  The Convention which defines 
genocide in legal terms was adopted in 1948.173  The laws of the 
Convention however were not enforced until 1998 during the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.174  
 
Even with respect to treaty law, one could ask to what extent the existing 
rules of interpretation such as those as set out in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provide an adequate basis for the 
interpretative functions surrounding the complications associated with 
humanitarian challenges in the international community.175  Especially 
since there are “three commonly acknowledged approaches to treaty 
interpretation, which correspond to methods of construction of any legal 
text—including constitutions, statutes, and contracts.” 176  Consequently, 
there is a tendency among various scholars, 177 and even among various 
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tribunals, to rely more on one type of interpretative approach than others 
in arriving at the final interpretation of a treaty provision.178 
 
Moreover, although Article 27 of the Vienna Convention (VCLT) 
establishes an obvious rule in international law that states may not 
neglect their international obligations upon their domestic law.  Article 
27 says nothing about how a state’s domestic legal system should define 
their interpretation of international law into state law, nor does it discuss 
the legal process of international law in domestic law.179  “The [Vienna] 
Convention does not invoke any concept of ‘consideration’ or ‘cause’ for 
the purpose of determining the obligatory effect of treaties.”180  Which as 
this thesis argues is puzzling since systemic pressures must be translated 
through the state’s unit-level variables such as decision-makers' 
perceptions and state structure to assure authority.181 
 
Therefore if the intended role of an enforcement mechanism, such as the 
Vienna Conventions in this instance, is to ensure that international policy 
is implemented but the language of the treaty is ambiguous in certain 
aspects or there is an absence of language, then the strength of its 
enforcement has not been institutional designed to promote consistent 
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standard practice.  This was clearly established in its lack of enforcement 
during the Rwandan genocide and the current arguments concerning the 
Responsibility to Protect and the use of military force in Syria.182 
 
Furthermore, since there are no parameters specified to measure inferred 
standards, to what extent do the existing rules of interpretation such as 
those as set out in the Vienna Convention represent an adequate basis for 
the interpretative functions surrounding the complications associated 
with human rights challenges in the international community? Indeed, 
with the ever-increasing growth of international law, and particularly law 
concerning humanitarian pressures, where do humanitarian intervention 
and its interests in effect interact with a state’s legal behaviour 
concerning the course of action to be taken in the formation of foreign 
policy? 
 
2. How Legal Behaviour Shapes Foreign Policy 
Toward International Law 
 
As Friedman’s states, a state's legal behaviour is shaped by its traditions.  
Legal traditions "comprise a set of common principles, values and 
concepts, a shared discourse and practice and are parts of a particular 
tradition of thought.”183  This set includes sources of law, the way law is 
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created within a particular state, and the application of that law.184  The 
legal tradition of a state will therefore have a central influence on legal 
behaviour subject to the rule of law, resulting in different perspectives 
regarding the course of action to be taken in similar situations.   
 
If one considers that law (domestic and international in the context of 
this thesis) is dealt with through the state’s legal institutions, examining 
the role of domestic law as a constitutive factor in the state’s decision-
making process provides the framework through which decision-makers 
interpret international law.  In this way decision-makers will base their 
decisions on the appropriate form of interpretation based upon their 
beliefs in the role of law, the way law is created and sources of law.  
Each of these aspects clarifies for the state the shape foreign policy will 
take.  This clarification includes the primary purpose of the domestic and 
international laws as recognised within the state; as well as how new law 
is created or existing law is amended.185  For instance, legal tradition 
which understands that changes in law come about through actions 
consistent with changes in society, may interpret international rules in 
the same way.  States where international law has been incorporated into 
the domestic legal system will likely interpret existing international legal 
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rules differently from a state whose legal traditions challenges 
incorporation. 
 
The Legal Systems of France and the United States 
 
National legal systems invariably have particular rules 
for the interpretation of [international] legal norms ..., 
to give uniform effect to their provisions in national 
law irrespective of whether the legal system has a 
dualist or monist approach.186 
 
Monism and dualism are used to describe two different theories of the 
relationship between international law and state law.187  For this reason 
the legal systems of France (monist) and the United States (dualist) were 
chosen to illustrate the thesis position concerning interpretation.188  
France and the United State share many similarities, originating from the 
revolutionary beliefs that form the basis of their state identities.  Both 
states developed however under individual historical circumstances 
which led each to be influenced by distinctive legal and political 
institutions.  Although France and the United States share values inherent 
in most democratic societies with constitutional legal systems, such as 
liberty, equality and justice, the two have very different legal 
perspectives concerning aspects of international law and its 
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application.189  These inherent differences in legal perspective present 
both possibilities and problems for each state’s normative vision given 
that each state has an interpretive belief.190  Consequently, interpretations 
and applications of law made by the two states are different regardless of 
the legal matter.191   
 
Both states will adhere to the rules of international law, but each will 
take a different approach in its interpretation and consideration of 
international law.192  So a certain rule may be valid law in France, but 
not in the United States - which is to say that it satisfies the conditions 
necessary for being law in France but not those pertaining to the United 
States.  This assumes that the content of the rules is the same, but the 
underlying difference is whether the rule meets the criteria of effective 
legality in the relevant jurisdiction.  Effective legality is assessed by 
either the Conseil d'État in France or the State Department Legal Advisor 
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in the United States.193  It is the duty of the legal adviser to counsel the 
government on the existing international law in respect to a particular 
issue or situation, so that state policy does not conflict with international 
law.194 
 
The fundamental differences in judicial control and the ways in which 
the legislature of France and the United States exert authority and thus 
their interpretation and application of international law, forms the core 
basis for the different approaches both states take with respect to 
international law.195  The differences reflected through state norms and 
by means of the legal-political bodies which apply those norms connects 
the historical development of each legal system to the modern view of 
law and determines the ease with which international law is interpreted 
and viewed as part of a modern legal system.   
 
As stated above, to address the practice of legal interpretation and the 
manner in which foreign policy is justified, it is necessary to understand 
the legal perception expressed by each state when addressing 
humanitarian concerns at the international level.  This includes the 
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differences in legal systems.  By itself comparative law therefore remains 
essential when considering communication between different legal 




Since the French Revolution, French law is made only by the 
representatives of the people. This has largely meant the legislature, but 
has also included the executive branch.  Such as when Charles de Gaulle 
enhanced the role of the executive in the legal process after World War 
Two and President Mitterrand during the Rwanda conflict.197  
Accordingly, France relies upon a civil legal system that facilitates the 
inclusion of international legal principles into France’s domestic legal 
framework and constitutes the framework under which France’s 
decision-makers will interpret international law.198   
 
The primary source of law is written law, including the French 
Constitution and the French Codes.  Judicial decisions are not considered 
sources of law and the judiciary does not have the power to interpret 
French law in such a way as to create a new legal principle.199  Academic 
doctrine also has a role in French law but it maintains a certain 
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intermediary status.  There has not been any power afforded the judiciary 
to make or amend law in French history since post-Revolutionary.  
Sources of law may be changed or modified only in the same way they 
were created, through amendment by Parliament.200  Although this lack 
of judiciary power allows for an efficient procedure for making law, the 
development of interpretations of the law are stifled by the prohibitive 
political process inherent in the legislative branch.201   
 
The French Constitution of 1958 also created in France a monist system 
in terms of the incorporation of international law into the domestic legal 
structure.202  An entire section of the French Constitution is devoted to 
international treaties and their role as law in France.203  In the event of a 
conflict between an international treaty and France’s Constitution, 
legislative space is created that allows the Constitution to be amended 
before the international treaty commitment is accepted. Once ratified by 
the Executive or National Assembly, treaties become law in France and 
are treated in the same way as domestic law.   
 
This process facilitates the recognition and application of international 
law into the French legal system.204  Based upon these legal 
characteristics, this thesis expects that France will follow a traditional 
method of interpretation of international law, particularly in cases where 
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the choices are between adopting a long-standing interpretation of 
international law and advocating new interpretations.   
 
 United States 
By contrast, the United States relies upon a common law system which 
utilizes law primarily as a method to protect individual interests, which is 
grounded in legal history.205  The common law system often emphasizes 
the historical development of legal concepts. This leads to the analysis of 
older case precedent in order to determine whether the law is still 
applicable to current societal needs or whether incremental change is 
called for.206  
 
Unlike France, the structure of the United States legal institutions 
“makes incorporation of international law into the domestic system 
difficult.”207  Sources of law are also significantly different.  Although 
Congress is responsible for passing legislation, which is considered the 
law, the highest form of law is that of the United States Constitution.  
For this reason, no legislation, judicial decision nor international legal 
principle can take precedence over the provisions set forth in its 
Constitution.  For instance, because human rights are considered part of 
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the law of the United States, federal courts have jurisdiction over 
international human rights laws as a matter of law under international 
law. As a consequence the interpretation of an international legal 
principle is limited by both the Constitution and the judiciary.208   
 
This authority afforded the judiciary has a large influence on how law is 
created in the United States because creation of law by the judiciary and 
creation of law by the legislature are two very different entities.209  
Unlike the French legal system, the separation of powers includes 
substantial powers for the judiciary, including the power of judicial 
review.210  This difference is characterized by the fact that the courts 
create law based on actions already taken and the legislature debates law 
first and then passes the law.  Even though the Supremacy Clause211 
allows for the automatic incorporation of ratified treaties which places 
them in a position to be applied by the court, legislative approval 
concerning treaties will be influenced by its dependency upon ensuing 
statute and case law.212   
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As a result, this dualist approach to international law means that any 
international agreement not ratified is not automatically incorporated into 
domestic laws.213  This approach is also determined by what is known as 
“American exceptionalism” which can lead to isolationism or 
involvement.  Historically therefore the United States has proved more 
likely than France to apply liberal interpretations toward existing legal 
principles of international law.214 
 
Differences Establishing a Rule of Customary International Law 
The way France and the United States recognise the existence of a rule of 
customary international law through foreign policy is also revealing of 
their differences in their legal systems. These differences are set out in 
contemporary debates concerning issues on the use of force and 
humanitarian intervention.  The United States generally develops more 
of a policy-oriented approach which leads the US to consider its acts and 
behaviours as decisive.215  In applying this approach the United States 
goes beyond France’s legal formalist approach by insisting on the 
primacy of a customary law that is more adapted to specific situations 
and also more directly based on moral and political values.  At the same 
time, and based upon the French formalist legal system, France engages 
in a more restrictive interpretation of the material aspect of customary 
law so as not to systematically devalue the formal text as such.216 
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For research purposes within this study, this means that in France 
because the French Constitution fixes the hierarchy of laws and rules 
within the French legal system, the interpretation of use of force and/or 
human rights should rely upon the statutes as written for that time period.  
In the French case studies, policy decisions are therefore expected to be 
devoted to the content of the law as written. This is based on the fact that 
international law is recognised in French law and it is considered a 
binding source of law in the same way the constitution or civil codes are 
considered binding.  This is perceived as a commitment in law that is 
tied to the responsibility of maintaining an existing situation even though 
that existing situation may be considered unsatisfactory.217   
 
The 1958 French Constitution effectively deals with human rights as 
applied in French law.  However, Africa is also integrated into the 
French Constitution which will present a legal conflict for France 
between human rights and its ties to Africa.218  That is to say that 
France’s interpretation of human rights will be tied to where it places the 
higher priority – human rights protection or its sphere of influence (pré 
carré).    
 
In the United States cases, the interpretation of a humanitarian situation 
must be compatible with the principles of the Constitution.219  It will be 
necessary to determine what the existing law is [on humanitarian 
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concerns] to decide whether or not to intervene; and then look to 
additional legal material and extract specific rules to support a foreign 
policy decision.  The application of which may be elaborated upon in 
legal-political decisions for human rights protection as well as the use of 
force for that protection from which precedent may adapt new rules 
precipitated by humanitarian concerns.  Thus, it might be expected as a 
result of the US Constitution as well as United States’ interest at the 
time, the use of force and human rights may create a conflict between the 
norms of international law and facts related to the humanitarian situation.  
This will result in different approaches to decisions on whether to use 
military force to intervene or not intervene and will further determine the 
authoritative role of international law in policy decisions. 
 
Ultimately, the issue of how much international law will affect either 
France or the United States’ legal position with respect to laws on human 
rights protection and the use of military force for that protection is 
difficult to ascertain.  While the purpose of international law is that 
relations between states should be governed by customary rules,220 those 
rules are determined by state interest, which is often determined by 
domestic concerns and applicable law.  It is from this position that 
differences relating to interpretation for the use of force as the right of 
the state have become one of the more controversial issues relating to 
                                                          





foreign policy when humanitarian issues arise.221  Whether it is the 
United Nations Charter, or state responsibility under international 
humanitarian law, existing studies222 on the status of international law in 
the legal-political system come from the position that all states accept the 
same meaning of the international legal principle at issue and that all 
actions or non-actions are measured in terms of that single meaning, but 
this position needs to be reconsidered.  Particularly when the 
interpretation of that principle ultimately affects the course of action a 
state may be willing to take in humanitarian intervention.223  As a result, 
obligations under the principle of human rights are interpreted differently 
and will affect the protection of those rights.  
 
Therefore, this thesis assumes that international law is a factor in a 
state’s decision-making process because of a state’s constitutional 
processes, a state’s interpretation of international law is a central 
component of foreign policy formulation and the foundation upon which 
states ultimately act in the international system.  This research analyses 
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how international law is used in decisions to use force in foreign policy, 
not whether it is used, since this will ultimately determine the course of a 
state’s foreign policy.   
 
3. International Legal Study and Foreign Policy Analysis 
Traditional methodological approaches are somewhat limited in scope 
when analysing the current relationship between international law and 
foreign policy due to globalisation, threats to peace, and more diverse 
security issues.  McClelland and Pfaltzgraff note that “theories of 
international relations were notably deficient in their ability to predict the 
end of the Cold War.  Moreover, the dramatic and accelerating changes 
that have transformed the world since the end of the 20th century have 
enhanced the problems inherent in developing accurate appraisals of the 
world in its international aspect.”224  This is witnessed in the 
humanitarian case studies researched for this study - the Liberian civil 
war (1989), Operation Restore Hope (1992 Somalia), Opération 
Turquoise (1994 Rwanda) and the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-
present).225  Knowledge about both domestic and international norms and 
institutions, as well as the interrelationships between them, becomes 
critical to fully understanding the ways in which law both restrains and 
empowers states in their pursuit of national and international security.   
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This is of importance when considering that the traditional understanding 
of international law is based upon the function of the law as implied and 
not upon its interpretative nature.226  Criticisms of this concept include 
its rigidity and a focus on informed consent227 without acceptance of, or 
allowance for, interpretation, despite the fact that the mere enactment of 
a law by a political institution does not imply the acceptance of all such 
laws as legitimate and binding.228   
 
When analysing international law as specified in the United Nations 
Charter, one can see that humanitarian intervention is not compatible 
with the Charter.  This is witnessed in the rules on use of force and 
human rights.  Humanitarian intervention is also not considered a rule 
(norm) of international law.229  (This gives credence to Chesterman’s 
argument that humanitarian intervention, as a legal concept, is 
incoherent.)230  Consequently, there are no established internal 
mechanisms to provide for its effectiveness.  Therefore as this thesis 
suggests, it is necessary to provide a framework identifying when the 
rules of humanitarian intervention become effective within foreign 
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policy due to international law’s dependent characteristics.231 A 
framework would need to address how humanitarian intervention is 
recognised within the state’s legal structure.  Is it through legislative 
enactments or judicial decisions?  Are new rules concerning 
humanitarian intervention interwoven with the old rules of human rights 
and sovereignty or do they extend beyond the traditional concepts of 
human rights and sovereignty?  
 
In addition the theoretical framework must also consider that since the 
use of military force in humanitarian intervention or non-intervention is 
fundamentally a domestic decision, the relevance of perceived threats 
outside a state’s sovereignty must also be taken into account.  How does 
a state interpret a rule of international law that involves the simultaneous 
application of laws on the protection of human rights and the use of force 
for human rights protection given that the United Nations Charter itself 
highlights the confusion between sovereignty, independence and equality 
of states on the one hand, and the need for the international community 
to ensure peace and security on the other?232   
 
Finding a balance is of significance since both the right to sovereignty 
and the ensuring of peace and security require a discussion of legality for 
intervention.  Thus, the relationship between international law and 
foreign policy requires construction of the rules of international law 
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within the domestic legal-policy process.  Donnelly has explained that 
this relationship is based upon a domestic,  
legal system that tells us at any given point in time which 
rights are considered most fundamental in society.  Even if 
human rights are thought to be inalienable…rights still have 
to be identified by human beings and codified into the 
domestic legal system.233 
 
Consequently since many human rights treaties do not contain 
enforcement mechanisms,234 the interpretation of a principle of 
international law into the domestic legal system is required so that 
international law becomes binding on domestic authorities.235  In some 
circumstances however a state may not be willing to obey a principle of 
international law which inevitably becomes a source of tension during 
decision-making. 
 
Tension between International Law and Foreign Policy    
The tension between international law and foreign policy has promoted 
debate about whether international law is irrelevant to state policy or 
whether it actually influences it.236  Noortmann has noted that previous 
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research has not settled the debate.237  Onuf writes: “[l]aw cannot cause 
action in any meaningful way; instead, law operates so as to provide 
reasons for action. It does not have a single defining characteristic”238  
Abbott argues the “theorization of the relationship of international law to 
the broader political system of which it is a sub-system should be of 
relevance to scholars of international law and international relations.”239 
 
Responding to these arguments Charlotte Ku maintains “a continuation 
of the gap that exists between those who focus on international law and 
those who focus on international relations continue to present a barrier to 
research.”240  Brunnée and Toope discuss how some international 
lawyers express concern about interdisciplinary dialogue with 
international relations. “These lawyers articulate the need for legal 
autonomy.  For them, law’s goal is to shape and judge behavior, and not 
primarily to explain or predict behavior, which they take to be the 
purpose of IR [international relations] theorizing.  It is feared that to 
draw the two fields together will inevitably result in a watering down of 
law‘s ability to provide an external critique of social interaction.”241  In 
contrast David Forsythe argues that: “too often public international law 
                                                          
237 “[T]hese projects failed or lost momentum of over time for different reasons” 
Noortmann 2012:6).  Hurd 2009; see also, Wiessner & Willard (1999:316-334) “Policy 
oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World 
Public Order of Human Dignity”; and Baubérot (2000) Histoire de la laïcité française 
(normative models in French governance). 
238 Onuf 2013:111. 
239 Kenneth W. Abbott ‘Symposium on Method in International Law: International 
Relations Theory, International Law and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal 
Conflicts’ (1999) American Society of International Law 338.  Shirley Scott  also 
discusses this in ‘Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and 
International Politics’ (1984)  5 European Journal of International Law, 313. 
240 Ku 2010; also see Westra 2017. 




has been taught as if it were just another black-letter law course whose 
subject matter was about as straightforward as the federal income tax 
code.... Unless we reestablish the integral connection between the study 
of international law and the practice of international relations.”242 
 
Despite this apparent tension Coleman and Hurd have argued that the 
interpretation of international law through a state’s domestic legal 
environment is frequently overlooked.243  It is therefore often necessary 
to discover a state’s position on international law by examining its 
domestic legislation and legal sources.244  Consequentially, international 
law differs from domestic law in ways that affect, but do not eliminate, 
its ability to influence state behaviour.245   
 
The primary distinction between domestic law and international law is 
that international law often lacks an enforcement mechanism.  Legal 
systems based upon tradition and cultural differences, discussed 
previously in this chapter, also make the interpretation and application of 
international law difficult.  As a consequence one could question whether 
the rules of international law can be considered applicable law if they are 
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not translated into the domestic legal framework where there is greater 
potential for application and obligation.246   
 
This is not to argue that contemporary writings fail to engage in criticism 
of foreign policy and international law.  Quite to the contrary; criticism is 
not hard to find, particularly when directed at the misuse of international 
law or the failure of the international system to solve problems 
associated with the compliance and implementation of international law.  
However, these criticisms are generally concerned with refining accepted 
norms and standards and in this sense the criticism appears to be 
restricted to arguments about particular theories and beliefs, instead of 
investigating the ways in which decisions are actually legitimated and 
presented for authorisation at the state level.247   
 
This observation remains relevant.  Not only do arguments regarding the 
applicability of international law underlie legal debates on the cases 
under review in this study - Operation Restore Hope, Opération 
Turquoise and the ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire – but the prolonged 
violence in Syria has raised new debate on this same problem.248  Issues 
concerning the international community's responsibility to intervene for 
the protection of civilians caught in regional crisis are raised.  
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Specifically legal issues relating to decisions to intervene with the use of 
military force for civilian protection as well as concerns on non-
intervention, issues which are discussed further in section three. 
 
Brunnée and Toope were correct to note that whilst both Onuf and 
Kratochwil attempted to “posit an important role for international law in 
helping to construct the identities of sovereign states and in shaping their 
behaviour.  Yet they failed to allow the full scope for the influence of 
law because they were constrained by their implicit adoption of the 
framework of positivism.”249 Subsequently Hans Morgenthau raised the 
question in Politics Among Nations as to whether it is possible to assume 
that international law imposes legal restraints upon individual nations 
while at the same time national sovereignty precludes these same nations 
from being subject to legal restraints remains of relevance today.250   
 
Similarly, the argument as to whether international law is really law and 
the argument about how to clarify the relationship between an individual 
state’s foreign policy and international law, are not unrelated.   The view 
that international law is not law dates back to the nineteenth century 
English jurist John Austin, who argued in An Essay on Sovereignty “that 
international law is merely a set of moral principles with no binding 
force.”251  As we later came to know the question of what international 
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law is, would be superseded with the emergence of the Danish Institute 
Report (1999) and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (2001).  The 
question of the conceptualisation of international law at the domestic 
level and its effectiveness however remained unanswered.    
 
It stands to reason that clarification of the relationship between an 
individual state’s foreign policy and international law can be witnessed 
in the allocation of power in the normative legal aspects of the decision-
making process to interpret and apply the principles of international law.  
This will reinforce the relationship used to govern state behaviour 
particularly when an external source defines a state’s sense of what 
constitutes legitimate action within a state’s established normative 
system of rules.252   
 
Indeed, given that domestic uncertainty concerning authority will leave 
the decision-makers unclear about where to focus their strategies on 
decisions to use force or non-intervention, international law will play a 
role in regulating the interaction between the state and its position in the 
international system, through the state’s domestic legal framework.  
(This was particularly true in the early 1990s when no formal legal or 
political guidelines/mechanisms for humanitarian intervention decisions 
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were in place.)253  Noortmann has argued, correctly, that the implications 
of international law upon foreign policy should encourage dialogue 
between the two disciplines, especially in the areas of legitimate 
humanitarian needs and security concerns.254  Therefore it is necessary to 
reconcile different institutional processes – law and politics - that interact 
simultaneously in foreign policy. 
 
Rethinking State Power:  Neoclassical Realism & Legal Study 
Donnelly has stated that traditional concepts of realism in international 
relations theory attempt to reduce law to politics.255  Tunkin agrees, 
stating that “the realist approach to foreign policy means that one must 
achieve one’s objectives in foreign policy by any means, without taking 
into account principles of law.”256  The problem is that law and politics 
involve different institutional processes that interact simultaneously in 
foreign policy.  Thus as Forsythe asserts “it is wrong to think of either 
international or domestic law as a set of technical rules divorced from 
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politics. Since both international law and domestic law results from a 
political process.”257 
 
Unlike other theories of international relations,258 the thesis argues that 
neoclassical realism, with its emphasis on the domestic level of 
analysis,259 can clarify international law’s effectiveness on foreign policy 
through the state’s domestic legal institutions.  As the empirical studies 
of this research determine, neoclassical realism provides a viable 
enforcement mechanism for states to determine how domestic-level 
legal-political processes are capable of assisting systemic information 
through foreign policy.  In that state law will mediate the tension 
between the rules of international law and foreign policy and as such will 
fuse with international law to effect policy within a particular state.  The 
implications of which are significant concerning issues of authority and 
the legality of enforcement for foreign policy decisions about human 
rights and the protection of those rights.260 
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As this thesis suggests, the effectiveness of how international law 
determines the course of a state’s foreign policy rests upon the complex 
and sometimes contradictory nature of international legal principles and 
of a state’s legal framework.  This framework consists of the domestic 
institutions and norms clearly present within individual states.  This 
includes sources of law, the way law is created within an individual state, 
and how state law should function.  This legal familiarity will therefore 
have a central influence on behaviour subject to the rule of law, resulting 
in different perspectives regarding the course of action to be taken in 
similar situations.  Consequently, the conduct of states will differ from 
the expectations of the international system due to limitations inherent to 
any state’s legal institution and which cannot be overcome at the 
international level.261  These differences are based upon the interpretation 
of facts, the values ascribed to each state’s legal position, and on the 
substantive limits that legislatures have enacted or on which courts have 
ruled at the domestic level.262   
 
Therefore the traditional concepts of realism, which tend to leave little 
space for the operation of law,263 are wrong to reduce law to politics.  
Because legal institutions are deemed as normative power structures 
rather than descriptive power,264 that normative power structure may 
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transform domestic knowledge and preferences in ways that demonstrate 
how the interpretation of international legal principles are regulated 
differently by different states.  This is further established by 
Kratochwil’s argument above that the international legal process is 
inextricably linked to politics.265  This will be demonstrated by the 
comparative research into the foreign policies of France and the United 
States contained in section four.  When conditioned with issues of 
legality surrounding humanitarian intervention, the power of 
international law’s effectiveness is tied to the state’s domestic use of 
familiar internal legal resources that individual decision-makers will 
unquestionably understand as correct and valid.  These legal resources 
are measurable and predictable and have the ability to control policy 
outcomes. 
 
Christopher Hill extends this argument to the policy-making arena by 
arguing that policy is made within context of a ‘policy paradigm’.266 As 
summarised by Hay, “Hall asserts that, policymakers customarily work 
within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the 
goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain 
them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing … this framework is embedded in the very terminology 
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through which decision makers communicate about their work, and it is 
influential … this interpretive framework [is] a policy paradigm.”267 
 
Applying neoclassical realism268 to legal study can therefore clarify 
expectations regarding the normative aims of international law and the 
state’s interpretive process involving the simultaneous application of 
laws on the use of force and attention to human rights.  The fundamental 
tenets of neoclassical realism are that foreign policy is an outcome of 
both international structure and domestic factors, as well as of a complex 
interaction between the two.269  As Rose explains, “neoclassical realism 
argues that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven 
first and foremost by the country's relative material power.  Yet it 
contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is 
indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated 
through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers' 
perceptions and state structure.”270   
 
Adding further support to this perspective Jeffrey Taliaferro writes:  
That the strength of “domestic power structures act to 
condition the ability and willingness of policy leaders to 
provide ‘strategic leadership’ on behalf of convergence 
with systemic power shifts,“271 “such as how power is 
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perceived and how states mobilize the internal resources 
necessary to pursue their foreign or security policies.272   
 
Consequently, “power cannot be solely calculated on the basis of 
material factors.”273 
 
In this way, neoclassical realism provides a viable enforcement 
mechanism for states to determine how domestic level processes are 
capable of assisting systemic information (in this study, humanitarian 
principles) through foreign policy.  This specific underlying mechanism, 
which positions how the interpretative process is established and 
operates between humanitarian concerns and foreign policy, constitutes 
the essential differences in how the role and purpose of international law 
will be decided by both France and the United States.  This is because 
neoclassical realism concentrates not only on the content of the legal 
rules but also considers how those legal rules are strategically applied to 
justify and substantiate humanitarian concerns in foreign policy.274  
 
For example, both France and the United States will attempt to recognise 
and interpret the international legal principles involving humanitarian 
decisions through their own internal legal resources.  International legal 
principles, such as human rights and sovereignty, are recognised under 
customary international law, and accepted in both U.S. and French law.  
The human rights of another country however are not considered legally 
binding per se when considered outside the U.S. context.   
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In France, as mentioned previously, Africa is included in French law 
(Article 72 of the 1958 French Constitution) and will be an important 
consideration when considering issues of legality surrounding 
humanitarian intervention decisions.  An example of this and central to 
the thesis argument is the Rwanda crisis, which will present a legal 
conflict for France between human rights and its ties to Africa.  In 
France’s interpretation of human rights protection, French laws and its 
bi-lateral agreements and security commitments towards the 
Habyarimana regime effectively weakened the influence of humanitarian 
concerns, despite the genocidal nature of the civil war.   
 
In adapting neoclassical realism, with its emphasis on the domestic level 
of analysis, state power can no longer be limited to material factors 
because legal institutions also exert power.  Thus, as a point of analysis, 
this research stresses that the allocation of power in the decision-making 
process can be witnessed in the power of a state’s legal framework.  This 
framework consists of a state’s legal sources and the state’s strategic use 
of legal reasoning and legal argument.  A legal strategy associated with 
the capabilities of states to interpret, apply and execute the principles of 
international law with state law, which in turn justifies and controls 
foreign policy outcomes.  As noted above, this is based on the 
understanding that the function of any legislative or court system is the 




to claim that law lacks power illustrates a shallow understanding of legal 
concepts at both the state and international level.   
 
This thesis’ approach therefore considers a variation in the traditional 
meaning of power and rule structures inherent in realist theory, which 
has traditionally measured power in terms of military capabilities or 
economic strength.  The originality behind this approach is that it 
recognises that state power is not limited to its material factors but also 
draws upon its internal resources, such as sources of law (which re-
enforce a state’s normative power structures) and the strategic 
capabilities involved in the interpretation and application of the 
principles of international law.   
 
While neoclassical realism has been used only for theories of foreign 
policy thus far, if this approach is taken seriously, the author anticipates 
that new forms of analysis will emerge that will reconstruct the concepts 
of law (in the decision-making environment) to focus less on individual 
state preferences in foreign policy and more on how domestic legal 
institutions shape and redirect those preferences and may exert power in 




This section has presented the legal framework underpinning the thesis.  
For the benefit of this study, this section has advanced the importance of 
interpretation and how the use of interpretation carries the ability to 




reasons for differences in interpretation lie within the differences in the 
legal systems of France and the United States.275  These differences 
determine how domestic law shapes foreign policy toward international 
law.  Ronald Dworkin’s views on the interpretative nature of law and 
argument on the role of sources in law supports this position.276 Christian 
Tomuschat’s assertions regarding international law’s dependent 
characteristics would indicate that states utilize this dependency to 
construct international law effectively within foreign policy.277  
 
Following the thesis’ position on the importance of interpretation, 
Chapter Three argued that despite changes in the international 
environment existing studies have only begun to evaluate critically the 
influence of international law in a state’s domestic legal structures when 
explaining foreign policy.   
 
Neoclassical realism was also introduced to address the relationship 
between law and foreign policy.278  In its adaption of neoclassical 
realism, the research has considered a variation in the traditional 
meaning of power and rule structures inherent in realist theory, wherein 
power has traditionally been measured in terms of military 
capabilities,279 and considers that the allocation of power in the decision-
making process can be witnessed in the power of a state’s legal 
framework.  As a point of analysis, this research stresses that law, as a 
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state’s internal resource, is important in the domestic decision-making 
environment because legal institutions exert power.280 This approach will 
inform an understanding of how state and international law interact 
simultaneously in foreign policy to effect humanitarian concerns. 
 
In the often-quoted terms of Robert Cox, “theory is always for someone 
and for some purpose,” 281 and the theories outlined in the methodology 
that follows are no different.   The next section outlines the theoretical 
components of comparative foreign policy analysis and neoclassical 
realism, which underpin the argument of this thesis; which is then 
followed by a survey of the methodology.  
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The Theoretical Framework and 
Methodology 
 
Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis  
and Neoclassical Realism  
or “You Can’t Have Your Parsimony 
and Eat it Too.” 
 




II. Constructing a Methodology 
This section has two specific aims: first, to identify the rationale for the 
use of comparative foreign analysis, and second, to argue for an 
approach using neoclassical realism, the components of the theoretical 
framework underpinning this thesis.  Chapter Four identifies the 
rationale for the use of comparative foreign policy analysis, which allows 
the thesis to explain the various differentials that led the United States 
and France to adopt specific positions and approaches on intervention as 
official policy. Chapter Five briefly critiques four mainstream theories of 
international relations that the author considers dominate the foreign 
policies of France and the United States: realism, liberalism, English 
School and constructivism.  Additional consideration is given to 
constructivism in view of its traditional understanding of anarchy as put 
forward by such theorists as Alexander Wendt in international relations 
which this research challenges. 
 
The previous section dealt with the legal framework, this section takes 
the subject further, offering a methodological focus on legal study and 
foreign policy analysis. Which shows how decisions to intervene or not 
to intervene are, in part, determined by a state’s interpretation of a rule of 
international law in shaping the structure of authority and legitimacy 
within the decision-making process.  This leads to Chapter Six, the 
methodological process, which includes the formulation of the research 
questions and hypotheses that this thesis will test in the form of 




              4. Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis 
To explain the methodology used in this research, it is necessary to 
outline the approaches and theories which guide the choice of method to 
answer the set research questions.  The questions raised in this research 
fall within a subfield of international relations known as comparative 
foreign policy analysis.282  Comparative foreign policy is substantiated 
by empirical evidence and links the study of domestic politics - the 
conduct and practice of relations between different states – to the 
international system.283   
 
The origins of comparative foreign policy date back to the 1950’s.284  
The approach is built upon three definitive positions: first, Snyder, Bruck 
                                                          
282 The literature on the relationship between international relations theory, foreign 
policy and foreign policy analysis is extensive.  For instance: “theory remains essential 
for diagnosing events, explaining their causes, prescribing responses, and evaluating the 
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explanation of foreign policy” (Steven Smith ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and 
International Relations’ (1987) 16(2) Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
345:348).  International relations theories concentrate on the impact of the international 
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‘Foreign policy decision making revisited’ Palgrave 2002; Laura Neack, Jeanne Hey 
and Patrick Haney (eds.) Foreign policy analysis Prentice Hall 1995; Fearon 1998 
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283 As evidenced by Lantis and Beasley 2017:4; Beasley 2013; Treacher 2013; Hill 
2003; Fearon 1998; Chilcote 1994; Rosenau 1966, 1980; Smith 1987.  Moreover, the 
study of comparative foreign policy has expanded and benefited from many other 
disciplines as it grew as a field of research Hudson 2007 and Valerie M. Hudson,  
‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International 
Relations’ (March 2005) 1, Issue 1 Foreign Policy Analysis 1.   
284 Originators include: Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin Decision-
Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics  Foreign Policy Analysis 
Project Series No. 3) Princeton University Press 1954; Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck 
and Burton Sapin. Foreign policy decision making revisited  Palgrave 2002; Margaret 
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Politics Princeton Center for International Studies, Research Monography No. 30, 
1956; Roseenau 1966 and Rosenau, James N. ‘Comparative Foreign Policy: One-Time 
Fad, Realized Fantasy and Normal Field’ in International Events and the Comparative 




and Sapin suggest research needs to be based on observations below the 
state level, of those actually involved.285  Second, Hudson states that it is 
necessary to observe the international and operational environment or 
context as it is perceived and interpreted by decision-makers.286  Third, 
the study of foreign policy is rendered more methodologically precise by 
analysing events “in terms of independent, intervening, and dependent 
variables that are operational and manipulable.”287  These approaches 
afforded an explanation as to how to understand foreign policy as a 
process beyond systemic oriented explanations or outputs.288  In, as this 
thesis suggests, a mechanism is provided to “situate events and to 
interpret problems, as a way to mobilize and guide social action, and to 
suggest possible resolutions to current plights.”289  Consequently, by 
focusing on analysis at the domestic level, comparative foreign policy 
analysis is able to explain the actions and decisions not of systems, but of 
individual laws and decision-makers, as it systematically attempts to 
contrast and compare foreign policy decisions.290   
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Robert Jervis Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton 
University Press 1976; Cottam (1977) Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory 
and a Case Study.  
287 Rosenau 1980:119. 
288 Snyder, et al.2002; Sprout & Sprout 1957; Rosenau 1966; Chilcote 1994.  
289 James Rosenau ‘The External Environment as a Variable in Foreign Policy 
Analysis’ in The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy Nichols Publishing 1980:15.  See 
also James N. Rosenau Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and 
Continuity Princeton University Press 1990. 
290 Foreign policy analysis is “first and foremost interested in explaining how and why . 
. . decisions came about” (Marijke Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative 
Introduction Springer 2007:164); Valerie M. Hudson and Cristopher S. Vore ‘Foreign 
Policy Analysis: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’ (1995) 39 Mershon International 






If one considers that recent threats to international stability and security 
are about the inability of states to govern effectively within their own 
region.291  Contributed to by choices about international security made 
by state decision-makers, raising questions concerning legitimacy;292 
how do states, or more specifically, the decision-makers and institutions 
that act on a state’s behalf, perceive and assess international threats?  
Especially since the structure of the state “contributes to cohesion and 
fragmentation, and it can affect the way one state responds to a threat as 
compared to another responding to the same threat.”293  An explanation 
is needed to identify points of interaction between different legal regimes 
and the interpretive process during policy formation.  Such an 
explanation can provide foundations upon which to understand domestic 
and international phenomena during decision-making.294   
 
Despite the historical connections between France and the United States 
in Africa, their responses to the same external threats have been quite 
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different.  Comparative study of the foreign policies of France and the 
United States will provide a legal-political analysis of foreign policy 
outcomes on humanitarian interventions based on the interactions of 
comparable states, each with its own existing domestic legal framework, 
when faced with the same systemic pressures.   
 
As is known, domestic level variables will constrain or facilitate the 
ability of all states to respond to international crises, yet theories about 
how international and domestic law interact within foreign policy do not 
always recognise the complexities between international legal principles 
and different states’ legal frameworks.295  The explanation of which 
Rosenau argues requires a theory that integrates system-level and unit-
level variables between systemic pressures and foreign policy.296  
Neoclassical realism with its emphasis on the domestic level of analysis 
is able to integrate international legal principles on foreign policy 
outcomes because the domestic legal framework positions how the 
interpretative process operates between international law and foreign 
policy.297  Comparative foreign policy’s premise as to the necessity of 
analysing an occurrence in terms of independent, intervening, and 
dependent variables is, therefore, compatible with neoclassical realism’s 
                                                          
295 Forsythe 1990; Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood  1998; Tesón 2006; Kaarbo 2015. 
296 Rosenau 1980; Rose 1998:51; Taliaferro agrees with this position, he suggests “state 
power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic 
society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to 
pursue.  Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level 
variables” (Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical 
Realism and the Resource-Extractive State’ (July–September 2006) 15, no. 3 Security 
Studies 464. 
297 Thesis Chapter 3 p:77-84 (Neoclassical Realism & Legal Study); Thesis Chapter 1, 




basic theoretical structure: distribution of power in the international 
system (independent/systemic variable),  domestic perception and/or 
domestic institutions (intervening variable), foreign policy decision 
(dependent variable).”298  As such this theoretical framework becomes a 
viable research tool for this thesis and will inform an understanding of 
how essential differences in a state’s legal framework, its sources of law 
and strategic use of interpretation, affect how France and the United 
States shape the structure of authority and legitimacy to effect 
humanitarian concerns through the examination of unit level factors 
during decision making.299  Which, as noted previously, something other 
theoretical approaches are unable to do.300 
 
By focusing on the domestic level as an intervening variable, 
neoclassical realism is better suited to this study because the research is 
able to illustrate how comparative foreign policy analysis can explain the 
actions and decisions of individual decision-makers, not systems, as the 
analysis methodically attempts to contrast and compare the legal aspects 
of foreign policy decisions.  For instance, comparative foreign policy 
analysis can explain the various differential factors that led to the United 
States and France’s adoption of their specific positions and approaches 
on intervention as official policy in Africa in the 1990s.  This clearly 
concurs with Jessup’s assertion that “it is not the state which acts: it is 
always specific sets of decision-makers and state officials located in 
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specific parts of the state system;”301 and Hill’s, “foreign policy can 
never be abstracted from the domestic context out of which it springs.”302  
So a domestic level focus is integral to understanding how states can 
agree that a particular international legal rule exists but then understand 
the rights or obligations of that rule in different ways. 
 
This comparative analysis also brings in its wake an analytical problem.  
As Marijke Breuning asserts “leaders [often] make analogies on the basis 
of superficial commonalities while ignoring significant differences 
between situations.”303  These differences become evident in the 
empirical chapters which present evidence relative to the inconsistencies 
underlying the foreign policy decisions of the United States and France 
concerning Rwanda.  Particularly as it was without hesitation that both 
states intervened in Somalia in 1992 (United States)304 and were later to 
intervene in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (France).305  Stephen Van Evera has 
argued “conflict is made much more likely by states’ frequent 
misperception of international conditions, their own capabilities, and the 
intentions of other states.”306  As the empirical chapters will illustrate, 
drawing correlations between different conflicts based upon previous 
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situations can prove to be problematic in that it may cause a negative 
influence and/or exacerbate the situation.  Particularly when domestic 
level processes are not considered for humanitarian concerns when 
producing foreign policy, which neoclassical realism is able to do. 
 
Establishing Legal Precedent in Foreign Policy? 
This complexity also draws attention to insufficient legal analysis and 
clarification of legal issues at both the state and international levels when 
considering that states will need to integrate international legal rules to 
construct policy within an existing domestic legal framework.307  From 
within this same context, it also becomes questionable whether the norm 
of humanitarian intervention, if established at the international level, will 
indeed establish precedent at the state level, and vice versa.  This 
research ascertains that this was evident in Somalia when international 
humanitarian principles were publicly expressed by the United States and 
Western leaders to justify intervention, and to a certain extent limited the 
principle of sovereignty, when invoking Chapter 7 of the United Nations 
Charter.308  At the state level this precedent is obscured because analysis 
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is situated only at the international level.309 The analysis of “Security 
Council Resolutions are the common legal instrument … to make a 
recommendation or statement, recall a fact, express an opinion, or 
undertake any other matter of substance.  The importance of Security 
Council resolutions, combined with their infrequent invocation and 
extensive vocabulary, demonstrates a necessity for creating a hierarchical 
classification system internationally.”310 This is obvious in the 
comparison of Operation Provide Comfort311 which provided 
humanitarian and security assistance to the Kurds in Northern Iraq, with 
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.  Therefore, prior readings narrowly 
analyse the constraints of domestic law and ignore significant legal 
differences between situations. 
 
Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis and Neoclassical Realism 
Incorporating the comparative approach of foreign policy analysis into 
neoclassical realism allows the research to make parallel contrasts and 
subsequently determine how French decision-makers perceived France 
and its place in Africa in contrast to the United States, and how 
perceptions varied from Mitterrand to Chirac and G.W. Bush to Clinton.  
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This theoretical approach is able to focus on the domestic decision-
making environment between the international system and foreign 
policy, which will then identify and analyse how humanitarian pressures 
are translated through each state’s legal structures and its decision-
makers.312  Defining the “range of legitimate methods available in the 
international system,”313 which ultimately affects the course of action a 
state may be willing to take in humanitarian intervention decisions.314 
 
This incorporation of approaches further allows the thesis to explain the 
variances between individual decision-makers’ perceptions in relation to 
perceived security threats, and how adequate legal analysis at the state 
level aided humanitarian intervention decisions.315  As a result we 
understand a state’s legal behaviour – in particular how principles of 
international law interact with domestic law to regulate the interaction 
between the state and its position in the international system.  Thus it 
become possible to understand why France abandoned its non-
intervention policy in Côte d’Ivoire, thereby lending support to the 
foreign policy shaped by President Chirac’s government,316 while the 
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United States felt that Africa posed no direct threat to either the United 
States or world security.317   
 
Clearly then, for this research, applying comparative foreign policy 
analysis and neoclassical realism to the stated research question(s) is 
helpful in establishing differences between France and the United States 
regarding:  
• Casual factors relevant to the interpretation and application of 
international law and its principles;318  
• the study of differences in legal systems – including the domestic 
legal institutions and sources which protect those beliefs;319 and 
• when addressing the complex relationship between different legal 
regimes and the process of legal interpretation in foreign policy, to 
distinguish the effectiveness of international law in shaping the 
structure of authority and legitimacy within the decision-making 
process.320   
 
5. Old School vs. New School: Neoclassical Realism 
Beavis notes that “international Relations theory entails the development 
of conceptual frameworks and theories to facilitate the understanding and 
explanation of events and phenomena in world politics, as well as the 
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analysis and informing of associated policies and practices.”321  While 
theories may start from the same assumption (anarchy for example), each 
theory will reach different conclusions with different explanations.322  
Conversely there are different beliefs with regard to the use of force for 
the protection of human rights.  For instance, the use of force is generally 
explained based upon traditional realist assumptions.323  According to 
Donnelly, the study of realism has traditionally focused on power in 
international relations theory and in the traditional Westphalian system 
where the state is seen as having the most power based upon the legal 
concept of sovereignty.324  Critics of realism such as Elman acknowledge 
the basic components of realism but find that in several respects the 
theory lacks adequate precision and rigor.325  Keohane proposes that 
realist thoughts are contradictory between power struggles and aspects of 
cooperation.326  While Snidal puts forward “power plays a key role in 
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realism but the correlation between power and political output is not 
compelling, calling for an enrichment of other variables in the analysis of 
the international system.”327  Therefore if one considers that most 
conflicts since the early 1990s, and before, have been fought within 
states rather than between states, traditional assumptions of realism may 
not always be applicable because the assumed obligations under realism 
may affect the protection of civilians in conflict situations.   
 
As post-Cold War conflicts are re-identified, so too must approaches to 
international relations theory within foreign policy.328  Re-identification 
creates a period in which competing approaches of international relations 
theories emerge.  Space is therefore created by the failure of the old 
theoretical pattern and replaced with new theoretical patterns.329  As 
Benton and Craib argue, the result is the identification of new research 
and analysis which leads to original and innovative policies,330 (thus 
providing a basis for this thesis’ theoretical approach).  Consequently, 
competing perspectives in international relations theories portray 
important aspects of a state’s foreign policy in world politics.331  
Questions within French and United States foreign policy regarding the 
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use of force – “its legitimacy, its utility, its desirability”,332 beg other 
questions about what legal safeguards or factors motivate foreign policy 
behaviour.  For instance, how was foreign policy reflected within sub-
Saharan Africa, especially since, as noted before, effective humanitarian 
intervention was made unlikely for geopolitical reasons in that region 
between 1989 and 2002.333 
  
One objective of this research is to identify differences in the legal 
decision process between states concerning security threats involving 
intervention through the domestic legal framework.334  As previously 
mentioned, the United States does not consider human rights outside of 
the U.S. context as legally binding.335  In France however Africa is 
included in French law336 and will be an important consideration when 
considering issues of human rights.  For this reason, a set of explanatory 
foreign policy rationales are developed for each conflict analysis, by 
applying neoclassical realism to the decision-making process of both 
states.  These rationales will establish how France and the United States 
responded to each humanitarian threat, to determine whether certain 
behaviour patterns regarding a state’s decision-makers, its legal 
institutions and the different outcomes they produce fit within this theory 
approach better than different theoretical approaches when explaining 
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“the intentions, statements, and actions of an actor [state] ... when 
directed towards the external world.” 337   
 
As Rose contends by way of neo-classical realism, “the impact of power 
capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic 
pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables 
such as decision-makers' perceptions and state structure.”338  It is in 
following this premise and drawing on its complexity, that this research 
adopts an understanding of Taliaferro’s assertion that “power cannot be 
solely calculated on the basis of material factors;”339 Zakaria’s 
neoclassical realism position that “other elements of power must be 
considered, such as how states mobilize the internal resources necessary 
to pursue their foreign or security policies,”340 which is corroborated by 
Schweller who argues “states with more effective internal structures are 
going to be able to facilitate the extraction and conversion of resources 
more usefully than others.”341  To be more precise, in adopting these 
positions, this research asserts that the allocation of power can be 
witnessed in the power of states to interpret, apply and argue principles 
associated with legal rules.   In allocating space to the interpretative 
process though the state’s unit-level variables, neoclassical realism 
identifies the way a state manages systemic information (humanitarian 
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concerns) and how systemic information influences the state’s ability to 
interpret societal demands and respond to them effectively.   
 
In light of this assertion, “the most trenchant criticism of neoclassical 
realism has come from Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik342  They 
argue that the central problem with neoclassical realism is that it presents 
“a direct challenge to the theoretical distinctiveness of contemporary 
realism, one with immediate and significant practical implications. … [in 
that] the theoretical core of the realist approach has been undermined by 
its own defenders, in particular neoclassical realists.”343  Further critique 
towards neoclassical realism comes from within the school of Realism 
itself.344  In particular Adam Quinn’s Kenneth Waltz, Adam Smith and 
the Limits of Science: Hard choices for neoclassical realism situates 
itself as a critique to this thesis.345  Quinn argues, “in seeking to identify 
law-like patterns of state behaviour arising from the varied features of 
states themselves, NCR [neoclassical realism] appears to breach the 
outer limits of what Kenneth Waltz, the founding father of structural 
International Relations theory, thought tolerable in a theory of 
international politics.”346   
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However Quinn’s article does not differentiate between “law-like 
patterns” which are conceived at the international level and the 
state/domestic level.   Nor does his argument account for the importance 
of variables at the domestic level.  Instead it insinuates that “law-like 
patterns” are merely ideational factors which this thesis rejects given that 
the research stresses that law, as a state’s internal resource, is important 
in the domestic decision-making environment which thereby shapes 
foreign policy.347  Moreover, neoclassical realism does not seek to 
explain systemic outcomes348 as Waltz does by omitting unit-level 
variables,349 only how foreign policy is derived,350 which is what my 
thesis does.  Consequently, Quinn’s argument does not illustrate that he  
understands what law does in the interaction between different legal 
regimes, given that his argument does not recognise the practical legal 
requirements used to produce foreign policy.351  In opposition to Quinn 
and Waltz, Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “the particular style of legal 
reasoning that pertain to domestic systems cannot exist in international 
society.”352 
 
Neoclassical realism therefore provides a viable enforcement mechanism 
for states to determine how domestic-level legal-political processes are 
capable of assisting systemic information through foreign policy. As 
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such, this assertion will distinguish neoclassical realism from other 
international relations theories. The reason alternative theories of 
international relations are not appropriate for this research will be 
discussed in the following section. The significance of constructivism’s 
traditional understanding of anarchy will also be analysed.353  The crux 
of the constructivist approach to anarchy is often summed up by Wendt’s 
assertion that “anarchy is what states make of it;354 which suggests that 
anarchy is dependent upon the meanings we attach to anarchy at the 
systemic level355 and also assumes states act in a cohesive way in the 
international system.356  Yet, inasmuch as regional conflicts currently 
govern the international system, not conflict between states, and since 
constructivism is based upon norm construction at the international level, 
constructivism would be unable to meet the requirements of the 
humanitarian principles at issue within a state’s decision-making process 
on its own in its analysis of foreign policy in the way that neoclassical 
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The Schools of International Relations Theory 
 
This section will identify why alternative theories of international 
relations are not compatible with the aims of this research, and in doing 
so justify neoclassical realism’s compatibility with comparative foreign 
policy analysis to add value to the current literature. Theories of 
international relations can be divided into positivist/ rationalist and post-
positivist/ reflectivist.358  As discussed in Chapter Two, in the positivist 
conception, power inequalities are rooted in material reality. Hence there 
is objective reality and perception – real facts and perceived facts – and 
the analyst may compare the two.  In the post-positivist sense, perceived 
facts and real facts are one and the same – the ideational is privileged 
over the material.359  General criticisms centre on the nature of the 
international system and its effect on patterns of international outcomes 
such as war and peace or distribution of power.360  With each respective 
theory critiquing each other.  The most predominant challenges in this 
regard are posed by post-positivist’s theorists and include studies 
examining the role of psychological factors in international relations.361  
Stein notes that some of these psychological factors include groupthink, 
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where policymakers tend to make decisions based on “(mis)perceptions 
and analogies, or both.”362   
 
However while due consideration by the author of thesis was given to the 
various theoretical concepts, it is submitted here that four theoretical 
positions dominate the foreign policies of France and the United States:  
the realist, the liberal, the constructivist and the English School 
perspectives.363  The following section briefly reviews and critiques 
these four schools to establish that these theories do not provide a viable 
enforcement mechanism to assist systemic information through foreign 
policy based on their levels of analysis.   
 
Realism 
Various divisions in the realism school highlight analytical controversies 
at the methodological level.364  By definition realism is a broad group of 
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theories which rests on the assumption that states pursue their own 
interests in an anarchic system.  Realists assert that the character of the 
international system is its fundamentally anarchic nature.365  The 
“emphasis on anarchy and power leads them to a dim view of 
international law and international institutions.”366  Realists believe such 
facets of international politics merely reflect the balance of power . . . in 
an anarchic system with no hierarchical authority.367  Brunnée & Toope 
state, “realists believe law will inevitably be trumped by power and 
interest calculations.”368  Law can only be enforced through state 
power.369  This therefore renders international law at the systemic level 
non-binding on the domestic level of analysis.  The realist perspective 
considers the international system primarily in terms of a struggle for 
power, state capabilities, alliances as balance-of-power strategies and the 
threat and use of force.   Although realist theories disagree on the 
motives behind foreign policy behaviour, about the exact meaning of 
power and on how and to what extent politics is likely to influence 
policy. 370  They do agree that the primary determinant lies within the 
systemic level for analysis on the impact of the international system on 
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the behaviour of states.371  This is important  because it means traditional 
realist theories are not able to provide a viable enforcement mechanism 
to assist systemic information through foreign policy.   
 
Classical realism is primarily concerned with the sources and uses of 
national power in international politics and the problems that leaders 
encounter in conducting foreign policy.372  In contrast, the focus of 
neorealism (or structural realism) is on explaining common patterns of 
international behaviour over time.373  The international system is seen as 
a structure acting on the state with individuals below state level acting as 
an agency on the state as a whole.374  While neorealism shares a focus on 
the international system with the English School,375 it differs in 
emphasising the endurance of conflict and how the protection of human 
rights would be procured, and as such is unable to provide clarity for the 
enforcement of international principles found in the domestic legal 
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framework.376  As Waltz and Mearsheimer assert realism further divides 
into defensive realism (Waltz)377 and offensive realism (Mearsheimer)378 
and neoclassical realism. 
 
Rose contends that neoclassical positions itself as a realist alternative to 
other ways of theorising foreign policy.379  What distinguishes 
neoclassical realism from classical realism is that classical realism does 
not clearly distinguish between characteristics at the individual level, and 
the state and system levels. In contrast, the focus of neoclassical realism 
is on state level factors as crucial intervening variables between systemic 
forces and foreign policies, investigating how and under what conditions 
state-level factors matter.380  Thereby providing a viable enforcement 
mechanism to assist systemic information through foreign policy.   
 
Schweller contends that neoclassical realism has sought to refine 
neorealism by adding domestic intervening variables between systemic 
incentives and a state's foreign policy decisions.381  He makes clear 
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however: “neoclassical realism should not be mistaken for neorealism 
which seeks to explain systemic outcomes rather than foreign policy.”382   
“Unlike neorealism, neoclassical realism is able to translate the way 
different factors combine to yield foreign policy.”383  Neorealism’s 
systemic explanation Schweller argues, does not take into account the 
interests and motivations of states, which are important intervening 
variables during decision making.384  Further arguing that “foreign policy 
decisions limite.d to systemic factors alone are bound to be inaccurate 
much of the time.”385  This clearly concurs with Hill who asserts ‘foreign 
policy can never be abstracted from the domestic context out of which it 
springs.  Without domestic society and the state there would be no 
foreign policy.’386 
 
Even Waltz acknowledges that “the international system does not dictate 
exactly how each state will respond within international parameters.”387  
Waltz goes on to state: “one cannot infer the condition of international 
politics from the internal composition of states, nor can one arrive at an 
understanding of international politics by summing the foreign policies 
and the external behavior of states,” which differentiates neoclassical 
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realism from neorealism.388  Indeed “neoclassical realism does not do so.  
It uses the internal characteristics of states as a guide only to national 
responses to international constraints.”389 
 
It can therefore be interpreted by inference that neoclassical realism 
moves away from the rigidity of neorealism and its emphasis on the 
international level in its consideration of the importance of variables at 
the domestic level.  Yet at the same time it acknowledges the top-down 
approach of neorealism in that neoclassical realism recognises that 
systemic pressures create an agenda of reference for decision-makers 
(humanitarian situations position international rules/norms within the 
domestic legal framework) to explain patterns of foreign policy,390 as this 
thesis puts forward.  It is for these reasons it is advocated in this thesis 
that neoclassical realism can therefore assert that as a point of analysis 
domestic legal structures act as a connection or fuse between the 
international system and foreign policy.   
 
Moreover, while neoclassical realism may share the assumptions of 
neorealism concerning the influence of power, neorealism cannot advise 
as to how effectively (or even how) ‘the units of a system (states) will 
respond to international pressures’ (humanitarian crises, human rights 
abuses) and the ‘possibilities of changes in power’391 associated with the 
complexity, and sometimes contradictory nature, of international legal 
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principles and a state’s legal framework.  This was especially true for 
classical realism in the 1990s when, as John Clark writes, “it [classical 
realism] was silent on the subject of humanitarian situations in 
Africa.”392   
 
E.H. Carr recognised the importance of interpretation and in doing so 
created a way of looking at principles he disagreed with.  He considered 
principles without power, empty rhetoric.393 Neoclassical realism 
recognises this principle and power dichotomy in its allowance of 
systemic factors in the domestic legal framework.  Consequently, by 
authorising the importance of systemic variables, neoclassical realism 
allows for the consideration of systemic factors such as the distribution 
of capabilities (the legal capabilities of states to interpret, apply and 
execute the principles of international law) which form the permissive 
legal-political environment for foreign policy.  In this way, international 
law will regulate the interaction between the international system and its 
position within the state.394  This will account for the effectiveness of 
international law in shaping the structure of authority and legitimacy 
within the decision-making process, in that state law will interact with 
international law and either influence or restrict the norms of acceptable 
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To further ascertain why neoclassical realism is more suitable for this 
thesis, liberalism will be critiqued.  Realism moves to liberalism when 
the belief that states have fixed and uniform preferences is removed.395  
Unlike realism, which perceives nations as unitary players and focus on 
state capabilities, liberalism believes in state preference and permits 
plurality in state action.396  Liberalism contends that internal factors such 
as “political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics 
and social structure will influence the external behaviour of a state.”397  
As posited by Snyder this allows for the consideration of additional 
factors said to influence the nature of preferences, including culture and 
the political system,398 which liberal theorists believe explains state 
behaviour in foreign policy.399  According to Brown & Ainley the liberal 
perspective looks at the international system more in “terms of 
expanding cooperation and complex interdependence through trade, 
negotiations and international institutions, thus contending that state 
preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of 
state behaviour.”400  They theorise it is in the self-interest of states to 
cooperate with each other and that international institutions facilitate 
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cooperation among states by way of established rules since they explain 
state behaviour and state legitimacy at the systemic level.401    
 
However this contention can be criticised as it gives little attention to 
systemic constraints.402 For example human rights, a principle of 
international law, lies in the ambiguity, not adherence to the liberal 
values and rights of liberalism.403  It also underestimates the importance 
of variables at the systemic level, such as humanitarian intervention or 
use of force, which would therefore undermine the legitimacy of a state’s 
foreign policy and narrowly analyse the constraints of domestic law.  As 
Kaplan has argued, because of course, when looking at systemic 
constraints, the question will arise as to whose interests are reflected 
within international institutions.404  As Slaughter writes: “liberal theories 
are often challenging because international law has few mechanisms for 
taking the nature of domestic preferences or regime-type into account.  
These theories [of liberalism] are most useful as sources of insight in 
designing international institutions, such as courts, that are intended to 
have an impact on domestic politics or to link up to domestic 
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institutions.”405  Liberals argue against this, maintaining that there are 
consequences for breaking international law such as economic sanctions 
and stalled trade relations, and that international organisations would 
therefore have a measurable impact on state policy in international 
relations.406  However these arguments are flawed as they fail to take into 
account the fact that the use of sanctions gives meaning to an anarchic 
environment given the liberal attempt to predict the state behaviour of 
another state through the use of sanctions. 
 
Liberalism’s focus on cooperation between states also ignores significant 
legal differences between situations, as this thesis’ research illustrates 
and discusses in the empirical chapters.  In contrast to liberalism, 
neoclassical realism does not see states as simply aggregating the 
demands of different societal interest groups; rather, decision-makers 
define the national interest and foreign policy based upon their 
assessment of relative power and other states’ intentions, but still remain 
subject to domestic constraints and consequently view policy responses 
as a product of state–society coordination.407  As suggested previously, 
“one cannot infer the condition of international politics from the internal 
composition of states … and the external behavior of states.”408  This 
perspective gives meaning to resulting outcomes that affect another state 
and can be observed in the interactions of France and the United States 
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regarding their decisions whether to intervene with use of force 
concerning the protection of civilians caught in intra-state conflict or, to 
not intervene.  In this same context Jennifer Sterling-Folker writes 
“anarchy does not dictate how states should arrange their domestic 
processes to achieve that end.”409 Consequently, this affects whether 
states respond to international crises in a timely manner and ... “domestic 
processes act as the final arbiter within the anarchic environment.”410  
Thus liberalism ability to provide a viable enforcement mechanism to 
assist systemic information through foreign policy is undermined in 
favour of its quest for cooperation between states at the systemic level. 
 
The English School 
The distinctive feature of the English School is its questioning of the 
state-centric framing in international relations.411  Bull highlights that “it 
[the English School] sees international relations as a system which has 
been established based on institutions and rules which function in an 
anarchic manner as between sovereign states to create an international 
order.”412  Wight puts forward that it overcomes anarchy through the 
idea of international society.413 “That while the international system is 
anarchical, international law and international society should be 
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promoted though a social condition [diplomacy]”414 with sufficient 
influence on each to form an ‘international society’.”415  Theorist of the 
English School, such as Bull and Wight, maintain the international 
system functions in the absence of a central authority and therefore are 
able to demonstrate the role which international law plays as an 
institution of international order.416  They assert this position allows for 
authority in establishing international organisations such as the United 
Nations, which promote an intergovernmental society.417  Yet it is an 
authority established from the systemic level.  It is contended herein that 
the perspective offers little insight to the domestic level of analysis and 
its implications, and would be unable to provide a viable enforcement 
mechanism to assist systemic information through foreign policy based 
on the English School’s systemic level of analysis.   
 
Theorists of the English School are subdivided between pluralists such as 
Buzan and Jackson; and solidarists such as Dunne, with both in 
agreement that “international society is norm-governed; where they 
differ is over the nature of the norms in question, and the telos of 
international society.”418  These theorists have focused particularly on 
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humanitarian intervention.419  This has led to one of the principal 
tensions in the English School.  Solidarists who tend to advocate 
humanitarian intervention (particularly human rights), and pluralists who 
place greater value on order and sovereignty and the maintenance of 
international society.420  Proponents of the English School such as 
Watson and Buzan maintain that one of the necessary conditions for the 
existence of an international society lies in the acceptance of common 
rules by all its participants, and that participants will also share the same 
fundamental opinions regarding the “nature of the system, its actors and 
their behaviour.”421   
 
Yet as Dale Copeland argues, the problem with the English School is that 
international society norms provide little restraining power on countries 
determined to seek conflict.  Producing an inability to measure 
international society as a casual factor and provide a conditional 
framework under which the norms of an international society would 
affect state behaviour.422  This is relevant to this research given that in 
the case of civil conflict whether international law could or would 
authorise use of force for humanitarian concerns can only be decided by 
the state concerned and issues that support or negate that decision.423  
Given the position this thesis adopts, English School would be unable to 
provide clarity for the enforcement of international principles found in 
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the domestic legal framework concerning legal-political challenges 
involved in the formation of foreign policy as well as the identification 
of applicable law; and more importantly the determination of a state’s 
legal obligations.  Nor would the English School recognise interpretation 
at the domestic level when there is the need to integrate different legal 
norms and policy within a state’s existing legal framework.   
 
As a result it would be impossible to determine differences or explain 
patterns of foreign policy.  Especially since a state develops foreign 
policy with its own approaches to and understandings of the international 
environment, and would therefore look to the international system for 
different interpretations and methods to legitimate its foreign policy 
behaviour.  Moreover, the English School perspective implies a narrow 
approach, an approach which does not allow for essential change, 
particularly legal change, in interests and norms in determining conduct 
between actors.424  Thus norm expansion would be inhibited since it does 
not place the domestic level of analysis within its state-centric framing in 
international relations the way neo-classical realism does.425  Such a 
narrow approach bears similarity to the rigidity of neorealism and its 
emphasis on the international level in its consideration of the importance 
of variables at the domestic level. 
 
Once again this establishes, as set out in chapter one, that international 
legal principles are dependent upon the state’s legal interpretative 
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process and operates between humanitarian concerns and foreign policy 
as defined by neoclassical realism.  Consequently, as this thesis argues 
the allocation of power in the decision-making process is witnessed 
within a state’s domestic legal structures.  This allocation of power 




In establishing the effectiveness of international law at the domestic 
level, constructivism comes close to neoclassical realism.  In that it takes 
on the subject of perception by stressing the ideas, norms and values that 
shape the discourse and identity in which the context of foreign policy is 
formed.426  Hudson suggests it is through this perception that materially 
similar states act divergently within the international system.427  The 
constructivist focus on social constructs at the system level will therefore 
explain why a certain course of action is chosen by a state over another 
course of action in a way that other theoretical approaches do not.428  It 
attempts to remedy a course of action with the concept of collective 
identity norms, which, from a constructivist’s point of view both realism 
and liberalism fail to do.  In this sense, constructivists dispute the realist 
notion that self-help and power politics are essential features of anarchy 
but rather that they are institutions effecting the process rather than 
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structure of international relations.429 Yet in this same regard, Robert 
Jervis contends that, “constructivism does not, by itself, tell us something 
about the processes at work in political life, it does not, by itself, tell us 
anything about the expected content of foreign policies or international 
relations.”430  Wendt concurs with Jervis, he argues that the 
constructivist approach does not imply any particular unit of analysis as 
fundamental in the study of international relations.431  Subsequently 
constructivism does not allow for sufficient intervening variables in the 
formation of foreign policy given that authority is situated at the 
systemic level of analysis. 
 
Constructivist theory operates at a different level from both neoclassical 
realism and comparative foreign policy analysis.  Its focus is on the 
location of and interaction between states in the international system.  
Scharf describes the constructivist view of the state as simply a black 
box,432 a “unitary and rational actor in the state system.  State identities 
and interests are determined by the relational position in the international 
political system,”433 which drives foreign policy.  Domestic actors and 
domestic processes are deemed plainly irrelevant to the study of 
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international relations,434 and would therefore be unable to identify 
where humanitarian intervention and its interests interact with foreign 
policy formulation.  By focusing on the state-level, decision makers are 
not included which problematically shifts the human aspects of foreign 
policy to the systemic-level.435  Thus producing a systematic failure (in 
this author’s opinion) when applied to foreign policy analysis given 
constructivism inability to analyse both the role and interpretive process 
of international law at the domestic level during policy-making or the 
underpinning rationale of the decision-makers.  In fact, constructivism 
excludes questions concerning how systemic imperatives will likely 
translate through the intervening variables of state power into foreign 
and/or security policies.436  As Kratochwil explains: “law in international 
society exists simply by virtue of its role in defining the game of 
international relations.  It informs the respective decision makers about 
the nature of their interaction and determines who is an actor; setting the 
steps necessary to insure the validity of their official acts and assigns 
weight and priority to different claims.”437  This supports this research, 
which is seeking identify points of interaction between different legal 
regimes and the interpretive role of law during foreign policy formation. 
 
To further this point, Ann-Marie Slaughter writes: “constructivism notes 
that international bureaucracies may seek to pursue their own interests 
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(eg human rights protection) even against the wishes of the States that 
created them.”438  Because “international law is of its very nature norm-
focused, it holds a fascination with norm creation, evolution and 
destruction that has proven to be the strongest bridging point between 
some international legal theorists and the constructivists.”439 As a result 
“constructivists [with a few exceptions] have assumed a concept of law 
that is largely hierarchical and authority based.  For this reason, many 
constructivists still see law as a set of posited requirements, created 
through state institutions.”440  Yet, by focusing on the state level 
constructivism problematically moves decision making from the 
domestic environment to the systemic level.  This produces 
inconsistency during decision making because international law will 
therefore become the dependent variable.  Consequently there is little 
conceptualisation of unit level/intervening variables (domestic structures 
or legal institutions) necessary to establish foreign policy.441 
   
The impact of moving away from constructivism’s systemic theory is 
that is allows a neoclassical realist analysis of the state from the domestic 
level, as well as a legal analysis of how foreign policy is made.  This 
distancing also rejects any obscure version of law as resting on merely 
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ideational factors,442 given that the thesis underlying approach recognises 
the strategic capabilities of a state’s power to interpret, apply and execute 
the principles of international law.  While proponents of constructivism 
argue that the strength of a legal rule is a function of its level of 
institutionalisation (within a state’s constitutional, regulatory or judicial 
systems) precisely how domestically fixed international institutions 
become a part of decision-makers’ beliefs and thereby affect the state’s 
legal-political behaviour is underspecified.443  This under specification 
undermines the legal authority of a state, since as Coleman argues “a  
state carries with it the authority to impose fixed legal rules,”444 
including those based upon the principles of human rights as discussed in 
section one of this research.445 
 
This under specification cannot account for the different responses of 
France and the United States in the conflicts under study nor can it 
account for the extent to which states interpret international law as a 
means of constructing authority within foreign policy.446  As will be 
established in Section Four, whereas France and the United States may 
share a sense of identity in Africa based upon humanitarian reasoning 
(i.e. human rights) and thus cooperation, this does not account for the 
internal resources and interests within each state (the role of domestic 
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law and causal factors) and clearly does not identify any particular 
common interests in sub-Saharan Africa.  Similarly while constructivism 
is based upon norm construction at the international level, even 
Alexander Wendt realized “in most situations the best that can be 
expected is concentric circles of identification, where actors identify to 
varying degrees with others depending on who they are and what is at 
stake.”447  This is a significant admission on Wendt’s part, because 
although he assumes states act in a cohesive way in the international 
system,448 it highlights the fact that even the most systemic theories 
cannot do without the influence of the domestic framework during 
decision making.449  This is central to the thesis argument, in that the 
research attempts to understand the complexities associated with 
international legal principles and a state’s legal responsibilities when 
deliberating foreign policy.  Consequently constructivism will be unable 
to identify where humanitarian intervention and its interests interact with 
domestic variables during foreign policy formulation because the state is 
located only within the systemic level.450   
 
Challenging ‘anarchy is what states make of it’.451  
In moving away from constructivism, the thesis also aims to move 
beyond Alexander Wendt’s constructivism’s argument that anarchy is 
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what states make of it,452 which is a systems-level account of 
international relations.  That is to say, while the international system is 
anarchical, for Wendt anarchy does not determine state behaviour.  His 
argument is situated in the belief that because constructivism is based 
upon norms it can account for changes in the international system that 
other theories of international relations cannot.453   
 
Although this author holds an appreciation for this work, the research 
stresses that it is necessary to consider that it is regional (intra-state) 
conflict and violence which currently dominate the international system, 
not conflict between states.  Therefore the applicability of norm 
assumption [from the constructivist’s point of view] at the international 
level would be unable to meet the requirements of the humanitarian 
principles at issue within a state’s decision-making process on its own.  
Especially when humanitarian principles are generated for the protection 
of civilians caught within regional [intra-state] violence and the use of 
force will be generated from outside the state of conflict to constrain that 
same state’s illegitimate violence. 
 
As detailed above constructivism does not focus on the state as a 
domestic actor; the state is located only within the systemic level and as 
such is unable to identify specifics associated within regional (intra-state) 
conflict and violence.  Thus the focus is on the location of and 
                                                          





interaction between states in the international system.454  Yet we know 
that the roles performed by systemic effects and the unit-level (domestic) 
factors in foreign policy decisions are considerably different and will 
cause different effects in the international system.455  And while as noted 
above, constructivism argues that the strength of a legal rule is a function 
of its level of institutionalization, precisely how the rule affects the state 
in decision-making is under specified because constructivism does not 
account for unit-level factors in its analysis of foreign policy in the way 
that neoclassical realism does; this is the theoretical contribution of this 
thesis.456  The research stresses that law, as a state’s internal resource, is 
important in the domestic decision-making environment because legal 
institutions exert power. 
 
This position is supported by Kratochwil’s argument that Wendt’s 
“interest in norms is not motivated by some empirical test of legal 
validity within IR [international relations], instead the treatment of 
norms suffers from a variety of epistemological shortcomings”457  These 
shortcomings Kratochwil explains are “rooted in the very definition of 
IR as the study of anarchy and its sharp distinction between the domestic 
and international order.”458  Hidemi Suganami, offers much the same 
                                                          
454 Ibid; Risse and Sikkink 1999. 
455 Dworkin 1977:81-130; Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood 1998; Coleman 2008. 
456 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the result is the identification of new research 
and analysis which leads to original and innovative policies.  Carr 2001; Kaarbo 2015, 
etc.  This also identifies the third inter-related question of this thesis: “If international 
law is politically constructed within a state’s foreign policy through unit-level/ 
intervening variables does international law attain political authority?” 
457 Kratochwil 1989:1; see also Kratochwil 2000, 2014; as well as Onuf 2013; Sinclair 





critique.  “Wendt’s story so far is a hypothetical one.  He [Wendt] does 
not have in mind any particular historical period or case to explain his 
theory of anarchy.” 459 
 
Consequently, neoclassical realism’s ability to account for the 
effectiveness of international law in shaping the structure of authority 
and legitimacy within the decision-making process allows for structures 
of hierarchy otherwise absent in the international system.  While it is a 
given that international law contributes to state obligations, specifically 
when there is a perceived threat to security or challenge to the stability of 
the international order, an analysis of how international law is 
constructed within foreign policy through the domestic structures and 
mechanisms of the policy process indicates that the effectiveness of 
international law may indeed regulate and strengthen the policy 
behaviour of states.460  As Ian Hurd argues, “an external source that 
defines an actor’s sense of what constitutes legitimate action must be 
considered a centre of authority, and is, for all intent and purposes 
governmental.”461  While neoclassical realism recognises the inferences 
associated with hierarchy, in the realist tradition, its translation through 
unit-level intervening variables allows it to meet the requirements of 
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humanitarian principles through the foreign policy process.  Thus, the 
action is given validity not by the state’s compliance with international 
law, but rather by international law’s ability to affect foreign policy by 
utilizing the state’s domestic legal and political structures as a 
mechanism for international authority.  It is this legitimating function 
that affects a shift in authority structures within the state.   As 
emphasised in Chapter Three, state law will mediate the tension between 
the rules of international law and foreign policy which will fuse with 
international law to effect policy within a particular state or issue area.  
This includes the needs of humanitarian intervention within a constantly 
changing domestic and international environment.  
 
By focusing on how domestic-level legal-political processes are capable 
of assisting systemic information through foreign policy neoclassical 
realism has established why alternative theories of international relations 
are not compatible with the aims of this research.  This has been 
accomplished by critiquing realism, liberalism, English School and 
constructivism.  Although realist theories disagree on the motives behind 
foreign policy behaviour, 462 they do agree that the primary determinant 
lies within the systemic level for analysis on the impact of the 
international system on the behaviour of states.463  This is important  
because it means traditional realist theories are not able to provide a 
viable enforcement mechanism to assist systemic information through 
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foreign policy.  Liberalism ability to provide a viable enforcement 
mechanism to assist systemic information through foreign policy is 
undermined in favour of its quest for cooperation between states at the 
systemic level.464 Moreover, liberalism’s focus on cooperation between 
states ignores significant legal differences between situations. The 
problem with the English School is that international society norms 
provide little restraining power on countries determined to seek conflict, 
and thus would have an inability to provide a framework under which the 
norms of an international society would affect state behaviour.465  
English School is therefore unable to provide clarity for the enforcement 
of international principles found in the domestic legal framework, given 
its narrow approach.  Constructivist theory’s focus is on the location of 
and interaction between states in the international system.466  
Subsequently constructivism does not allow for sufficient intervening 
variables in the formation of foreign policy given that authority is 
situated at the systemic level of analysis.467  Consequently, it is this 
author’s belief that an expansion of the scope of international law and 
therefore its interpretation within the domestic framework could provide 
a clear development toward a changed scope of state sovereignty with 
respect to the state and human rights abuses, and clearer collaboration of 
states on the international level.   
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Towards A Neoclassical Realist Framework   
While this Chapter recognises the abilities of different theories of 
international relations within both the state and international systems, the 
problem with these theories is that they do not answer the question - how 
states translate into practice a rule of international law that 
simultaneously claims the protection of human rights and permits the use 
of military force for that protection.  This is specific to my analysis in 
that, in practice this means that the translation of capabilities into state 
power is often unpredictable over the short term.468  Neoclassical realism 
is able to answer this by way of the intervening variables.  In that the 
intervening variables have the effect of strengthening or weakening the 
influence of systemic factors (of the international system) on unit-level.  
Neoclassical realism therefore provides a viable enforcement mechanism 
for states to determine how domestic-level legal processes are capable of 
assisting systemic information through foreign policy.  As such, this 
assertion provides the basis for rejecting other theories of international 
relations as incompatible with this research. 
 
Having established that neoclassical realism is the theoretical framework 
from which to analyse the case of humanitarian intervention, given that it 
allows for interaction between the systemic and domestic levels, this next 
section identifies the decision-makers which it is proposed affect, 
through domestic law, the influence of international law on the policy 
process.  
                                                          





 The Decision-makers 
 
Hudson has said, “if our IR [international relations] theories contain no 
human beings to understand the foreign policy process, they will 
erroneously paint for us a world of no change, no creativity, no 
persuasion, no accountability.’469  This is a fair assessment since decision 
making creates actions and are at the centre of policy approval.  Both 
comparative foreign policy analysis and neoclassical realism account for 
the roles of ideas and perceptions as interpreted by decision-makers.470  
They do so by incorporating the human reaction to perceived power471 
rather than absolute power only, highlighting the influence of the 
decision-makers’ perceptions and the state on the process of foreign 
policy formation.  As indicated previously, for neoclassical realism 
structural factors remain influential in the decision-making process, but 
how the state responds to an international situation (for example, 
initiating a non-intervention policy, or intervening when the situation is 
deemed a threat to world security) and the assessment of power (the 
United States’ deference to France despite substantive policy differences 
or the use of the domestic legal structures).  Once again, this highlights 
that since the use of force in humanitarian intervention is a 
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fundamentally domestic legal-political decision, as is non-intervention, 
the way the facts relating to humanitarian concerns are interpreted and 
the arguments presented will have an impact in the decision-making 
process, especially when intervention is linked to human rights.  
 
Sterling-Folker notes that in addition, what decision-makers think about 
a situation will have more influence on foreign policy than what is 
actually happening, since their opinion will define foreign policy 
regardless of whether that opinion is valid.472  This position lies in the 
normative strength of the state and its relation to the international system 
which will determine a response by either limiting or increasing 
authority to react to an international appeal for humanitarian 
intervention.  As discussed previously, this authority will either expand a 
legal norm or restrict that same norm within foreign policy.473  This can 
be observed where France and the United States differed in their 
perceptions of the four conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, which influenced 
the legal status of humanitarian intervention in determining what course 
of action should be taken.   
 
The differences in the domestic environments of the two states (legal and 
political) had a direct effect on the ability both states had in pursuing 
particular strategies toward the humanitarian interventions.  Thus, 
despite the fact that systemic variables – the positions of France and the 
United States in the international system – served as the primary 






influence on foreign policy, the intervening variables of the decision-
makers’ perception and state power (including each state’s distinctive 
legal institutions) resulted in different approaches to decisions on 
whether to intervene and the use force for the protection of human rights 
or not to intervene.  This approach explains the underlying causal factors 
that play a role in the varying degrees to which international law is 
implemented by decision-makers through enforcement of the terms of 
the individual state’s foreign policy within an existing legal framework.   
 
Therefore, based upon the insights of neoclassical realism into the 
importance of the beliefs and perceptions of decision-makers and their 
legal and political institutions, the interpretation of international law at 
the domestic level is crucial to the relationship between different legal 
regimes and the interpretive role of law during the domestic process in 
establishing foreign policy.  In particular how humanitarian intervention 
is realized by a state. 
 
6. The Research Methodology 
The methodology builds on the previous chapters by outlining the 
specifics of the research.  By positing the importance of legal 
interpretation and the role of domestic legal-political sources to assist 
systemic information through foreign policy, a set of methods was 
necessary to allow an analysis of these phenomena.  Consequently, 




require a methodology with a dual function.  This dual function is 
undertaken by textual analysis.474  
 
Textual Analysis 
The first function of textual analysis, as applied to this study, allows the 
logic of the interpretivist process during decision making to be 
examined, and is therefore explicitly concerned with how the foreign 
policy of France and the United States was formed concerning 
humanitarian issues in the four civil conflicts under discussion in Section 
Four.  This seeks to answer the research question: do states interpret 
international law differently to support their foreign policy decisions to 
use force or not intervene for humanitarian reasons?  The second 
function is concerned with each state’s beliefs about the role of law, the 
way law and legal sources are created, authority and legitimacy interests 
domestically that underpin human rights and the protection of those 
rights.  This seeks to answer the question how do we understand the 
sources and process of the strategic use of interpretation and legal 
reasoning for policy purposes?  Notably, based on this domestic level of 
analysis, textual analysis will also address the question, if international 
law is politically constructed within a state’s foreign policy through unit-
level variables does international law attain political authority? 
 
McKee notes, “textual analysis is a research method that requires the 
researcher to closely analyse the content of communication rather than 
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the structure of the content. … This includes taking into account the 
purpose of the text, the time period in which the text was written and the 
audience for the text.”475  Textual analysis is unquestionable in its 
understanding of meanings and ideas expressed through written words, 
from the perspective of the researcher interpreting the data gathered.476 
 
Consequently, a case study approach477 was undertaken to determine 
through textual analysis how state and international law interact 
simultaneously to produce a synthesis that is used to regulate foreign 
policy behaviour in the context of decisions effecting humanitarian 
concerns.  Although the focus of the research is on the state’s domestic 
sources of law – legislative and judiciary, it also incorporates executive 
and senior administrative government members.  Such an emphasis 
reflects the manner in which, “the executive departments of government, 
and the political appointees who head them, are at the core of the foreign 
policy-making process.”478  Hall asserts that, “policymakers customarily 
work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only 
the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain 
them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
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addressing.  This framework is embedded in the very terminology 
through which policymakers communicate about their work.”479  Hay 
agrees, he concludes that this domestic framework is internalised by 
decision makers and policy experts, and “acts as a source of guidance for 
conducting and evaluating policies, which defines the range of legitimate 
methods available.  This in turn defines the very intentions and 
objectives of policy itself.”480  These texts are embedded within the 
domestic institutions of a state.481  Text as Jackson argues, “sets out the 
parameters of official thinking and forms the basis of policy and action; 
it establishes the core principles, assumptions and knowledge … implies 
the kind of actions that will be undertaken.”482  Textual analysis 
therefore allows this thesis to analyse and interpret: the practices and 
particularities of the human beings formulating foreign policy; the intent 
of the decision-makers; the text itself – in both its form and content; the 
reactions to and views of the overall policy decisions on legal 
interpretation; and the wider historical/linguistic context without which 
specific meanings could not be produced in the first place.     
 
As defined for purposes of this research, text (written, spoken, acted), 
includes documents specifying the functions and capacity of France and 
the United States, including government documents, internal government 
reports, letters written within the various administrations, constitutions, 
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charters and declarations, congressional hearing records, subcommittee 
statements, legislation, sources of law, etc.  Particular attention is paid to 
what institutional legal structures have been established to develop 
foreign policy and its ability to cope with decisions regarding the use of 
force in humanitarian intervention and the roles of legitimacy and 
international law.483  This provides empirical confirmation that foreign 
policies are influenced by specific domestic institutional environments 
and lead to different legal-political strategies.  Text selection was also 
supplemented with on-line Security Council Reports; Governmental and 
NGO Reports. This source of information will provide not only 
operational details and timelines, but also editorial comments and 
political statements.  Further selection included: professional 
publications, academic books, journal articles, contemporary and 
historical media publications; as well as interviews and questions of legal 
and policy practitioners and academics.   
 
An objective of this research was to gather primary data, however 
difficulties were encountered with this research.  Issues of transparency 
became obvious, that is the ease with which one is allowed to view 
existing state documents from both France and the United States. In 
France this was a result of the rules governing secret documents.484  As a 
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result, I was denied permission to view archives of the French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (Quai d’Orsay) and the Ministry of Defence (Hôtel de 
Brienne), both of which contain policy documents, was denied, citing the 
30-year rule.  Access was also denied to the Institut François Mitterrand 
which holds the archives of the Mitterrand Presidencies (although 
legislature was produced after my French research visit).  Therefore it 
was necessary to rely upon secondary documents because of the above 
governing rules.  Cancelled meetings and interviews with government 
officials, which happened in both countries but primarily in the United 
States, were also encountered. 
 
Of note, this thesis has intentionally limited the use of memoirs because 
as this author writes, decision-makers base their decisions upon their 
perception of the situation at issue and thus the foreign policy decisions 
in both France and the United States will reflect this.485   
 
Placing France and the United States within the Case Study    
To answer the questions central to this research it is necessary to 
understand the legal-political settings in which decision-makers shape 
foreign policy outcomes.  Thus by comparing how the legal-political 
systems of France and the United States function, the research is able to 
                                                                                                                                             
of Information for Rwanda, in charge of examining French policy on Rwanda from 
1990 to 1994 was published, anonymously.  Armée et génocide - Documents qui reste 
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consider the conceptual difficulties encountered when there are different 
legal regimes under study.486  Therefore the factors shaping the legal and 
political institutions, the state and international actors and domestic 
policy of France and of the United States are addressed.  France and the 
United States were chosen for analysis for several reasons:  
• Both have historical legacies and strategic relationships with Africa, 
as well as with each other, yet the legacies each have with Africa are 
very different.487   
• As established in Chapter Two, structurally both are democracies with 
constitutional legal systems.488  However since the two states differ 
both in their relative international power (although both hold 
permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council) and in the 
natures of their political institutions (France is a unitary semi-
presidential republic and the United States is a federal constitutional 
republic)489 it is possible to detect similarities and differences in their 
motivations in decisions to use force, or to intervene/not to intervene 
in these four African conflicts.  
• As will be identified in the empirical chapters, states have different 
goals when facing an humanitarian issue.490 While France and the 
United States share values inherent in most democratic societies, such 
as liberty, equality and justice, the two have very different legal 
perspectives, particularly over the role of international institutions and 
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the use of force.491  And as Chapter Two illustrated, both international 
law and Africa are incorporated into domestic sources of law in 
France; whereas in the United States the structure of its legal 
institutions “makes incorporation of international law into the 
domestic system difficult.”492 
• As a result this difference in legal perspectives will affect each state’s 
legal behaviour and its interpretation of humanitarian principles 
relative to intervention decisions.  Interventions undertaken by France 
in Africa will present legitimacy problems because of its colonial past. 
This research will explore where France places its higher priority – 
human rights protection or its sphere of influence (pré carré).493  
Whereas legitimacy problems concerning the United States in Africa 
are based upon its controversial interventions record.494  The United 
States’ interpretation of humanitarian principles will present a legal 
conflict based on the human rights situation’s compatibility with the 
Constitution and existing law.  An example of which is the United 
States failure to intervene in Liberia, despite notification of human 
rights abuse in addition to its long standing relationship with 
Liberia.495   
 
Thus, by comparing how the legal-political systems of France and the 
United States function, the research is able to consider the conceptual 
differences and approaches encountered when interpreting international 
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law within different legal regimes to understand the legal perception 
expressed by each in the formulation of foreign policy.496 This will add 
value to the literature, given that there have been few interdisciplinary 
connections between international legal study and foreign policy 
analysis.497  To understand the authority of influences on foreign policy 
behaviour, the four regional conflicts chosen for study: the Liberian civil 
war (1989), Operation Restore Hope (1992, Somalia), Opération 
Turquoise (1994, Rwanda), and the ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, 
will be assessed.  In examining selected text specific to each conflict,  the 
research is able to determine the domestic and international factors used 
to form varying foreign policy decisions concerning the use force for 
human rights protection or to not intervene, following the end of the 
Cold War.  
 
The Regional Conflicts/Civil Wars 
The frequency of regional conflicts has shaped not only international 
politics but domestic politics since the end of the Cold War.498  Several 
developments shaped relations with Africa in the 1990s.  First, the end of 
the Cold War reduced the interest of external actors in Africa and was 
perceived to be marginal to global security issues. This then “allowed 
both France and the United States to link development and aid to 
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democratization in sub-Saharan Africa.”499  This position changed, 
however, following the failure of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia 
and the genocide in Rwanda.500   
 
The four conflicts under study have different historical backgrounds and 
occurred at different periods of time in the larger geopolitical context 
(1989 vs. 2002).  The conflicts will illustrate how each government 
responded to the conflicts through its domestic legal structures and 
presents varying examples of intervention to human rights abuses in 
Africa that proliferated following the end of the Cold War to the 
emergence of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (“R2P”) which 
obligated states to protect their citizens.501  Each conflict relates directly 
to legal-political challenges and legal differences involved in the 
formation of foreign policy relative to the contestation over human 
rights.  Challenging decades of United States and French foreign policy 
in the African region. 
 
 For instance, when Liberia collapsed into anarchy and massacres after 
1989, the United States failed to intervene, despite its long standing 
                                                          
499‘Political reform took centre stage in 1990 as the United States and France each 
stated that future foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa would be conditioned upon 
democratization’ (Donald Rothchild Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa The Brookings 
Institution 1997:120-145); and 3 November 2009 meeting with Dr. Roland Marchal, 
Senior Research Fellow, Centre d’étudies de recherché internationales (CERI), l’Institut 
d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. Francis M. Deng, Donald Rothchild, and I. William 
Zartmann Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (1996) 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution. 
500 Ibid., Rothchild 1997; Marchal 2009. 
501  ICISS Report 2001.  For a discussion on Africa and sovereign responsibility see, 





relationship with Liberia.502  In Somalia, the United States was resolved 
to the fact that the breakdown of the Somali government merited United 
States intervention, yet government officials ignored the crisis in 
Rwanda except to evacuate United States’ citizens from the area.503  
Meanwhile due to France’s ‘precarious’ pré-carré status,504 France chose 
to send military troops to protect French nationals, and other foreigners, 
in Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire but failed to intervene in Rwanda despite 
the genocidal allegations that were repeatedly reported.505  France also 
undermined its position in Côte d’Ivoire by replacing French forces with 
ECOWAS506 forces in an attempt to guarantee a cease-fire.   
 
These inconsistencies resonate with the practical legal dilemmas inherent 
to the position of France and the United States in Africa.  These levels of 
intervention are particularly important when motives of national interest 
come into conflict with the implementation of humanitarian objectives 
based upon a state’s legal structure and its interpretation of the principles 
of human rights, the use of force for the protection of those right, and 
issues of sovereignty.507 
 
Finally, most research on humanitarian intervention analyses those 
interventions deemed illegal.  For example, the establishment of no-fly 
zones in Northern and Southern Iraq in 1991 and 1992, the bombing of 
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the Bosnian Serbs by NATO in 1995,508 and “the post hoc explanation 
that the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo was ‘illegal but 
legitimate’.”509  The four interventions in this study however all hold 
legal standing as defined by the international legal community, yet the 
domestic laws and mechanisms leading to political authority at the state 
level have never been questioned.    
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Chapters Four and Five have presented the theoretical framework 
underpinning the thesis.  Collectively, these chapters and the legal 
framework established a methodology which led to three assumptions 
about the effectiveness of international law in shaping the structure of 
authority and legitimacy within the decision-making process: 
• Effectiveness results from interpretation and application as prescribed 
within the domestic legal framework. 
• Systemic pressures create an agenda of reference for decision-makers 
(humanitarian situations position international rules/norms in the 
domestic legal framework) to explain foreign policy. 
• The differences in security perceptions by decision-makers will have 
an impact on the intervening variables concerning interpretation and 
application relevant to sources of law. 
 
Essentially the aim of the methodology is to underpin an answer to the 
puzzles which are at the core of this research.  These puzzles can be 
summarized by three specific interrelated research questions and 
proposed hypotheses: 
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1. Do states interpret international law differently to create legal 
authority to support their foreign policy decisions to use force or to not 
intervene for humanitarian reasons so that the rules arguably function 
within the international system? 
The research provides examples of humanitarian intervention as a 
case study using four regional conflicts situated in Africa from 1989 to 
2002 to assess the degree to which France and the United States interpret 
international law differently.  Since law (domestic and international) is 
dealt with through a state’s legal institutions, decision-makers will base 
their decisions on the appropriate form of interpretation based upon their 
beliefs about the role of law and the way law is created within each state; 
this would include sources of law.  This thesis postulates that while the 
content of the rules of international law (human rights, sovereignty and 
the use of force) is the same, the underlying difference is whether the 
rule meets the criteria of effective legality from within the relevant state 
and how that criterion is interpreted through the state’s legal institutions. 
This builds on the existing literature in that it reinforces the thesis’ 
position that the interpretation of international law and its 
conceptualisation at the domestic level, through a state’s domestic legal 
framework, is crucial to understanding how state and international law 
interact simultaneously in foreign policy to effect humanitarian concerns. 
 
2.  How do we understand the sources and processes of the strategic use 
of interpretation and legal reasoning for policy purposes, particularly 
since decision-makers tend to interpret potential security threats in 
different ways?   
 The scope of foreign policy serves state interests from a wide 
range and the legal foundations of foreign policy are made up of the rules 
of both international law and domestic law.  This thesis predicts that 
although the structure and the rules of both international and domestic 
institutions will sometimes force change due to unforeseen crises or 




course of action to be taken in similar security situations.  Because many 
international rules such as those pertaining to human rights have their 
origins within a state’s domestic structure, these legal rules, as this 
research argues, will act as a framework to regulate state behaviour.   
 
3.  If international law is politically constructed within a state’s foreign 
policy through its unit-level/intervening variables does international law 
attain political authority?   
It is hypothesised that in authorising the importance of systemic 
variables, neoclassical realism allows for the consideration of systemic 
factors such as the distribution of capabilities (the capability of states to 
interpret, apply and execute the principles of international law) which 
forms the permissive environment for foreign policy.  In applying neo-
classical realism the state, by utilizing its domestic legal and political 
structures as a mechanism for international authority, allows for 
structures of hierarchy otherwise absent in the international system.510 
This is achieved by allocating space to the interpretative process through 
the state’s unit-level variables. 
 
It is helpful at this point to reiterate the three causal factors the empirical 
section puts forth to make its argument as affecting the principles of 
international law on the policy process of each conflict: 1) the decision-
makers’ arguments for foreign policy reasoning; 2) the domestic legal 
framework, which includes legal tradition and sources of law; and 3) the 
actions of the United Nations.511  Based upon these causal factors 
separate rationales for foreign policy decisions, specific to each conflict, 
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are applied in this thesis.  As the empirical cases will establish, the 
rationale behind the forming of foreign policy decisions stems from the 
relevant facts and information presented for evaluation and differences in 
the interpretation of the information provided relevant to each conflict.  
The case studies address the underlying problem of the research, which 
is not whether a rule of international law is legally binding but rather 
how states translate into practice a rule of international law that 
simultaneously claims the protection of human rights and permits the use 
of military force for that protection. 
 
Summary 
Chapters Four and Five have presented the theoretical framework 
underpinning the thesis.  Together these chapters and the legal 
framework presented in Section One explain the thesis methodological 
focus on legal study and foreign policy analysis which then formulate the 
research questions.   
 
Chapter Four has considered the comparative foreign policy analysis 
approach to foreign policy.  In building upon this comparative approach 
the author evaluated the rationale for the use of neoclassical realism as a 
tool by which to consider the foreign policy decisions of France and the 
United States in the face of threats to humanitarian principles.   
 
Chapter Five has asserted that neoclassical realism is better suited to this 
thesis than other theories of international relations, and has established 




School. The chapter has argued that unlike liberalism, neoclassical 
realism does not underestimate the importance of variables at the 
systemic level.512  Nor does neoclassical realism lack a theory of the 
state, despite the views expressed by constructivists.513  In distancing 
itself from constructivism’s systemic theory, neoclassical realism also 
rejects any obscure version of law as resting on merely ideational 
factors,514 given the underlying approach of the research.  Moreover, 
given the English School’s narrow approach, which holds that all 
participants share the same fundamental opinions regarding the nature of 
the international system, the English School would be unable to integrate 
different legal norms and policy that allow for essential change with 
regard to interests and norms in the domestic framework.515   
 
Neoclassical realism asserts that as a point of analysis the domestic 
decision-making environment positions humanitarian concerns between 
the international system and foreign policy by authorising the importance 
of systemic (independent) variables.516 Thus, neoclassical realism allows 
for the consideration of systemic factors such as the distribution of 
capabilities (the capability of states to interpret, apply and execute the 
principles of international law) which forms the permissive environment 
for foreign policy.517  In this way, state law mediates the tension between 
the rules of international law and foreign policy and will fuse with 
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international law to affect foreign policy within a particular state.  This in 
turn allows international law to regulate the interaction between the state 
and its position in the international system. 
 
Lastly, Chapter Six has outlined the methodology and determined the 
formulation of the research questions and hypotheses that this research 
will test in the form of comparative studies between France and the 
United States to determine how state and international law interact 
simultaneously in foreign policy to effect humanitarian concerns. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter Seven, provides a brief historical background 
to the concepts of intervention and non-intervention (sovereignty) in 
relation to the theme of this thesis and the empirical chapters to follow.  
It aims to highlight the key debates on the progression of humanitarian 
intervention and places this progression in the context of the foreign 
policy decisions underpinning humanitarian intervention in the 1990s.  
The chapter also discusses the distinction between legitimacy and 





















“Count up the results of fifty years of human rights 
mechanisms, this is a failure of implementation in a 
scale that shames us all.” 
 
Mary Robinson, 10 December 1998 
 
 




III. The Relevance of the Humanitarian  
Intervention Debate 
 
In the previous chapters the legal and theoretical foundations of the 
thesis were defined.  This outlined their significance to the interpretation 
of international legal principles in foreign policy decisions to establish a 
legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention to affect foreign policy 
behaviour.  In order to advance the legal and theoretical positions 
outlined in the previous chapters, this section links their relevance to the 
development of humanitarian intervention to demonstrate that the 
implementation of humanitarian intervention is influenced by the legal 
and theoretical foundations as asserted.  To do so, it is necessary to 
review some of the historical background on the concepts of intervention 
and sovereign non-intervention and the various legal debates that 
continuously reappear.  This section introduces the reader to this 
background and its legal debates and segues to the empirical chapters 
that follow, in that it also helps to establish how levels of intervention 





7.a. The Principles of Intervention and Non-Intervention 
An important question for the international community is whether to 
intervene forcibly to stop a massive and systematic violation of basic 
human rights committed by the authorities of one state against its own 
citizens. Looking at the development of the principles underpinning 
humanitarian intervention offers historic insight into situations where 
humanitarian action was or was not taken.  Given the focus of this 
research, this will prove particularly useful when considering that the 
globalization of rules and procedures, at both the international and 
domestic level, will affect the scope of legal interpretation which may be 
considered unprecedented given the ongoing debate on human rights 
protection. This chapter will therefore provide a brief outline of the 
background leading to the development of humanitarian intervention as a 
concept and how it has been used differently in various cases. This 
historical perspective on the humanitarian intervention debate will 
provide a focus to the empirical cases of the Liberian civil war (1989), 
Operation Restore Hope (1992, Somalia), Opération Turquoise (1994, 
Rwanda) and the ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (2002, present), 
which this thesis analyses to establish how states interpret the rules of 
international law for humanitarian concerns.   
 
During the period between 1990 and early 2000 humanitarian 
intervention emerged as a challenge to traditional theories of 




protection for civilians caught within intra-state violence.518 As the 
conflicts in Liberia, Somalia and, with qualification Rwanda illustrate,519 
decisions to use force were argued against what limits, if any, should be 
imposed upon a sovereign state’s actions when it came to internal 
matters that were deemed external and non-threatening to another state or 
to international security.  As indicated at the start of this research, one of 
the fundamental problems of humanitarian intervention during the 1990s 
was that there were no formal legal guidelines or legal mechanisms at the 
state level for humanitarian intervention decisions in place at the time.520  
This thesis contends that the problem was situated in the capacity of 
states to produce institutions at the domestic level capable of assisting 
international humanitarian principles through the foreign policy process.   
 
Notwithstanding state sovereignty debates, during the early 1990s the 
question of justifiable humanitarian intervention521 took on new urgency 
when states, the United Nations and regional organizations intervened to 
help people subject to gross violations of human rights, from Iraq in 
1991, Rwanda in 1994 to East Timor in 1999 and Côte d’Ivoire more 
recently.  Since the 1990s there has been a growing argument that certain 
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human rights violations - genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic 
cleansing, all constitute threats to international peace and security and 
fall outside a state’s domestic jurisdiction.   
 
In these instances the use of force was deemed necessary to protect those 
being violated against.  For example, this was first enforced in 1992 
when the Security Council held that violations of international 
humanitarian law, in addition to ‘the magnitude of the human 
tragedy,’522 were factors in its determination that the violence and 
instability in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and 
security.523  Despite this determination, during this period we began to 
witness contestation over the meaning of human rights in conflict 
situations as well as discussion of the need for human rights protection.   
 
With the emergence of the Danish Institute Report (1999)524 and the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (2001),525 there was international 
acceptance that certain human rights violations should be protected by a 
responsible international community.526 Despite this acceptance, 
                                                          
522 Security Council Summit Statement Concerning the Council’s Responsibility in the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UN Doc S/23500 1992, (1992) UNYB 
33, in Chesterman 2002:300-301. 
523 Abbott 2005; Thomas M. Franck Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats 
and Armed Attacks Cambridge University Press 2002 (Franck discusses the evolution of 
the international use of force rules). 
524 The Danish Report (1999); Evans and Sahnoun (2001). 
525 ICISS Report 2001. 
526 Security Council Resolution 1674, adopted on 28 April 2006, "reaffirms the 
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit” and commits the 
Council to action to protect civilians in armed conflict.  Scholars have noted however 
that “there are some key differences between the original ICISS doctrine and the World 
Summit Outcome” Heinze 2011:12; Hehir 2010:119; Pattision 2010:14.  See also, 
Secretary-General Ban Kimoon’s Report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect developed with Special Advisors Francis Deng and Edward C. Luck (Report of 




consensus among states remains elusive and identifying how human 
rights norms translate into practice when cases of humanitarian concerns 
arise still proves to be challenging for decision-makers given that 
humanitarian intervention arises from two competing demands – the 
protection of human rights and sovereignty.527  Subsequently, the 
translation of human rights norms may differ between states when it 
involves the simultaneous application of laws on the use of force and 
attention to human rights.  As a result, and as the research will show, 
whilst states may agree that a particular international legal rule exists, 
states may then understand the rights or obligations of that rule in 
different ways.  
 
Given that the rules prohibiting forcible intervention have been codified 
in the United Nations Charter (Article 2 (4)), this chapter begins with the 
historical evolution of the principles of intervention and non-
intervention.  Focus then turns to the contradictions between use of force 
and sovereignty, highlighting the key debates on the development of 
humanitarian intervention.  The chapter concludes by distinguishing 
between the legality and legitimacy of actions, given the general 
confusion on their differences to determine the extent to which 
humanitarian rhetoric is undermined by this confusion.  To do this the 
chapter makes use of the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo and the 
                                                                                                                                             
Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect, (Report of the Secretary-General, UN 
document A/64/864, 14 July 2010). 
527 ICISS Report 2011; Abiew 1999:58; Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams ‘The New 
Politics of Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 
82, no. 7 International Affairs 825; Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) Problematic Sovereignty: 




recent crisis in Syria.  This chapter however does not explain the manner 
in which sovereignty is pursued nor does it explain the escalation of 
conflicts over self-determination as it is beyond the limits of this thesis. 
 
Echoes of the Past – the Basic Principles 
 
There remains ongoing debate surrounding the protection of human 
rights during intra-state conflict.  Hoover argues the contestation over the 
meaning of human rights concerning protection for those caught in 
conflict situations is recognised within both the international and state 
systems.528  The meaning of human rights proves to be challenging not 
only due to its normative status and how that status is perceived as 
codified in the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2.4; but as Besson 
notes, because “[p]roponents of human rights usually have a hard time 
responding to critiques that bear on the justifications”529 of those rights 
when making decisions as to whether to intervene or not intervene.530    
 
As is well documented, earlier guiding principles relating to state 
sovereignty can be traced back to the agreements made by European 
states as part of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.531  The Peace of 
Westphalia initiated the modern western-European state system, 
                                                          
528 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 (A/RES/3/217 A) 1948 [online]. 
“Within the founding text of the contemporary human rights movement there is an 
ambiguous account of rights” (Jon Hoover ‘Rereading the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: Plurality and Contestation, Not Consensus’ (2013), 12 issue 2 Journal 
of Human Rights 217).  See, Michael Goodhart ‘Human Rights and the Politics of 
Contestation’ in Human Rights at the Crossroads Oxford University Press 2014. 
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international political behaviour” (Thakur & Weiss 2009); Evans 2009, Bellamy 2016. 
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established the nation-state as the principle actor in international law, and 
essentially institutionalized sovereign non-intervention.532  The non-
intervention rule became the central legal principle for the sovereign 
state and the international system.  The post-1945 system of international 
order is based on this model.533 
 
The non-intervention principle is also identified in a number of legal 
texts, including: regional and international treaties, United Nations 
resolutions and decrees of the International Court of Justice.  The 
incorporation of non-intervention is a founding principle of both the 
League of Nations Covenant534 and the United Nations Charter535, all of 
which confirm the rule’s formal primacy.  As a result, non-intervention is 
considered the supreme jus cogens norm of international law, and is 
defined as the authoritative principle recognised by the international 
community.536 
 
                                                          
532 Kelly 2000:110-111; Kritsiotis 1998. Non-intervention is a founding principle of 
both the League of Nations Covenant (Article 10, reprinted in Evans 2006:3) and the 
United Nations Charter (Article 2 paragraphs 4 and 7, reprinted in Evans 2006:9), all of 
which confirm the rule’s formal primacy. The non-intervention principle is also 
identified in several legal texts, including: regional and international treaties, United 
Nations resolutions and decrees of the International Court of Justice. 
533 Kelly 2000:402-409. “States jealously treasure the principle of non-intervention and 
it is the chief envy of aspiring states because it is the legal insurance of their sovereign 
existence” (Kritsiotis 1998:1009).  
534 League of Nations Covenant, article 10, reprinted in Evans 2005:3. 
535 The UN Charter, article 2 paragraphs 4 and 7, reprinted in Evans 2006:9. 
536 Jus Cogens is “the peremptory principles or norms recognised by the international 
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The twentieth century, however, witnessed a series of changes which 
affected the sovereign non-intervention principle.537  Two World Wars 
and the gross atrocities associated therein forever altered strategic 
assumptions between states and influenced decision-makers.  Because of 
these gross atrocities, decision-makers in the twentieth-century sought to 
establish, through the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact538 and 
the United Nations, an international legal framework that would 
centralize decision-making concerning the use of force and create a 
system to prevent the use of violence in resolving conflicts and attempt 
to minimize the impact of violence on citizens.  This culminated into the 
Charter of the United Nations, Article 2 (4).539   
 
The 1945 Nuremberg Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal in 
Tokyo began the modern international tribunal process by establishing 
legal precedent whereby international courts could bring legal action 
against political and military officials for war crimes and crimes against 
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humanity.540  The proceedings also promised the future installation of a 
permanent international tribunal.541 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),542 although not 
legally binding, was one of the first attempts by the international 
community to reconcile sovereignty and human rights.543  At the same 
time however the variance between justifications for the legality of 
humanitarian issues and the moral aspects associated with humanitarian 
concerns begins to appear.  For instance Besson argues justifications 
continue to affect the allocation of human rights practice because 
appropriate international action has yet to establish an effective 
mechanism or enforceable rules within either state or international 
systems.544  (Beeson’s position ties to this thesis’ theoretical argument 
concerning neoclassical realism’s ability to provide a viable enforcement 
mechanism to assist systemic information through foreign policy based 
on its level of analysis.) 
 
                                                          
540 For an opposing view on approaches to the installation of tribunals see Jon Kyl’s 
The War of Law: How New International Law Undermines Democratic Sovereignty 
(2013) who argues “the growing acceptance of transnational legal concepts has 
practical consequences. One has been the practice of courts targeting foreign officials 
for supposed wrongdoing. Using a 1994 law originally aimed at Rwanda’s 
genocidaires, activists in Belgium filed war crimes charges in 2003 against former U.S. 
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missile attack on Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War.” 
541  The International Criminal Court (ICC), under the Rome Statute, was adopted on 17 
July 1998 and came into effect on 1 July 2002.  The ICC’s aim is to advance the rule of 
law and the notion of international justice.  Unlike the ICJ, the ICC is legally and 
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certain powers to the United Nations Security Council. http://untreaty.un.org/cod/ icc/ 
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One of the key principles of the Declaration was to confirm a move in 
international affairs to human rights as an international concern.545  
Under the scope of the Declaration we began to witness a transformation 
in state and international accountability for human rights protection 
under the Covenants mandated by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ESCR).546  These Covenants emerged as quasi-legal 
international mechanisms for enforcing and protecting human rights 
within the international system.547   
 
Other enforcement mechanisms for human rights within the United 
Nations include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide,548 the High Commissioner on Human Rights, whose 
duties include ensuring that standards associated with human rights are 
met;549 the Human Rights Council;550 and treaty monitoring bodies.  
Their role as enforcement mechanisms is to encourage compliance and 
have a binding effect upon those who have agreed to them - in that it 
places international law into the legal systems of states to define and 
effect policy decisions.  This may afford the organizations within the UN 
accessibility in establishing higher standards but it will also act as a 
barrier at times.  This is possibly best witnessed by the treaty on 
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genocide, the laws of which were not enforced until the 1998 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda despite repeated knowledge 
of gross violations of human rights abuses during the 1990s and before. 
 
Although these UN organizations have some jurisdiction over cases 
concerning human rights, for example the settlement of international 
disputes by peaceful means, including arbitration and judicial settlement 
(Article 33)551 and to encourage the development of international law 
and its codification (Article 13);552 there are two different legal regimes 
at play.  This is because the enforcement of international law and 
therefore human rights is the legal responsibility of the state which acts 
as the initial path toward an effective enforcement mechanism.553  As a 
general rule there is a certain level of disparity between the human rights 
principles states have endorsed and the principles often discussed in 
foreign policy given that limitations inherent to any state’s legal 
institution will cause the state’s conduct to differ from the expectations 
of the international system.554 
 
During the Cold War the principle concerning humanitarian intervention 
was pushed, to some extent, in a different direction based upon the 
ideological objectives between communism and capitalism.555   Although 
the end of the Cold War brought about an optimistic international legal 
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environment, the focus of conflict subsequently shifted from an 
international struggle consisting of East-West hostilities to a situation 
comprised of several intra-state conflicts.  In which state order collapsed 
in some areas of the world, particularly Africa, often resulting in gross 
violations of human rights.556   
 
This shift in focus brought about further debate concerning human rights 
and the concept surrounding humanitarian issues.  Debate focused 
mainly on the question of whether violations of human rights constituted 
a threat to international peace and security.557  Holzgrefe questioned 
whether gross and systematic violations of human rights should be 
allowed to continue unchecked.558  Whilst Hehir noted there was “a 
marked unwillingness amongst States to intervene when national 
interests are not at stake regardless of the humanitarian suffering taking 
place."559  Wheeler’s argument centred on the change of norms in 
relation to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.560  The problem 
facing the international community at the time therefore was no longer 
that the Security Council was unwilling to intervene, but that it was 
unable to intervene in compliance with Article 2.7, which seemingly 
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prohibits intervention in situations ‘essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.’561   
 
Later the link between human rights and security was largely recognised 
by the United Nations Security Council who interpreted Article 39 (1992 
Somalia) as permitting collective involvement in intra-state conflicts.562  
By the end of the 1990s however and with the 1999 NATO intervention 
in Kosovo, the level of debate questioning whether such interventions 
needed Security Council approval increased.563  Nonetheless, as a result 
of the restored functioning of the Security Council, the majority of 
interventions after 1990 were authorized.  This includes the landmark 
decision for intervention in Somalia (Resolution 751)564 and the 
Resolutions authorising humanitarian action in Rwanda.  Although the 
intervention in Somalia was the first time a Chapter 7 intervention was 
initiated, the Somalia intervention failed to establish precedent for 
humanitarian intervention given that consistency in humanitarian actions 
was not developed.  Evidence of which was later witnessed by the 
inaction of the international community in Darfur, Rwanda and Kosovo, 
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despite evidence of systematic human rights violations severe enough to 
warrant humanitarian intervention.565   
 
The moral and legal justification for the Somalia intervention was based 
in Security Council Resolution 668 (Iraq 1991) which emphasised the 
relationship between violations of human rights within a state and the 
threat to international peace and security as sufficient for ordering 
humanitarian intervention.566  Resolution 668 however did not expressly 
authorize military intervention but it did elicit international debate with 
regard to paragraph one of the Resolution which read “a threat to 
international peace and security;”567 and which would later be justified in 
Operation Desert Fox (1991) by appealing to the fact that international 
peace and security were in danger.  Reasonably Resolution 668 could 
therefore be interpreted as expressing an evolving opinio juris regarding 
the legality of humanitarian intervention (the belief that an action was 
carried out because it was a legal obligation).568   
 
The basis of providing a discussion on humanitarian intervention relates 
to the theme of this thesis concerning how levels of intervention and 
changing international principles affected those caught within civil 
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conflict.  A discussion on the authorization of humanitarian interventions 
is not the subject of this thesis however. What is of subject are the legal 
and strategic factors that led states to develop decisions to intervene for 
humanitarian reasons in the framing of foreign policy, since 
humanitarian intervention involves the simultaneous application of laws 
on the use of force and attention to human rights.  The underlying 
problem is not whether a rule of international law is legally binding but 
rather how states interpret a rule of international law that reasonably 
claims application of the same question.   
 
For instance the scope of humanitarian intervention must operate within 
the law to establish legality.  The application of the question concerning 
intervention must include objective language and evidence to construct a 
case to intervene or not based upon the violation of human rights during 
the decision-making process at both the state and international levels.  
The basic principle of human rights represents the same principles in 
state and international laws.569  There are no differences about what 
human rights constitute, however the facts or circumstances and thus 
interpretations and justifications that may result in the protection of 
human rights differs for each state.   
 
It is suggested here that this difference is based upon the interpretation of 
those facts from within each state’s distinctive legal framework, the 
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values ascribed to the interest position at issue, and on the substantive 
limits that legislatures have enacted or on which courts have ruled.  
Therefore, while the fixed content of the rules of international law 
(sovereignty or the use of force or attention to human rights) is the same, 
the underlying difference is whether the rule meets the criteria of 
effective legality from within the relevant state (unfixed) and how that 
criterion is interpreted for application.   
 
Therefore, although states may agree that the principle of human rights 
exists (as well as laws on the use of force and sovereignty) the 
justifications and obligations under this principle are translated 
differently and will therefore affect the protection of civilians.  This is 
because the justification of human rights is based on information as 
received while the legitimacy of the rights requires authority.570  Such 
contestation over the protection of human rights is based on external 
normative grounds which international and state legal systems find 
difficult to reconcile relative to legal authority.571  This raises complex 
questions as to the implementation of human rights in both France’s and 
the U.S.’s legal systems and how the function of human rights may or 
may not effect legal change at the state and international level.  It also 
reflects a different understanding of the relationship between law and 
policy since laws are the standards and procedures governments should 
follow to achieve policy goals.572  This difference will have significance 
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when conditioned with issues of authority and legality for foreign policy, 
which as this thesis contends are determined by a state’s interpretation of 
an international rule at the domestic level. 
 
In line with the above, the next section examines the distinction between 
legitimacy and legality to determine the extent to which humanitarian 
rhetoric is undermined by the ongoing debate over the protection of 
human rights during intra-state conflict. 
 
Key Reoccurring Legal Debates on Humanitarian Intervention:  
 
Law and policy specialists have traditionally contrasted humanitarian 
intervention’s attention to human rights and state sovereignty by 
discussing under what circumstances the former should be allowed to 
interfere in the internal affairs of any given state.  In practice, discussions 
of what to do regarding intra-state violence when there is blatant 
humanitarian suffering remains prominent concerning failed states.   
 
As will be discussed in further detail below, most literature and debate 
analyse foreign policy and international law from the viewpoint of the 
legitimacy and legality of the use of force in humanitarian intervention at 
the systemic level.573  Bellamy argues “that this is largely due to 
lingering concerns about RtoP’s potential to legitimize interference in the 
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domestic affairs of states and other fears about abuse.”574  Besson argues 
that this systemic debate is because the issue regarding humanitarian 
intervention does not centre completely on the nature of the rights 
involved but also on when to enforce those rights.575  This is clearly 
reflected in Danish Institute Report (1999) and the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine (2001), which Wheeler and Bellamy argue were 
invoked to support international involvement against intra-state conflict 
but fail to bring state institutions into the discussion.576  The literature is 
therefore limited to how the state should respond to a humanitarian 
challenge relating to regional conflict.   
 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is historically strongly tied to 
the theory of just war (bellum justum).577  Throughout history the use of 
force was seen as the means for implementing foreign policy and 
resolving disputes among nation-states.578  The general inference behind 
the theory of just war and the Westphalian concept (non-intervention) is 
that a state is responsible for its own affairs as long as those affairs are 
within the limits of international law.579 Just war theory thus places an 
emphasis on legitimacy over legality which poses problems with the 
enforcement of the principles of international law.  There is extensive 
literature on just war theory and state sovereignty.  Michael Walzer 
provides the most contemporary discussion on non-intervention as the 
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moral integrity of the state.  Citing that the acceptance of intervention as 
only permissible when the state violates humanity’s morals.580  
Chesterman’s argument on sovereignty corroborates Walzer’s position.  
Chesterman argues that principles of sovereignty and non‐intervention 
reject the right of humanitarian intervention.581  This is central to the 
thesis argument in its attempt to understand the complexities associated 
with international legal principles and a state’s legal responsibilities 
when forming policy concerning concepts of sovereignty and 
intervention. 
 
The concept of state sovereignty was also to a certain extent one of the 
main considerations when the United Nations Charter came into force 
and is considered a codified normative principle of international law.582  
At the same time, the United Nations Charter prohibits resorting to war 
or using armed forces in order to resolve disputes through the principle 
of non-intervention.583  The principle of non-intervention is an outcome 
of this basic principle of sovereignty.584   
 
Krasner writes that it is assumed that no other power can intervene 
legitimately in the internal affairs of a sovereign state as it is the ultimate 
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authority within any international or state’s political system.585  This 
assumption of authority within political systems brings to the foreground 
the contradictions inherent in the concept on use of force and sovereignty 
- intervention and non-intervention for humanitarian concerns.  
Contradictions primarily due to the confusion created by the right to 
intervene and the duty to intervene.  As a result, this only positions 
further debate as to whether states have a legal right to act or do they 
have a moral obligation to act to maintain international peace and 
security.586     
 
Since most claims in international law must be made by a state this 
contradiction only presents larger limitations in legalizing moral 
standards for intervention at the international level.  This supports the 
constructive theory of the international system as anarchic, an 
assumption then mitigated by its subsequent dependency upon the state 
as an enforcement mechanism which is of importance when thinking of 
hierarchical political systems, as this study discusses. 
 
As a consequence this contradiction - between intervention that ensures 
respect for fundamental human rights and the principle of sovereign non-
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intervention - underlies the debate on humanitarian intervention.587  A 
contradiction the United Nations Charter itself highlights, as evidenced 
in Article 1(1) the maintenance of peace and security and Articles 2(4) 
on the probation of use of force and 2(7) non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of other states.588  When this confusion occurs, it 
becomes difficult to separate humanitarian motives from political 
motives, such was the case in Rwanda with regard to France’s sphere of 
influence (pré carré) status.589  Although sovereignty and non-
intervention are considered fundamental principles of the international 
system, intervention by external powers in the affairs of other states is 
now more than likely to occur during intra-state conflicts to remedy 
human rights abuses.  This is evidenced in the interventions in Iraq (1991 
and 2003), Somalia (1992), Libya (2011), as well as the inadequate 
response to the genocide in Rwanda (1994) and more recently Syria.   
 
Furthermore, in practice, because of humanitarian emergencies, 
intervention mandates may be provided retroactively.  For instance, 
France’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was made initially without a 
United Nations’ mandate.590  While it can be assumed that this “clearly 
challenges the central tenets of the international system and international 
law: the sovereign integrity of the state and non-interference into 
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domestic jurisdiction.”591  These precedents are not necessarily helpful if 
they are not saving lives and demonstrate further that the balance 
between respect for state sovereignty and humanitarian concerns has still 
not been found.   
 
These criticisms lead directly to the argument that “humanitarian 
intervention rests on the notion that the principle of self-determination is 
negated when a genocidal regime does not have the consent of the 
people, so the legal principle of non-intervention does not apply”.592  
This includes the perception that humanitarian intervention is a 
counterbalance to some degree against unilateral abuses of state 
sovereignty.593 
 
Francis Abiew has long argued that as long as there is “an overriding 
humanitarian motive … considerations of national interest should not of 
themselves, render illegal or illegitimate an armed intervention so long as 
the motive for the action is the protection of the most fundamental 
human rights”.594  This rationale corresponds to Tesón who writes 
“human values, not state values, are integral to the debate on what action 
is justifiable in the event of a humanitarian crisis.”595  In that a state loses 
its sovereignty when it fails to protect its citizens.596  Besson concurs 
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when she argues that the justification for human rights “should not be 
conflated with the object of human rights but often is … [We should] 
understand human rights as a justification of rights, and of legal and 
moral rights at the same time … as embedded in the legal practice of 
human rights.”597  
 
It is questionable whether it is actually possible to engage in a 
humanitarian action to rescue individuals being abused by a genocidal 
regime without engaging in military force of some type.  As the 
interventions in Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda as well as the recent crisis in 
Syria reveal, more often than not, it is difficult to preserve the credibility 
of the state and international systems in addressing humanitarian crises 
without resorting to the use of force.  Since inaction or reluctant 
intervention not only achieves very little but proves to be detrimental to 
those in the abusive situation.  In this sense it could be argued that the 
Security Council’s inability to act in Rwanda or Syria, amongst other 
violent conflicts, represents a more serious threat to the principle of 
human rights than its lack of action in Kosovo which was later ruled a 
humanitarian necessity.598  This casts doubt on the United Nations 
Charter as a legal framework for humanitarian intervention.  These 
doubts are not new, they began to surface as early as 1958 when Bowett 
and Brownlie asserted that the use of force when used to rescue abused 
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or threatened individuals does not violate a state’s sovereignty and is, as 
such, legal.599   
 
Suffice it to say that currently any argument about absolute 
sovereignty600 will prove to be limited when it relates to humanitarian 
intervention in the face of human rights abuse since human rights are in 
some sense binding to the state, and compel both domestic and 
international attention.  If nothing else, it is obvious that the principle of 
sovereignty no longer affords protection to failed states that grossly 
abuse their citizens.  From a legal perspective this limitation on the 
principle of non-intervention provides a clear development toward the 
changed scope of state sovereignty with regard to the state and human 
rights abuses.601   
 
The Danish Institute Report on Human Rights (“The Danish Report” 
1999) and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (“R2P” ICISS 2001) 
were established to move beyond the lack of consensus concerning 
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humanitarian intervention. 602  The Report was challenged because it 
attempted to establish from a practical perspective that “states may need 
more than humanitarian motives to be willing to intervene in a 
substantial way.”603  Its opponents argued that, in effect, it constituted a 
dismissal of other cultures or alternative political systems; ‘which 
consequently are seen as having insignificant value and neglect the 
conflicts that are forgotten by the media.’604  Such criticisms would, at 
times, appear relevant given that intervention efforts occurred in Somalia 
and Rwanda in order to remedy situations of fundamental human rights 
abuses committed by a state against its own people of which the 
consequences of those interventions caused further insecurity due to their 
failure.605 
 
R2P was developed in an effort to “reconceptualise the humanitarian 
intervention debate in the wake of the 1999 Kosovo crisis.”606  It was an 
attempt to reconcile the tension between sovereignty and human rights 
proposed by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen through their work with 
internally displaced persons (IDP).607  The concept for R2P as an 
emerging norm was reified in several established international legal 
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provisions, including Article 24 of the Charter.608  The viability of R2P is 
outlined in the ICISS Report (2001) and includes three responsible 
elements: prevent, react and rebuild.  By creating standard benchmarks 
the ICISS assumed that once states were given factual evidence of 
human rights violations a cohesive conclusion would be reached by the 
international community.   
 
To the contrary, cohesion did not happen because R2P reproduces the 
same contradictions that promulgated the need for intervention in the 
first place.609  The failure to incorporate specific criteria into the 
Document created weak dialogue that held the potential to adversely 
affect the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention decisions.  Particularly 
as humanitarian decisions will only gain legitimacy from clear and 
foreseeable legal standards.610 
 
As a result, in 2009 following the 2005 World Summit, the UN Secretary 
General issued a report on the implementation of R2P identifying state 
obligations under R2P.611  Gareth Evans commented that the justification 
used for the rationale behind the responsibility to protect language was 
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its capability of producing a response to extreme human rights abuses 
that the ‘right to intervene’ language could not.612  The change in 
language placed the focus on the protection of human rights (i.e. human 
security).  In doing so the focus shifted from traditional security concepts 
which made it difficult to justify intervention in conflict affected states, 
to the people affected by the conflict.613  Yet there was still nothing in 
the Document that established criteria for when humanitarian 
intervention is appropriate and/or necessary. 
 
R2P was then “perceived ... to create a new norm that would eventually 
‘legalize’ humanitarian intervention”.614  That the extent to which 
humanitarian intervention is allowed and legitimized is due to the nature 
and strength of a norm permitting humanitarian intervention.615  Yet the 
protection of human rights is contentious because states and the 
international community will translate protection according to their 
applicable mandates.  Consequently the moral justifications of human 
rights will differ significantly depending on how a state translates what it 
will perceive as its moral obligation. 
 
While some states may be willing to intervene to stop atrocities, the 
international system is reluctant to establish a norm that involves 
protection under the responsibility to react which may or may not 
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involve the use of force.616  In reality, it reinforces the divide between the 
implementation of international norms and how to implement those 
norms by means of the state.617  This has serious implications for the 
success of R2P.  While there may be justifiable benchmarks for 
humanitarian intervention, in effect the fundamental concern is to what 
extent has R2P contributed to the resolution of intra-state violence for 
humanitarian needs?  Moreover, the international community will be 
unable to determine if success has been met if there are no parameters 
specified to measure success.  This would imply that in certain aspects, 
R2P has not been institutional designed to promote consistent standard 
practice.  Although this question is not specifically addressed within the 
thesis it does illustrate the thesis’ position that that the interpretation of 
international principles at the domestic level, together with state interest, 
is crucial for effective legality from within the state.  And as such lends 
legitimacy to intervention and/or non-intervention decisions.  
 
Edward Luck has argued that “the strength of R2P lies in its limits, its 
application. There is a meaningful threshold that warrants intervention 
and agreement on that threshold as the UN helps to ensure a considerable 
degree of consensus and legitimacy.”618  Inasmuch as Luck’s argument 
may clarify and establish inferred standards for humanitarian 
intervention, it cannot refer to indeterminable legal obligations. He can 
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only reflect upon the legal obligations and as such does not establish any 
form of legal precedent.  This is because his argument neither explicitly 
creates nor alters any such legal obligations as to how those standards 
apply, particular with regard to the elements obliging the international 
community to respond to mass atrocities.  [Luck does not address this, 
his argument advances there is no need to.] 
 
Moreover, Luck’s argument is situated in the systemic level of law, not 
in the domestic level of law.  Therefore, can R2P be considered a norm if 
individual state practice is not associated with the legal implications of 
intervention for the existence of a norm.  Until a consensus can be 
reached concerning the obligations of R2P, when it should be invoked 
and by whose authority it should be invoked, it cannot be considered a 
norm nor can it be considered legally obligatory.619   
 
Despite the moral philosophy underlying the concept of intervention the 
question still remains as to how a legal right of humanitarian intervention 
translates into practice given that there are certain legal threshold 
conditions which must be met relative to human suffering.  Therefore, if 
intervention, by any definition, involves the intrusion of force onto 
another state, the focus must be on the degree to which the state’s 
legality of foreign policy makes use of international law to establish a 
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legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention to regulate its behaviour 
within a third state or issue area.  
 
Subsequently this thesis explores where humanitarian intervention, as a 
legitimate practice, and its interests interact with a state’s domestic law 
and interests in the formation of foreign policy that lead states to 
intervene.  This interaction will ultimately determine the course of a 
state’s foreign policy, especially since decision-makers have a tendency 
to look for and perceive factors that support their decisions.620 
 
According to this legal framework, decision-makers respond in a given 
manner not based on what is happening in the international environment, 
but rather from what they perceive the legality of the situation to be 
inasmuch as human rights “cannot provide justification external to the 
law”.621  This is in accordance with the findings of this thesis. 
Furthermore, as stated earlier, no one has yet addressed the issues 
surrounding transference of legal authority from the state to the 
international level.    
 
As the empirical cases will show, what decisions-makers perceive from a 
situation, as well as state laws and interest, influences the decision-
making process more than the situation itself.  To make a determination 
of the situation it is necessary to first identify the principles represented 
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by the humanitarian situation and then determine how these legal 
principles are to be interpreted for justification into practice.  Inasmuch 
as every decision requires interpretation of the facts presented, the 
perception of the decision-makers generally addresses two issues: 
information received at both the international and domestic level, and 
which information received is relevant to the decision and which is not.  
Accordingly, either a decision to use force for the protection of human 
rights or a decision to not intervene will be put forth.  As set out in 
chapter one, while states may agree upon which international principles 
to use in decision-making relating to humanitarian intervention, the 
application is always open to interpretation, because effectiveness rests 
upon interpretation.622   
 
As a result, the [moral] justification and rationale behind the framing of 
policy decisions stems from the differences in information and the 
interpretation of the information provided, including use of humanitarian 
language or the absence of such language, in the application process 
relevant to each conflict.623  It will therefore be necessary for the 
interpretation of the international principle, together with state interest, to 
meet the criteria of effective legality from within the relevant state.  
Decision-makers will therefore be aware of the necessity to interpret 
international principles that will afford legitimacy to their decisions in 
certain situations.  This is evident in the case of Somalia, where human 
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rights violations were interpreted as a threat to international peace and 
security and a Chapter 7 intervention was authorized for explicitly 
humanitarian purposes.624  Yet, in Rwanda although France’s general 
foreign policy approach was considered one of intervention at the time, 
intervention was based upon President Mitterrand’s personal relationship 
with Rwanda and not on the human rights violations.625  It was further 
shaped by bilateral cooperation and defence agreements between the two 
countries.626 
 
Therefore, since use of force in humanitarian intervention is a 
fundamentally domestic political decision, as is non-intervention, the 
way the facts are interpreted and the arguments are presented will have 
an impact in the decision-making process, especially when intervention 
is linked to human rights.  Indeed, although the international system (i.e., 
the United Nations) allows for the possibility of intervention, the scope 
of intervention is not determined by international law alone but by a 
pattern of interactions between the international system and a state’s 
domestic legal institutions to effect humanitarian concerns.   
 
Consequently, the conduct of states will differ from the expectations of 
the international system due to limitations which are inherent features of 
any state and which cannot be overcome at the international level.627  
Which as this thesis asserts is based upon the way law is created within 
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each state, as well as sources of law which lends legitimacy to state 
actions.  Therefore, while systemic pressures may create an agenda of 
reference for decision-makers (humanitarian situations position 
international rules/norms in the domestic legal framework) to explain 
foreign policy,628 these systemic pressures cannot assure relevance 
similar to a sovereign state’s legal-political structures. 
 
This again brings to the foreground the question of how states will 
interpret rules of international law as well as the role which international 
law plays in the domestic process during the course of foreign policy, 
because perceptions relevant to security and the moral issues associated 
with human rights are integral to, rather than independent of, foreign 
policy behaviour.  This gives identity to humanitarian crises by 
determining which humanitarian crisis warrants a response and how that 
response will be received since, as noted above, how a decision-maker 
perceives a situation will generally have more influence on foreign 
policy than the situation itself.    
 
Therefore if a legitimate exception to the principle of non-intervention 
rests upon the interpretation of humanitarian concerns, then the causal 
factors that influence the decision-making process, in large part, depend 
upon a state’s interpretation of a principle of international law that 
involves the simultaneous application of laws on the use of force and 
attention to human rights.  Since humanitarian intervention’s dependency 
                                                          




compels not only a moral duty upon states to intervene but also a legal 
duty per se within the jurisdiction of the state, interpretation is required 
to bridge the gap between international rules, the domestic legal-political 
framework, and the situations to which those rules apply.629   
 
Since foreign policy adhering to international law must be political to 
have influence, some degree of legal effectiveness is required.  In 
addition because policy decisions are considered equal to law, those 
decisions must be accompanied by some legal obligation or recognition 
about how authority is constituted and maintained within a state.630  The 
state therefore by using its domestic legal and political structures as a 
mechanism for international authority, allows for structures of hierarchy 
otherwise absent in the international system.  This analytic/problem-
solving point of view would consequently address the issue concerning 
the transference of legal authority from the state to the international 
level.631 
7. b. The Distinction between Legality 
and Legitimacy of Actions 
 
The purpose of this section is to clarify the distinction between legality 
and legitimacy.  When and how to intervene are directly linked to the 
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legality and legitimacy of actions which are generically criss-crossed by 
the interplay between law and policy.   
 
Although both terms are used frequently when discussing humanitarian 
intervention, very little attention is actually given to what the terms mean 
or how they work. Nor has anyone noted the persistent gap between 
legality and legitimacy which is rooted in the disconnect between the 
international rules that attempt to govern conflict situations.  This is quite 
relevant because this disparity is the foundation for the lack of consensus 
that causes humanitarian intervention to rather ironically exacerbate 
conflict rather than diffuse it.     
 
While it is easy enough to deduce that legality relates to the lawfulness 
of a rule, there is no model of legitimacy that provides for the 
effectiveness of international law within the decision-making process.  
Although there is evidence that decision-makers take the power of 
international legitimacy seriously,632 the concept itself rarely receives 
attention in an analysis of a state’s established normative structure of 
rules, despite international legal obligations that may be created.  
Consideration of the interaction between a state’s established normative 
structure of rules and humanitarian intervention was particularly true in 
the early 1990s when there were no formal policy guidelines or 
mechanisms for humanitarian intervention decisions in place at either the 
international or state level.   
                                                          






Accordingly, this section performs two tasks.  First it will distinguish 
between the legality and legitimacy of actions for humanitarian 
intervention.  It then focuses on the case of the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999, the recent crisis in Syria and the debates stemming from 
the United Nations Charter.  Discussing the complications that arose with 
Kosovo in defining legality and legitimacy in decisions to intervene with 
force or not.  This draws particularly attention to legitimacy concerns 
and how these concerns may dominate other considerations in the 
decision-making process as a reason for reluctance to undertake an 
intervention with force, such as was the case in Rwanda, which reads 
directly into the empirical studies of this thesis.  Finally, as an example 
of the legality-legitimacy dilemma regarding the legal standardisation for 
the use of force necessitated by humanitarian intervention, this section 
discusses the quagmire underscoring Kosovo’s continuing legacy and the 
lack of international enforcement mechanisms which continue to 
complicate intervention decisions and illustrates the importance of the 
legal and theoretical assertions of this thesis.  
 
Legality and Legitimacy 
The interpretation of humanitarian crises as threats to international peace 
and security reveals the intricate link between legality and legitimacy.  
Although legality and legitimacy are often considered synonymous, a 
distinction can be made between the legality and the legitimacy of 




scope of humanitarian intervention must operate within the law to 
establish legality, despite the international legal obligations that may be 
created. 
 
Legality is about the lawfulness of a rule, its duties and its obligations, 
“whether and under what conditions international law [or domestic law] 
authorizes such actions.”633  Legitimacy has to do with justification of 
the rule, its ability to conform to or act in accordance with said 
established rules, standards or principles and “the normative status of 
humanitarian intervention as an instrument of international justice.”634  
Legitimacy is what gives a state’s government its moral authority and the 
standards for that legitimacy are grounded in the law.635  However the 
law is only the beginning, because public perceptions of legitimacy are 
also shaped by moral standards and values derived from legal 
traditions.636  These standards of legitimacy reflect cultural values and 
define public perceptions of what is right and proper for a state including 
limits on the use of force and are the measure of legal and political 
legitimacy. 
 
Consequently Chesterman and Slaughter contend legitimacy is the 
reason legal rules are obeyed, both domestically and internationally.  
There are procedural as well as substantive reasons; that is to say, the 
                                                          
633 Holzgrefe 2003:18; Brunnée & Toope 2010. 
634 Holzgrefe 2003; Coleman 2007:27, writes that “legitimacy is a public judgment 
according to public rules”.  
635 Ibid. 




ideas which support the notion that rules must be regarded.637  For 
instance, humanitarian intervention becomes a legal and legitimate action 
in international law as well as an action in foreign policy by process of 
domestic institutions.  For the purpose of this research, legitimacy is also 
a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and is 
defined by the actor’s perception of its legal and political institutions.638  
Institutions as defined in the Introduction of this Thesis are the rules and 
codes for governing that produce foreign policy.   
Tucker and Hendrickson expand on the differences between legality and 
legitimacy: 
[L]egitimacy arises from the conviction that state action 
proceeds within the ambit of law, in two senses: first, that 
action issues from rightful authority, that is, from the 
political institutions authorized to take it; and second, that it 
does not violate a legal or moral norm. Ultimately, however, 
legitimacy is rooted in opinion, and thus actions that are 
unlawful in either of these senses may, in principle, still be 
deemed legitimate. Despite these vagaries, there can be no 
doubt that legitimacy is a vital thing to have, and illegitimacy 
a condition devoutly to be avoided.639 
 
As discussed previously,640 contemporary legal debates about 
humanitarian intervention typically begin and end with the Charter of the 
United Nations.  Article 2.4 prohibits the threat or use of force against 
another state, thus restricting jus as bellum as a customary right to war 
held by sovereign states.  Various debates on intervention and numerous 
international legal instruments treat the United Nations Charter’s ban on 
the use of force in absolute terms except where authorized by the Charter 
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itself.641  The doctrine of R2P reasserts this authorization under the guise 
of the Security Council.642   
 
Non-intervention, the Inability to Act 
Under the Security Council criterion the ICISS Report (2001 “R2P”) 
attempts to justify the breach of the norm of non-intervention.  There is 
an ambiguity however.  R2P may offer language that emphasizes the role 
of the international system in aiding states to comply with citizen 
responsibility but R2P says nothing about the international system’s 
failure to intervene.643  This is disconcerting because the failure to 
intervene is central to critical discussions of human rights protection.  
Non-intervention is “presumably as politically powerful as the practice 
of intervention, and must somehow be accommodated into the 
argument.”644   
 
Non-intervention is not the same as neutrality however when gross 
violations of human rights are at issue.  Neutrality does not provide 
human rights protection.  It condones human rights violations by 
perceiving human rights from a subjective position instead of its 
objective variances.645   Yet the question of whether this is sufficient to 
address challenges which arise out of the disparity between humanitarian 
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intervention and state sovereignty is another concern that remains 
unresolved.  It is likely to remain unresolved pursuant to Switzerland’s 
apathy following the recent ruling of the European Court of Human 
Rights denying the genocide of the Armenian people which subsequently 
affects Switzerland’s Swiss-Armenian citizens.646 
 
It should also be noted that Article 2.4 is not an absolute prohibition 
against the use of force.  It is simply a general prohibition, allowing 
exceptions in certain circumstances.647  These exceptions can be found 
for instance within Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which discusses 
collective operations, Article 51, self-defence and Article 53 discusses 
measures taken against enemy states, all of which include permissible 
use of force.648  Because of these exceptions Ferencz & Perkovich have 
argued “that once the right of self-defence is conceded Article 2.4 can no 
longer be regarded as an absolute prohibition of the use of force and that 
it is consequently a matter of interpretation whether other situations 
merit an exception to the rule.”649  This absolute view was held with 
regard to sovereignty but the absolute principle regarding sovereignty 
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has foregone necessary changes to meet current societal needs as 
outlined earlier in this chapter.   
 
In addition, while provisions within the Charter create a framework for 
international law wherein the use of force ought to be applied only as a 
last resort, international law has yet to establish any mechanism or 
procedure which has the capacity to direct this process.650  In other 
words, there is no set precedent, for instance as with the Caroline case,651 
for the legal standardization of the use of force for the necessity of 
humanitarian intervention.   
 
As a consequence, while the right to intervene has been established, it 
has not been mandated.  The guidelines established by R2P are not rules 
on intervention and are therefore not state compulsory.  As a result, the 
right to authorize intervention with force continues to be a key point of 
debate652 and is as problematic now as in the 1990’s when there were no 
legal guidelines or legal mechanisms in place.   
 
Kosovo and Syria - Between Legitimacy and Legality  
This interplay between the concepts of legality and legitimacy was 
illustrated best when in 2000 the Independent International Commission 
on Kosovo established by the UN Security Council, concluded, amongst 
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its findings, that the NATO action in Kosovo was not legal, but that it 
was legitimate.653 Intervention was justified due to humanitarian 
necessity.654  This was a crucial ruling and points to a continuously 
challenging dilemma that the international community faces in 
responding to security threats, in that it re-established the inconsistency 
between legality and legitimacy of actions.   
 
Falk and Franck, amongst other authors, wrote opposing points of view 
following the Kosovo decision.  Falk stated that the “Kosovo dilemma 
disclosed an undesirable gap between legitimacy and legality.  Whereas 
Franck, when evaluating the work of the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo, stated that it was a contribution towards 
bridging the gap…between legality and legitimacy (italics added).655  An 
obvious criticism to these arguments, made by this research, of course, is 
that their opposing comments not only challenge but further illustrate the 
inconsistency between legitimacy and legality.  This only serves to 
reinstate the fundamental problems of humanitarian intervention during 
the 1990s and one which continues today.   
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Although Tucker, Hendrickson and the Kosovo decision attempt to 
distinguish between legality and legitimacy this distinction neither 
identifies nor attempts to remedy the disparity brought about by the 
disconnect between the international rules that attempt to govern conflict 
situations.656  In other words, any distinction that has been made between 
legality and legitimacy does not reconcile the inconsistency.   
 
The key issue here is that the result of Kosovo decision alludes to the 
position that legitimacy is more important than legality in the 
international arena when it comes to use of force for intervention 
purposes.  In effect, this seemingly gives plausibility to the balance 
between what is legal and what is legitimate.  During the 1990s there 
were no formal legal guidelines in place, the legitimacy of the use of 
force relied upon standards of legality.  The Kosovo decision however 
has reversed this legal standard and put forth the use of force as 
“implicitly legalized by international law.”657   
 
“[W]hen a nation seeks to justify its action by asserting that international 
law is or ought to be something else, the justification in effect admits 
violation, especially when the nation cannot reasonably expect that its 
‘proposed norm’ would be acceptable.”658 This is evidenced in this 
study’s empirical chapters.  Interventions undertaken by France in Africa 
contain legitimacy problems because of its colonial past, whereas 
legitimacy problems concerning the United States in Africa are based 
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upon its controversial interventions record.  It is easy to conclude that the 
distinction between legality and legitimacy on concerns whether to 
intervene with force or not was to become a debate on the role of the 
state regarding international law because the legacy of Kosovo is that it 
does not actually establish precedent.659  This is witnessed in the 2003 
Iraq invasion where even now it is argued that the invasion was legal 
since authorization was implied but not legitimate because evidence did 
not substantiate the laws relied upon.660   
 
This dilemma was one of the rationales behind the development of the 
R2P doctrine.661  It was developed as an operating principle in an attempt 
to reconcile this disparity but still questions focus on the legality and 
legitimacy of the doctrine’s components, particularly legal grounds for 
the use of force.  An example of which is the current civil unrest in Syria.   
 
Wilson argues the Syrian humanitarian crisis only serves to promulgate 
the Kosovo legacy.662  Arguments are ongoing about the legality and 
legitimacy for a use of force action in Syria without Security Council 
approval, with proponents citing Kosovo and the ongoing moral dilemma 
to prevent further civilian tragedy.  Debate on the use of force in Syria 
centers on the responsibility to protect (R2P) in an attempt to increase 
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the pressure on the international community to act, but once again as in 
Kosovo, the Security Council is in deadlock; legally rendering the 
Council ineffective and unable to reconcile laws on the use of force and 
human rights.663 
 
Admittedly, the deadlock does provide a cross check that serves the 
purpose it was designed for.664  Paradox aside, this deadlock does not 
support international guidelines instituted in legal doctrine, such as R2P, 
concerning the protection of civilians caught in protracted situations of 
intra-state violence.  If anything the deadlock strengthens the disparity 
and substantive legal issues between the legality and legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention and the international rules that attempt to 
govern intra-state conflict situations associated with an intervention.   As 
a result, Syria illustrates that R2P’s reliance on the legal framework of 
the United Nations may prove to be ineffective in its practical application 
since intervention decisions only obtain legitimacy from clear and 
predictable legal standards.665 
 
The question then arises, who decides the need for a military 
humanitarian intervention in specific cases when the Security Council is 
unable to make a decision for use of force when humanitarian concerns 
arise in specific cases.  How are the principles interpreted into practice to 
affect legality when cases of humanitarian concerns arise?  Certainly 
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inaction into a humanitarian crisis would render Edwards Luck’s 
rationale on UN assistance ensuring a considerable degree of consensus 
and legitimacy for human rights protection as arbitrary.666   
 
There will always be different views and interpretations, as well as 
opposition, on when to intervene.  The United Nations and its member 
states intervened in Somalia with Chapter 7 use of force operations (as 
well as Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti and more recently Libya) but not in Rwanda 
until genocide was shown as a feasible motive to intervene.667  This was 
after the United States, United Kingdom and France cast vetoes against 
intervention, supported by Rwanda who sat on the Security Council 
during the crisis.668  However, use of force concerning human rights 
abuses was overlooked in the Kosovo crisis, wherein NATO took 
military action without express authorization from the Security Council.  
Syria reiterates the quagmire associated with Kosovo and the lack of 
international enforcement mechanisms which continue to complicate 
intervention decisions.669  As a consequence, seventeen years after the 
Kosovo intervention we still question its effect on intervention decisions.  
Thus Kosovo misdirects the establishment of precedent for legal grounds 
involving laws on the use of force and the attention to human rights.670 
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It would appear that the substantive relationship between the legality and 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention rests on the extent to which the 
rules (norms) of international law are interpreted within a state’s legal 
framework and how the state constructs that legal principle within 
foreign policy to prevent or stop human rights abuses.671  In any legal 
system issues of legal procedure and legal substance are involved as well 
as sources of law which are formed by relevant interest in any 
humanitarian situation.672  As such legitimacy concerning the use of 
force in humanitarian intervention will reveal that there are established 
legal institutions, both international and domestic, that interact with the 
decision-making process in the framing of decisions that lead states to 
intervene.   
 
As set out in chapter two and illustrated in the next section, in both 
France and the United States issues of legal procedure and legal 
substance are involved as well as the sources of state law which are 
formed by state interest. As such legitimacy concerning the use of force 
and protection of human rights will reveal that there are established legal 
institutions, both international and domestic, that interact with the 
decision-making process in the framing of foreign policy that lead states 
to intervene.  Humanitarian issues become part of the interpretative 
practice of a state because such issues are ruled from within, through 
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interpretation, rather than outside.  This allows the state through its legal 
and political structures to commit to the fixed limitations of legitimacy in 




The need to reconcile intervention with the principle of sovereignty is a 
critical issue in any debate on humanitarian intervention, which evolved 
with the Peace of Westphalia and established the nation-state as the 
principle actor in international law.  Despite inherent contradictions 
between the use of force and sovereignty, following the atrocities 
associated with two World Wars in the twentieth century components of 
sovereignty were set in humanitarian norms, such as the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.   
 
Yet it was not until the post–Cold War world that gross violations of 
human rights were recognised by the international community as 
constituting threats to international peace and security.  The balance 
between respect for state sovereignty and humanitarian concerns 
however had not been found. States were still unable to identify how 
these norms translated into practice when cases of humanitarian concerns 
arose.  One explanation for this controversy was that there were no 
formal legal guidelines or legal mechanisms at the state level for 
humanitarian intervention decisions in place at the time.  This problem 
                                                          




was situated in the capacity of states to produce institutions at the 
domestic level capable of supporting humanitarian principles through the 
foreign policy process.  The Danish Institute Report and Responsibility 
to Protect Doctrine were established after the intervention in Kosovo to 
move beyond this but the disparity by which humanitarian intervention 
becomes a legal and legitimate action in international law as well as in 
state policy persists.  
 
This brings about the question of authority within a state’s legal and 
political structures because if intervention, by any definition, involves 
the use of force onto another state, the focus must be on the degree to 
which foreign policy makes use of international law to establish a legal 
basis for humanitarian intervention to regulate its behaviour.  Such a 
focus draws attention to the role of international law in shaping 
humanitarian intervention as a legitimate exception to the principle of 
non-intervention within foreign policy.  Especially since humanitarian 
intervention is dependent upon legal, as well as political concerns that 
inevitably influence policy outcomes, at this thesis contends.674   
 
Subsequently, while states may agree upon which international principles 
to use in decision-making, the application is always open to 
interpretation, because effectiveness rests upon interpretation.  Therefore, 
while the content of the rules of international law is the same, the 
underlying difference is whether the rule meets the criteria of effective 
                                                          




legality in the relevant jurisdiction and how that criterion is interpreted.  
The legitimacy or legality of an action may enter into the decision 
process of states, but states pursue actions that are determined by their 
interpretation of a rule of international law.  Thus, the underlying 
problem remains, which is not whether a rule of international law is 
binding but rather how states translate into practice a rule of international 
law that reasonably claims application of the same question so that the 
rule arguably functions within the international system.   
 
This reinforces the main claim of this thesis.  That the interpretation of 
international law and its conceptualisation at the domestic level, through 
a state’s domestic legal framework, is crucial to understanding how state 
and international law interact simultaneously in foreign policy to effect 
humanitarian concerns. 
 
Thus far this study has identified two dependent characteristics that 
states may utilize to legally construct international law within foreign 
policy as it relates to whether or not to use force.  First, chapter one 
argued that based upon Christian Tomuschat’s assertions that 
international law has “no source of democratic legitimacy on its own, its 
democratic [autonomous] credentials rest on the democratic processes 
within a state and that states utilize this dependency to construct 
international law within foreign policy.”675  This corresponds to this 
section’s assertion that humanitarian intervention is dependent upon not 
                                                          




only the moral and political duties of states to intervene but also a legal 
duty within the jurisdiction of the state to use force or to not intervene 
when human rights are at issue.   
 
At the core of humanitarian intervention is the question of how to 
reconcile in the most productive way the degree to which force is used 
internationally to constrain illegitimate force domestically.  This belief 
was codified in the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4).676  Two 
World Wars and the atrocities associated therein forever altered strategic 
assumptions between states.  During the Cold War ideological objectives 
assumed a duty to intervene in the domestic affairs of states.677   
 
Yet, the 1990s witnessed a decade of humanitarian intervention, a decade 
which began with the expectation of ending massive human rights 
abuses.  These hopes vanished after failures in Somalia and Rwanda 
(amongst others), but the international community’s responsibility to 
protect and assist people reflects the evolving concepts of use of force 
and sovereign non-intervention.678   
 
To date, however international consensus on appropriate international 
action does not yet exist nor has international law established an 
effective mechanism which has the capacity to direct this process.  As 
this author argues though, by interpreting international legal principles 
through the domestic legal framework, a state theoretically provides an 
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enforcement mechanism.  As a result, and taken together, the legal and 
theoretical framework of international legal study and foreign policy as 
set out in sections one and two, constitutes the pursuit of legality within 
humanitarian intervention decisions. 
 
In situating the historical background and debates concerning 
humanitarian intervention to the legal and theoretical framework, this 
section segues to Section Four, the empirical portion of the thesis - the 
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IV. Testing the Theory: the Empirical Chapters 
Section Four is the empirical portion of the thesis.  It includes the case 
studies of humanitarian intervention in four regional conflicts in sub-
Saharan Africa.  In applying neoclassical realism, the chapters that 
follow illustrate how the United States and France responded to each 
humanitarian crisis as they each constructed the case to intervene or not 
to intervene.  In this section it becomes evident that a state’s legal 
framework will enhance the state’s strategic use of legal reasoning and 
legal argument to focus on the legitimacy of the international principles 
at issue, which ultimately affects the course of action a state may be 
willing to take in humanitarian intervention decisions. 
 
As set out previously, humanitarian intervention is used as a case study 
because it captures the tension in domestic foreign policy decisions 
between levels of intervention such as whether to use force, or whether 
or not to intervene concerning the protection of human rights.  These 
levels of intervention are particularly important when differences in 
domestic law and international law come into conflict with the 
implementation of humanitarian objectives.   
 
The four regional conflicts examined have different historical 
backgrounds and occurred at different times in the larger geopolitical 
context (1989 vs. 2002).  Each conflict however relates directly to legal-
political challenges involved in the formation of foreign policy with state 




still have a wider relevance for humanitarian concerns today.  Each 
conflict answers the question of how states arrive at different 
interpretations of the same principle of international law to regulate its 
behaviour within a third state or issue area.  Thus, leading to a clearer 
understanding of how the strategic use of interpretation and legal 
reasoning reflects the different legal and political traditions of the two 
countries under study, France and the United States, even when each 
state faces the same systemic pressures.  This legal behaviour will show 
where humanitarian intervention, as a legitimate practice, and its 
interests interact with a state’s domestic law in the formation of foreign 
policy that lead states to intervene, or as in the cases of Liberia and 
initially Rwanda, to not intervene.  This will account for the 
effectiveness of international law within the decision-making process.  In 
that it identifies how a state theoretically provides an enforcement 
mechanism for international authority at the state level through its unit-
level/intervening variables (legal institutions). 
 
Section Four is structured as follows: initially a brief outline on Post-
Cold War Developments in sub-Saharan Africa is provided.  Chapter 
Eight then analyses United States foreign policy decisions concerning the 
Liberian civil war (1989) and Chapter Nine analyses Operation Restore 
(1992, Somalia).  Following this chapter, Chapters Ten and Eleven 
analyse the foreign policy decisions of France in Opération Turquoise 
(1994, Rwanda) and the ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (2002,current), 




overview of the history of each conflict and the stance of the United 
States and France toward the countries under study in Africa.   
 
To determine the effectiveness of international law within the domestic 
legal framework, three causal factors are proposed as affecting the 
influence of the principles of international law on the policy process of 
each conflict.  They are: 1) the decision-makers’ arguments for foreign 
policy reasoning; 2) the domestic legal framework, which includes legal 
tradition and sources of law; and 3) the actions of the United Nations.  
Aside from helping to answer the research questions; the causal factors 
will also help to determine how systemic pressures create an agenda of 
reference for decision-makers to affect legality and how this is 
interpreted to explain foreign policy, as explained by the basic 
architecture of neoclassical realism. 
 
In addition, because states often react differently to similar systemic 
pressures and decision-makers responses may be less motivated by 
systemic-level factors than domestic ones; several separate possible 
rationales for decisions to use force or to not intervene, specific to each 
conflict, are examined.   
 
Post Cold-War Developments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Despite international developments in human rights during the 1970s and 
1980’s, it was not until after the end of the Cold War that there was any 




human rights or for that matter any form of domestic accountability.679  
The reasoning behind this was because as long as Africa was placed 
between the United States and Soviet Union, policies of containment 
were adopted to limit Soviet expansion.680   
 
The security vacuum following the end of the Cold War in Africa was 
subsequently filled with internal conflicts which included not only 
massive human rights abuses against civilians but also the genocide of 
nearly one-half million people in a matter of months in Rwanda.  One of 
the problems faced by African states, and compounded by the security 
vacuum, was a lack of leadership and thus a lack of authority.  Such was 
the case in Liberia and Somalia and followed soon thereafter by Rwanda. 
 
 One characteristic of these failing states was the greater their 
relationship with global economic markets, the more the rulers of the 
failing African states appeared to be predisposed to becoming warlords.  
As a result there were often several actors within each African state 
competing for the same right to claim domestic authority and ultimately 
exacerbating internal conflict.681  Since the 1990s Africa’s internal 
conflicts have caused more deaths than anywhere else in the world.  As 
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well as causing extensive disruption to Africa’s fragile political and 
economic systems, destroying most of its infrastructure.  This included 
health and education, and also damaging the environment which in turn 
has contributed to further conflict.682  To date, insecurity continues to 
affect the African continent as a whole.683  
 
International security also changed significantly with the end of the Cold 
War.684  This altered perceptions of security toward Africa.  First, the end 
of the Cold War reduced geo-strategic interest in Africa.  Africa was 
therefore perceived to be only of marginal importance regarding global 
security issues.685  These security perceptions changed following the 
failure of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the genocide in 
Rwanda.  Thereafter issues associated with failed states and internal 
conflicts appeared not only on France’s and the United States’ political 
agendas but the world as a whole as well.686  
 
As a consequence humanitarian intervention in Africa would prove to be 
controversial, both when intervention happened and when it failed to 
happen.687  In the case of Liberia’s collapse into anarchy and massacres 
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the United States hesitantly failed to intervene, despite its long standing 
relationship with Liberia.688  In Operation Restore Hope, United Nations 
forces had to be rescued by United States military forces and then both 
withdrew and left Somalia in chaos.  Moreover, although it is argued that 
the failure to intervene in Rwanda is one of the greatest scandals of the 
twentieth century, controversy surrounded France’s involvement in 
Rwanda regarding Opération Turquoise.689  Meanwhile France’s 
“presence and use of force in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict involuntarily, but 
in effect, separated the state in two.”690   
 
With this in mind, the following chapters will focus on how the United 
States and France responded to each humanitarian challenge through the 
legal-political decision-making process and the degree to which foreign 
policy makes use of both state and international law concerning 
humanitarian intervention. 
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The United States: Liberia & Somalia 
 
The United States’ presence in Africa only became significant after 
World War I and African independence.  During the Cold War, United 
States foreign policy toward Africa had little to do with Africa.691  It was 
instead rationalized by the need to protect western interests and limit 
Soviet expansion.692 
 
In December 1992 President Bush (H.W.) sent military forces to Somalia 
to provide for the delivery of food and emergency supplies.693  The 
operation had the full support of the United Nations to “use all necessary 
means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief in 
Somalia.”694  In direct contrast to the use of force for humanitarian 
objectives in Somalia is the lesser known Liberian conflict.  In December 
1989, a small band of rebels began a civil war that claimed the lives of 
nearly ten percent of the population and all but destroyed Liberia’s 
economic infrastructure.  Diplomatic efforts were held in an effort to find 
a resolution, but a military intervention was ruled out.695  
 
Somalia illustrates a multilateral intervention led by the United States for 
the purpose of the protection of human rights, one which permitted the 
use of military force for that protection.  Liberia on the other hand is 
clearly a case of non-intervention but one that should have necessitated 
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the same type of human rights protection. Their case studies illustrate the 
rationales that brought about such different foreign policy outcomes 
. 
8. Liberia 
United States Relations with Liberia 
The United States has had a long-standing relationship with Liberia 
which included direct political and economic involvement dating back to 
the nineteenth century when the American Colonization Society, a 
private, philanthropic organization, assisted freed American slaves in 
settling on the African coast.696  Liberian state structure and society 
reflected a blend of indigenous and Americo-Liberian cultural and 
political influences, which included adopting the United States 
Constitution as a model and the dollar as their currency until the mid-
1980s.697 
 
In the early years of independence a United States military presence was 
established in Liberia to discourage French and British colonial 
intentions, as well as U.S. interest in Robertsfield Airport.698  In 1926 
Firestone Tire and Rubber established operations in Liberia further 
increasing United States-Liberian ties and became the principal private-
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sector employer.  Several defence cooperation pacts were signed in the 
1940s and the United States Peace Corps was present in Liberia from 
1962 to 1990.  The United States was Liberia’s leading pre-civil war 
trading partner and a major aid donor until the Liberian civil war began 
in 1989.699   
 
When the civil war began, the United States choose not to intervene.  
Instead U.S. citizens were evacuated from Liberia and talks to establish a 
peacekeeping force were not favoured in Washington.700  While the 
United States supported the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS)701 both financially and diplomatically, early 
negotiations that sought to involve the United Nations were unsuccessful 
and Liberia was not placed on the United Nations’ agenda until nearly 
three years later.702  
 
Background to the Liberian Conflict (1989-1997) 
On 24 December 1989 the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led 
by Charles Taylor crossed into Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire to remove 
Samuel Doe as the dictatorial Liberian President.  President Doe tried to 
contain the threat of the NPFL with the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) 
but Taylor defeated Doe’s forces.  By July 1990 all civil authority within 
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Liberia had broken down.703  In August 1990, members of the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
attempted to impose a cease-fire through military intervention.704  The 
ECOMOG intervention was undertaken after the United Nations and the 
United States declined to intervene in the civil war.  In September 1990 
President Doe was captured, tortured and killed.705   
 
The conflict that ensued escalated into a seven-year civil war despite the 
signing of multiple peace agreements, the presence of United Nations 
observers706 and the deployment of a regional intervention force 
dispatched by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS).707  A peace process, initiated in mid-1996, resulted in the 
July 1997 election of Charles Taylor as president of Liberia.708 
 
The Humanitarian Situation of the Liberian Conflict 
The civil war shocked much of the world by the extent of its bloodshed 
and human tragedy largely due to Taylor’s systematic abuse of human 
rights.  According to the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) it is estimated that the conflict caused between 150,000 and 
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200,000 deaths and displaced much of the population.709  It also caused 
considerable reduction to rural food production and cut off international 
trade, causing hunger and widespread malnutrition.710  In April 1998, 
international donors agreed to resume aid to Liberia.  In September of the 
same year, Liberia received foreign assistance from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  In March 1999, UNDP provided Liberia with 3.4 
million dollars for housing construction and a credit programme for 
small business owners.711  A second civil war broke out in Liberia in 
April 1999 which lasted until 2003.712 
 
United States Policy toward the Liberian Conflict 
 
As Liberia’s civil war escalated many Liberians hoping for intervention 
from the United States were surprised when the United States did not 
intervene.  Instead United States citizens were evacuated from Liberia.  
Hopes for a United States peacekeeping force were thwarted.  Former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen, wrote that the 
various agencies within the State Department and other African agency 
specialists supported a United States intervention in Liberia to protect 
United States facilities and pursue resolution of the conflict.713  This was 
in addition to the evacuation of United States citizens from Liberia.  For 
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the policymakers responsible for Africa, Liberia was a concern not only 
for obvious humanitarian reasons but also because it “threatened to 
destabilize an entire region given that the civil war in Liberia would most 
likely spill over into the neighbouring countries.”714  However, according 
to Cohen, higher-level decision-makers did not share these objectives 
and saw little need for a United States role in Liberia.715  Kevin George 
reiterated Cohen’s sentiment when speaking before the United States 
Senate.  
“Unfortunately, the [first] Bush administration did not place 
Liberia high on its list of foreign affairs priorities.  President 
Bush did not ever publicly speak about the conflict in 
Liberia. Former Secretary of State James Baker III never 
publicly spoke about the conflict in Liberia. This lack of 
high-level concern for Liberia among the top leadership of 
the U.S. Government was perceived by Liberians as 
abandonment and may have fostered a continuation of the 
conflict.”716 
 
Senator Nancy Kassebaum raised the Liberia issue with Bush’s 
administration officials in the mid-1990s but her concern received very 
little Congressional support from either political party.717  Administrative 
policymakers were, however, considering the Liberian situation from a 
number of different perspectives particularly as Roberts Field airport 
possessed a facility for storing military supplies as well as Liberia’s 
proximity to Angola.718  Another issue was Libya's role in supporting 
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Charles Taylor.  Because of this support the isolation of Libya was a 
priority for some of the higher level decision-makers.719   
 
The principle input for the Liberian decision-making process came from 
the State Department and the Defense Department via the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA).  This low level of input stemmed from the 
decline of an official United States presence in Liberia and as a result 
some policymakers viewed Liberia as peripheral to United States 
interests.720  The State Department called for numerous interagency 
meetings, including a number of Deputy Committee meetings, most of 
which took place via secure television, in part due to the 1992 
Government cables leaked to the NPFL who then released the cables to 
the press.721   
 
From the early stages of the conflict the Defense Department made it 
clear that it was not interested in spending resources in an area not 
considered strategically important and the National Security Council 
agreed.722  The State Department also found it difficult to put forth a case 
for military intervention because “all sides in the Liberian conflict were 
committing atrocities.”723  In addition, a BBC documentary entitled 
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“wigs vs. skirts”, viewed by numerous policymakers, “vividly depicting 
the role of African juju (magic)” significantly influenced the decision-
making process.724   
 
As a consequence Liberia was no longer favoured with particular 
attention or engagement and a basic position of non-interference in 
Liberian internal affairs became an appropriate guiding principle for 
United States’ foreign policy.725  According to Cohen however, others 
believed that the historically close relationship between the United States 
and Liberia obligated the United States to take some responsibility 
toward Liberia’s humanitarian needs and human rights abuses.  This 
included the developmental needs necessary for promoting a democratic 
system of government.726    
 
As the conflict continued, United States involvement in Liberia centred 
on policy that ensured the delivery of emergency humanitarian 
assistance, provided technical and logistical support to the ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and supporting ECOWAS and United 
Nations meditation efforts but not of military assistance.727  This position 
was reaffirmed by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs George 
Moose, in a 1993 statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs.  
It was the only hearing held on Liberia:  
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We have strongly encouraged and supported that [ECOWAS] 
effort and will continue to do so.  At the same time, I would 
simply add that we continue to urge support for ECOMOG.  
We believe that in due course ... the Yamoussoukro Accords 
will be implemented fairly and objectively and that no party 
need be unduly concerned about the manner in which that 
accord is implemented.  ...  [O]ur concern for the Liberian 
people and our desire for peace is unconstrained by strategic 
necessities ... ultimately it will be the people of Liberia 
themselves who must resolve to make the most of their 
opportunity and chart the future of this nation.  That remains 
the essence of our policy.728 
 
Later Senator Kassebaum argued in 1993 that the Clinton White House 
should reverse the policy of non-intervention and adopt her view that the 
response of the United States to Liberia had to be stronger.729  This 
position was further supported by Janet Fleischman of African Watch, 
who reported in a 1993 statement that the United States was aware of the 
increasing human rights problems associated with the ECOMOG 
intervention, yet United States foreign policy still revolved around full 
support for ECOMOG.730   
There is an obvious discrepancy between what American 
officials say in private, as evidenced by the leaked cables and 
other statements intended to be off-the-record, such as former 
Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen’s statements 
questioning ECOMOG's neutrality which aired on the BBC 
in November 1992.  It is critical for the administration to 
make clear its concern about human rights violations by both 
ECOMOG and the forces with which it is allied, and 
condition its aid on respect for human rights.“731 
 
The United States response to the Liberian conflict was repeatedly 
criticized as inadequate.  It was further suggested that it would have been 
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appropriate for the United States to have sent in troops at various stages 
of the conflict to help restore order and protect civilians given the special 
relationship between Liberia and the United States.732  Much of the 
critique centred on Haiti as an example of a successful humanitarian 
intervention in comparison to the non-intervention stance taken by the 
United States and the international community regarding Liberia.733   
 
Another aspect of United States policy during the Liberian conflict was 
its support for the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (1993-
1997).734  UNOMIL was charged with monitoring compliance with 
cease-fire agreements and a ban on arms shipments to Liberia, the 
disarmament and demobilization of combatants, election observations 
and assisting in the coordination of humanitarian aid.735  However, the 
United Nations’ role in Liberia also deserves analysis in relation to the 
United States response.736   
 
Although the United Nations contributed significantly to the emergency 
relief and humanitarian aid to Liberia, it did not address the crisis in 
political terms until November 1992.  It was nearly three years after the 
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crisis began when the UN imposed an arms embargo.737  The United 
Nations Secretary General dispatched a special representative to 
investigate the situation.  The report, released in March 1993 makes no 
reference to human rights.  Human rights language is notably absent 
from the Secretary General’s report, “thus missing yet another occasion 
to raise the issue of human rights protections into the peace negotiations.  
The report suggested that there might be a role for U.N. observers to 
monitor a new cease-fire agreement, but foresaw no human rights 
monitoring component to their mandate.”738  
 
Causal Factors Affecting International Law on the Policy Process 
 
The Decision-makers’ Arguments for Foreign Policy Rationale:  Despite 
the close relationship between the United States and Liberia, the United 
States took a basic position of non-interference in spite of concerns of 
human rights abuses.  This was because the State Department had a 
difficult case to make for military involvement given that all sides in the 
Liberian conflict were committing atrocities.739  More specifically 
foreign policy set out that the United States was ‘unconstrained by 
strategic necessities in Liberia and no party need be unduly concerned 
about the manner in which that [peace] accord is implemented’.740  As 
the conflict continued involvement in Liberia centred on foreign policy 
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that ensured emergency assistance and one that supported mediation 
efforts alongside ECOWAS and United Nations.   
 
The Domestic Legal Framework:  Both the constitutional and legal 
framework on human rights existed but was nullified given the lack of 
concern from top government officials in both Administrations.  The 
issues would have been reviewed by the Office of the Legal Adviser.741  
This lack of concern was further exacerbated by the United Nations’ 
failure to incorporate human rights language into its reports, a factor 
which influenced how the legal language of foreign policy was 
constructed.   
 
Actions of the United Nations:  The United Nations did not address the 
Liberian conflict in political terms until November 1992.  More 
importantly, human rights language is notably absent from the United 
Nations Report released in mid-March 1993.  Consequently, the United 
Nations Secretary General failed to raise the issues of human rights 
protections into the peace negotiations.742 
 
Legal Analysis of the Causal Factors  
In analysing the four causal factors that influenced the policy process 
concerning the role of international law, the research finds that 
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international law did aid in regulating foreign policy regarding Liberia, 
but did so in an indirect manner.  This finding is consistent in that the use 
of force and protection from the violations of human rights were not 
legally interpreted as a threat to international peace and security within 
the United State’s domestic legal framework.  In other words, while 
making its case for non-intervention the United States recognised the 
legal nature of the underlying principles at issue but it basically 
interpreted international law in a way that matched its own legal and 
political interests at the time.743  This included United Nations’ interests.  
Issues neither the United States nor United Nations were prepared to 
identify – severe human rights atrocities.744  This is evidenced by the 
application of the sovereign non-intervention principle, instead of the 
principle of human rights, which meant non-involvement in the Liberian 
humanitarian crisis.745 
 
As illustrated both the constitutional and legal framework on human 
rights and use of force existed but were nullified.  Through legislative 
procedure, Senator Kassebaum clearly established human rights abuse 
violations attributable to the state of Liberia against its citizens as set out 
in  Restatement (Third) § 702 where ‘consistent patterns of gross 
violations of internationally-recognised human rights’ were visible.746  
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Therefore not only are rules of international law recognised in the 
Constitution but also in the tort law of the United States, for the reason 
that human rights are considered part of the law of the United States.747   
 
Based upon this legal status, the relationship between domestic law and 
international law and the status of the international legal rules within the 
United States’ domestic jurisdiction should have been clearly visible.  
Consequently the interpretation of human rights abuses would have 
portrayed humanitarian intervention as both a state concern and an 
instrument of foreign policy.  The foreign policy articulated however 
compromised Liberia’s human rights issues due to the failure to 
incorporate the facts of the conflict with human rights language in the 
foreign policy decisions.748  The policy decisions would have also 
included information gathered from the United Nations Reports.   
 
As stated above, although the international rule of human rights may 
have been positioned within the domestic legal framework, its 
representation relevant to the Liberian humanitarian situation was not 
interpreted to protect fundamental human rights in its foreign policy 
decisions.  This is peculiar since both international and domestic law 
advance the protection of human rights, as well as the regulation of the 
use of force for that protection.  These principles are clearly set out 
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within written text that provides a succinct, albeit basic, definition of 
human rights and establishes its status, as outlined in chapter seven.  
 
One explanation for this rationale may be that there were no formal legal 
guidelines for humanitarian intervention decisions in place at the time.  
The absence of a reasonably consistent set of legal guidelines would 
have contributed to the controversy and repeated criticisms of 
inadequacy amongst government officials who defended a decision to 
use military intervention.  The lack of guidelines can be legally defended 
and attributed to the fact that the application of international law by the 
state depends upon a decision by the domestic legal system.749 This 
would have included any limits that legislature may have imposed or on 
which the US courts had ruled.  In this regard, there were insufficient 
sources of law at the domestic level to rule upon or otherwise provide 
reasoning and as a consequence the state’s legal structure was unable to 
recognise humanitarian concerns in the formulation of its foreign policy.   
 
The scope of legal protection afforded by the United States is defined by 
precedent.  In the Liberia matter there was no case law to justify 
intervention for humanitarian reasons.  Unlike the precedent established 
in Filartiga v. Pena Irala (630 F 2nd 876 2nd Cir. 1980)750 regarding the 
status of human rights relative to sources of law and specifications for 
the domestic court to assert jurisdiction, the policy articulated concerning 
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Liberia was unable, or even unwilling, to interpret human rights 
language because the United States (and the United Nations) attempted 
to detach itself from the substantial injuries incurred during the Liberian 
conflict.751   
 
It can be reasoned therefore that the conceptual structure for 
humanitarian intervention at the US’s domestic level was unfamiliar and 
interpretation made it appropriate to apply the sovereign non-
intervention principle to its foreign policy decision.  It also suggests that 
the status of international legal rules within the United States domestic 
jurisdiction and political justification require a framework with clear and 
consistent guidelines.  In this case, there was an obvious necessity to 
provide internal guidance to government officials, as well as non-
governmental, to explain intervention decisions taken or not taken as 
opposed to restrictive legal language.  Language that was further 
restricted by conflicting international legislation (the 1993 UN Report), 
which upheld the misconduct of the Liberian state while setting aside 
human rights protection for Liberian citizens.  In this instance, there was 
a need to integrate the principle of human rights together with the 
humanitarian situation to allow for essential legal change within the 
existing legal frameworks of both the United States and United Nations.  
Arguably, this would have then allowed for outcomes that were 
presumably acceptable to all participants. 
 





Through the above analysis it can be determined that norm restriction is 
evident as attention to human rights was considered a separate part of the 
process in establishing foreign policy (at both domestic and international 
levels).752  This underscores how we understand the importance of the 
application of sources of law and legal reasoning regarding the course of 
action to be taken in conflict situations, as set out in chapter one.  In 
positioning non-intervention between the principles of human rights and 
sovereignty, the US identified both its legal scope and its limitations.  
Inasmuch as the legal authority of a state carries with it the authority to 
impose limitations, including those based upon the principles of human 
rights.  The assumption of responsibility afforded international rules is 
dependent on domestic law for implementation and as such is legally and 
politically constructed within foreign policy.  As this thesis argues, this 
will provide international rules political authority at the state level.  In 
the case of Liberia, the international rules dependency upon US domestic 
law effectively restricted international law’s political authority.   
 
As outlined in the introduction to this section, additional possible 
rationales, specific to each conflict are considered.  These rationales will 
further identify how sources of law and the strategic use of interpretation 
and legal reasoning recognise a rule of international law within the 
state’s legal structure for policy purposes.   
 
In the case of Liberia, one additional possible rationale for non-
intervention can be further explained based upon the causal factors.   






The United States was unable to authorize viable policy action because 
the United Nations avoided language relating to human rights nor did 
the United Nations condemn the actions undertaken during the Liberian 
conflict.   
 
Another possible explanation for the United States’ non-intervention 
behaviour could be that it was difficult to interpret the principles of 
humanitarian intervention.  This is based on several reasons:  one, the 
United Nations’ notable absence of human rights language in its report, 
as well as its failure to raise the issue of human rights protections in the 
peace negotiations;753 and two, the United States domestic decision-
making process considered the legal issue of human rights a separate part 
of the policy process.754  These two reasons had the effect of nearly 
isolating human rights from the entirety of the conflict itself and 
weakening the influence of structural (systemic) factors that account for 
the effectiveness of international legal principles in shaping the structure 
of authority and legitimacy within the domestic decision-making process.   
 
This absence of language makes clear how crucial the facts presented for 
evaluation in the decision-making process function.  The interpretation 
of the information provided illustrates how a state will interact with 
principles of international law to construct effective foreign policy 
concerning humanitarian issues.  In this case, interpretation was based on 
facts that were not provided.  This afforded justification for the decision 
not to use military force in connection with human rights issues.  This 
not only weakened the human rights concerns and strengthened the 
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sovereign non-intervention principle, but the United States, as well as the 
United Nations, were then not obligated to any issues of liability or legal 
responsibility on behalf of the Liberian citizens; which would have 
required appropriation of money by the US Congress and use of military 
personnel.   
 
As a matter of law interpretation of the rules of humanitarian 
intervention in the formulation of foreign policy as legitimate is of 
importance.  The application and enforcement of which affect not only 
the international community but the state that is in conflict as well.  
Discerning which rule to apply will depend on the factual circumstances 
of the humanitarian situation, violations of human rights should have 
established intent as the key for military intervention in Liberia.  While 
there were no specific requirements shaping United States foreign policy 
at the time, the relationship between its domestic law and international 
law concerning the legal status on human rights existed at both levels of 
law.  Clearly legal status was fully in force at the time of the Liberian 
non-intervention decision.   
 
Furthermore, as this case reflects, the effectiveness of the international 
rule alone may not be enough because even if international rules succeed 
in entering into a state’s legal system they are still subject to possible 
restrictions imposed by the state.  This was clearly evident since issues of 
the human rights atrocities in Liberia were almost entirely isolated from 




state interest is a strong element of humanitarian support when it 
concerns violations of human rights.   
 
In concluding this chapter, it is necessary to take into account that the 
relationship between domestic law and international law has two aspects.  
The first is the underlying limitation of sovereign rights and the second is 
the status of international legal norms within a state’s domestic 
jurisdiction.  As discussed in chapter seven, another explanation for non-
intervention surrounds the debate on humanitarian intervention.  Whether 
violations of human rights should be interpreted as a threat to 
international peace and security or whether use of force is a satisfactory 
alternative in accordance with Article 2.7 of the Charter, which prohibits 
intervention in situations ‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state’.755   
 
Historically it has been assumed that the end of the Cold War would 
allow a more unified and active Security Council to fulfil its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.756  
Yet, based upon the circumstances witnessed in Liberia it is evident that 
this period saw a blurring of the circumstances and the manner in which 
the Security Council could exercise responsibility, in particular its 
relative definition of a threat to international peace and security.  This 
was rather odd.  While a great deal of international law is based upon 
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pre-existing state practice, the community of states has the legal capacity 
and authority to formulate legal principles through multilateral 
consultation, even in the absence of pre-existing state or international 
practice. 
 
In the case of Liberia, violations of human rights were not viewed as a 
threat to international peace and security and therefore were not seen as 
warranting military intervention.  The arguments presented by the United 
States may have advocated support for humanitarian aid, supporting 
ECOWAS and the United Nations’ meditation efforts to prevent human 
rights violations, but the United States did not link military intervention 
to human rights in the course of its policy process.  This was advocated 
clearly in its foreign policy decisions. 
 
While ECOWAS’s use of military force in Liberia is outside the scope of 
this thesis, it does draw attention to the fact that the African community 
was able to interpret facts in support of force as necessitated by the 
mitigating circumstances, - the conflict and the non-intervention of the 
international community.  As indicated above, the United States justified 
its decision of non-intervention based upon issues that both the United 
States and the United Nations were not prepared to address, the issue of 
human rights.  It could have been argued that an intervention for 
humanitarian reasons would be consistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations, namely the protection of fundamental human rights; an 
argument that was put forth in later United States policy decisions in 





Humanitarian Intervention as a Legal Instrument of Foreign Policy 
 
Although the humanitarian aspect of the human rights abuses in Liberia 
and the crisis it presented created an agenda of reference for decision-
makers, as suggested by neoclassical realism, the recognition of 
humanitarian intervention as a legitimate practice and therefore its legal 
status failed to interact with the decision-making process.  In essence the 
international principle of human rights may have been positioned within 
the United States’ domestic legal framework, but its representation was 
not interpreted to protect fundamental human rights in its decisions 
concerning Liberia.  As noted previously it is evident that the domestic 
policy process considered the human rights issues as separate from the 
decision-making process, essentially bifurcating human rights from the 
conflict itself. 
 
Perhaps more significantly while supporting non-intervention, the United 
States did not move forward with an interpretation of the human rights 
principle as its traditional manner would suggest (distinctly different 
from the international level).  The interpretation of the abuse of human 
rights, a fundamental Constitutional principle, was not represented as a 
threat to international peace and security.  Consequently, the regulation 
of humanitarian intervention as a domestic concern and thus an 
instrument of foreign policy, in this instance, had implications in its 





Finally, evidence would suggest that both international law and state law 
on the issues of humanitarian intervention in Liberia could be interpreted 
as insufficient to protect core human rights values.  While arguably the 
principle of non-intervention is an outcome of the basic principle of 
sovereignty, it is debatable whether the application of non-intervention 
was based upon this reasoning.  Instead it became obvious that the laws 
on human rights and sovereignty could not take place simultaneously 
concerning outside intervention by either the United States or the United 
Nations (i.e., the international community).  In this case, when assessing 
the interpretation of human rights to the legal framework in the 
formulation of non-intervention, it would be necessary to also consider 
the state and international legal dimensions of unenforceability or 




9. Somalia: Operation Restore Hope (1992-1993) 
 
United States Relations with Somalia 
  
United States interests in Somalia began during the Second World 
War.757  These interests included a naval facility for the United States at 
the port of Berbera as well as military and electronic facilities elsewhere.  
During the Cold War Somalia held geopolitical importance due to its 
proximity to the Middle East and strategic location next to the Red Sea 
and Persian Gulf.758  From 1978 until 1989, the United States was an 
important ally to Somalia and provided a large amount of economic and 
military assistance. The United States Embassy in Mogadishu also 
became one of the largest US diplomatic missions in Africa.759   
 
Even after war broke out in May 1988, the United States continued to 
provide military assistance and to defend Somalia against a non-
supportive Congress that was increasingly critical of the Somalia 
government’s human rights record and its conduct of the conflict.760  
Between 1989 and 1990, however, the Bush administration began to 
disengage from Somalia and institute change in its policies. This was a 
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direct result of pressures from Congress who demanded disengagement 
on human rights grounds,761 as well as the realization that Somalia’s 
government was disintegrating and that Cold War rivalries had ended.762 
 
Background to the Somalia Conflict (1991- ongoing) 
  
The Somali Civil War began in 1991 and has caused destabilisation and 
instability throughout the country.763  Somalia has been without an 
effective central government since 1991 when factions overthrew 
President Siad Barre.764  The collapse of Somali lies in the breakdown of 
its traditional society and Somalia’s role as a Cold War proxy of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. At the time, Siad Barre’s clan 
benefited the most from the large influx of foreign aid, initially from the 
Soviet Union until 1977 and thereafter from the United States.765   
 
The conflict began after Siad Barre precipitated a war against Ethiopia in 
1977, causing instability and an increase in Siad Barre’s repressive 
behaviour.  To maintain power he began a policy of systematic 
kidnapping and murder against rival clan leaders that increased in 
intensity over time.  Finally, in 1990 during anti-government riots, Siad 
Barre’s bodyguards killed sixty-five civilians and seriously injured over 
three hundred.  Losing legitimacy, Siad Barre was forced to flee the 
country in January 1991.  The collapse of Somalia’s central government 
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created a void that was rapidly filled by rival political faction leaders 
turned warlords and thereafter Somalia fell into a state of political and 
economic chaos.766   
 
In addition to the conflict, a drought-caused famine was causing 
starvation and death to thousands in Somalia and refugees were 
becoming a problem in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia.767  Although 
numerous humanitarian relief organizations were in Somalia, there was 
little progress in stopping the devastation.  Faced with humanitarian 
disaster and exacerbated by a complete breakdown in Somalia’s civil 
order, the United Nations created the United Nations Operation in 
Somalia I (UNOSOM I) in April 1992.768  However, due to the local 
warlords and their rivalries failure to compromise with each other, 
UNOSOM I could not be fulfilled - the main challenge to the flow of 
relief supplies continued to be the rivalry between feuding warlords.769 
 
In response to the worsening famine, Operation Provide Relief was 
initiated in August 1992, but problems associated with distribution 
continued to hinder the relief effort.770  In December 1992, a coalition 
led by the United States and termed Operation Restore Hope, approved 
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by the Security Council, was deployed to Somalia to protect relief 
workers with a mandate to protect humanitarian operations and create a 
secure environment for eventual political reconciliation and the authority 
to use all necessary means to ensure that relief supplies reached those 
who needed them.771  The United States withdrew in late 1993 after the 
military operation left eighteen United States troops dead.  UNOSOM II, 
the second United Nations mission, withdrew in March 1995.772 
 
The Humanitarian Situation of the Somalia Conflict 
 
Human rights conditions in Somalia were, and continue to be, a problem 
due to the unstable political situation in the country.773  Since 1991, 
widespread violence, poverty, persistent droughts and floods have 
generated a complex humanitarian emergency in Somalia.  Statistics 
from the United Nations indicate that the first year of the conflict saw a 
massive loss of life due to famine and civil war.774  The Human Rights 
Status Report concurred with the U.N. report and included that the rape 
of women between 1991 and 1994 “was widespread and has been used 
as a tool to punish and intimidate ethnic factions.”775  United Nations and 
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humanitarian agencies efforts to deliver food and aid were constantly 
met with armed opposition and the hijacking of relief supplies.  
Operating conditions continue to challenge aid workers, as many are 
often victims of killings, roadside bombs, abductions and harassment.776 
 
United States Policy toward the Somalia Conflict 
 
The Bush administration’s position throughout much of 1991 and early 
1992 was that the crisis was an internal Somali problem; that it did not 
represent a threat to regional or international stability.777  However 
officials at the State Department’s Africa Bureau, including Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, as well as Andrew 
Natsios, the Assistant Director of USAID, and James Kunder, Bureau for 
Food and Humanitarian Assistance,778 were concerned about the Somalia 
tragedy and pressed for a more active United States response.   
 
In January 1992, Natsios began holding regular press conferences to 
highlight the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe.779  In June 1992, the 
United States Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone Jr., travelled to 
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the Somali-Kenyan border.  He reported his trip in a cable to Capitol Hill 
entitled “A Day in Hell,” and outlined the humanitarian suffering.780  
Walter Kansteiner, Director for African Affairs at the National Security 
Council, forwarded Hempstone’s cable onto Bush.  Within a few days, 
Bush returned the cable to Kansteiner with a number of questions and 
comments written in the margins.781   
 
In early summer 1992, Somalia was also becoming a regular feature on 
the evening news, a fact not lost on a White House engaged in a political 
campaign that did not have foreign policy as a major component.782  
According to Walter Kansteiner, “political pressure began to resonate at 
the White House and in late July, Bush encouraged staff to examine 
additional diplomatic efforts to enhance the United Nations efforts in 
Somalia.”783  There is evidence to suggest that Bush’s policy shift on 
Somalia came in response to both the increasing pressure to do 
something in Somalia and also in response to the political backlash on 
Bosnia.784    
 
The few NGOs working in Somalia issued reports in autumn 1991 citing 
the catastrophic conditions.785   On 23 January 1992 the Security Council 
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voted unanimously to increase humanitarian aid to Somalia (Resolution 
733) and called for an embargo on weapons and military equipment sent 
to Somalia.786  On 24 April 1992 the United Nations increased aid 
(Resolution 751)787 and authorized the deployment of fifty United 
Nations observers to monitor food distribution (UNOSOM I), which 
collapsed from infighting and an inability to provide safety for relief 
operations.788   
 
By the end of July, Boutros-Ghali outlined his concerns in his report to 
the Security Council.  Boutros-Ghali also openly complained about the 
West being more interested in Bosnia than the humanitarian catastrophe 
in Somalia and accused ‘Western leadership of being racist.’789  A few 
days after Boutros-Ghali’s public accusation the United Nations 
approved an emergency airlift and the deployment of five hundred 
peacekeepers (Resolution 767).790   
 
Senators Kassebaum and Simon travelled to Somalia in July 1992.  Both 
held hearings on the human rights tragedy in Somalia offering evidence 
that chronic insecurity remained and that “the conflict and the scarcity of 
food fed on each other in a vicious spiral.”791  The first hearing was held 
on 16 September 1992 just after Bush agreed to supplement United 
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States support for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 
I).792  A major point of contention for opponents to UNOSOM, led by 
John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations,  
[W]]as the fear that deployment of armed forces would be a 
precedent-setting action by the Security Council and might 
lead to greater United States military involvement when 
United Nations forces got into trouble.793  
    
Further evidence was provided however as to how efforts to deliver food 
were met with armed opposition and the hijacking of relief supplies.794   
 
Despite Bolton’s protests, on 15 August 1992 a security force was 
formed to protect United Nations humanitarian operations in Somalia, 
Operation Provide Relief.795  The issue remained under intense debate 
among the State Department and the NSC staff.796  Prior to the December 
1992 intervention the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including General Colin 
Powell,797 “argued during interagency meetings that humanitarian 
emergencies, by their nature, were political events in which one side or 
another would ‘balk’ at international assistance.”798  Opposing calls for 
US humanitarian military interventions in Somalia (as well as Liberia 
and Bosnia).  It was argued that the conflict was not relevant to United 
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States vital interests; it was simply a humanitarian tragedy.799  There was 
also consensus among senior officials that the crisis in Somalia was, at 
the core, a political issue that could not be readily resolved with the use 
of military forces.800 
 
A second hearing followed on October 1992 wherein evidence stated that 
“the security situation had deteriorated and starvation and malnutrition 
are widespread.”801  The hearing further discussed the role of the United 
Nations and the United States commitment to Somalia.802  A Report 
followed in November 1992 outlining the “total collapse of a country 
with mass starvation and utter lawlessness. … The Somalia people need 
food and medicine urgently ... but essential to their survival now is 
hope.”803    
 
Operation Restore Hope (1992-1993) 
 
By December Bush had wide congressional support on the conflict.804  
“Senate majority leader George Mitchell stated that there was no need to 
reconvene Congress under the terms of the War Powers Act805 because 
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the mission in Somalia was aimed at feeding the starving rather than 
putting down a revolt or dislodging a government.”806 
 
As the humanitarian situation worsened in Somalia a United States led 
coalition - Operation Restore Hope - approved by the Security Council, 
was deployed to Somalia to protect relief workers on 4 December 
1992.807  Its mandate was to protect humanitarian operations and create a 
secure environment for eventual political reconciliation until a more 
permanent United Nations peacekeeping force could take on the 
responsibilities.808    
 
Operation Restore Hope also had the authority to ‘use all necessary 
means’ to ensure that relief supplies reached those who needed them.809  
Significantly, Resolution 794 referenced Chapter 7 of the United Nations 
Charter, concerning peace enforcement.810  This was the first time in 
which the United Nations had sanctioned or actively participated in the 
armed intervention of a sovereign state without invitation.  On 10 
December 1992 Bush reported, consistent with the War Powers 
Resolution, that United States armed forces had entered Somalia on 8 
December 1992 in response to a humanitarian crisis and a United 
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Nations Security Council Resolution determining that the situation 
constituted a threat to international peace.811  
 
During the course of Operation Restore Hope additional hearings and 
reports commenced to discuss the foreign policy decisions in Somalia as 
well as the authorization and legality of US military forces.812  With 
respect to United States domestic law on the legality necessary for 
military participation evidence was put forth that under Section 6 of the 
United Nations Participation Act, “the President is authorized to 
negotiate and implement proposed policy to support United Nations 
peace operations, when considered vital to protect national security 
interests.”813   
[T]he President therefore has a wide range of discretion in 
interpreting and applying the Charter, like other laws.  
Congress has parallel legislative powers in relation to the 
Charter ... especially in areas that involve the use of force.814   
 
 
In accord with authorization of United States action in Somalia, the 
House passed Joint Resolution 45 authorizing the President to use United 
States armed forces in implementation of “United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992 and Resolution 814 of 25 
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March 1993 to constitute the specific statutory authorization under 
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.”815 
 
On the subject of the humanitarian operation in Somalia, Harry L. 
Johnston stated: “[I] plan to begin a systematic inquiry into the idea of 
humanitarian intervention as an element of post-cold war United States 
policy.”816  He further stated that “the implication of the Somalia 
operation is that we have advanced our thinking on the concept of 
humanitarian intervention.  Operation Restore Hope ...  has provided 
valuable insights into factors that should guide policymakers in those 
rare instances when military intervention to save lives should be 
considered.”817   
 
The United States withdrew its mission in late 1993 after the military 
operation left eighteen United States Rangers dead.818  On 7 October 
1993, amid rapidly deteriorating public and congressional support for the 
mission, Clinton announced his intent to end US involvement in Somalia 
by 31 March 1994.  Clinton enacted PDD25, a presidential directive 
which placed strict conditions on United States support for UN 
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peacekeeping.819 This decision was supported by the Defense 
Appropriations Act for FY1995 which prohibited the use of funds for the 
continuous presence of US forces in Somalia, except for the protection of 
US personnel after September 30, 1994.820  The remaining Marines, who 
had remained to protect United States diplomats, were withdrawn 15 
September 1994.821  UNOSOM II, the second United Nations mission, 
withdrew in March 1995.822 
 
Causal Factors Affecting International Law on the Policy Process 
The Decision-makers’ Arguments for Foreign Policy Rationale:  Despite 
the Bush administration’s early position that the crisis in Somali was an 
internal problem that did not represent a threat to regional or 
international stability, officials within the State Department; and other 
United States agencies, pressed for a response to the humanitarian 
suffering.823  Notwithstanding opposition to secure military forces, a case 
for military involvement was heightened following reports concerning 
the deterioration of security, which was emphasized alongside the 
tragedy of the human rights situation and widespread starvation.824   
 
The Domestic Legal Framework:  Both the constitutional and legal 
framework on human rights and use of force were present. The 
Constitution requires specific congressional authorization for the 
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deployment of US forces to potential combat abroad under the War 
Powers Act.825  As is discussed below, the use of human rights language 
was specifically applied to legitimately justify use of force within the 
context of foreign policy for the protection of basic human rights. 
 
Actions of the United Nations:  Reports citing the catastrophic conditions 
were first issued in 1991.826   Further efforts were made by United 
Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali without garnering much 
attention.  Following this Boutros-Ghali accused the West of “racism”,827 
which brought about a United Nations emergency airlift and the 
deployment of five hundred peacekeepers.828  Various Resolutions were 
initiated on the grounds of humanitarian concerns. 
 
Legal Analysis of the Causal Factors  
In analysing the causal factors that influenced the policy process 
concerning the role of international law on the situation in Somalia, the 
research finds that international law’s effectiveness was determined by 
its interaction with the United State’s domestic legal framework.  The 
question as to whether, in the case of a civil conflict, international law 
could or would authorise use of force for humanitarian concerns can only 
be decided by the state concerned and issues that support or negate that 
decision.  In this case the interpretation of humanitarian concerns was 
given statutory and constitutional authority at the state level so to permit 
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the use of military force for humanitarian protection at the international 
level.    
 
In positioning human rights and use of force, the US identified both its 
legal scope and its limitations in establishing humanitarian concerns into 
its foreign policy. The limitations were highlighted by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and other government officials who initially argued against 
intervention they saw as inappropriate and outside the effectiveness of 
United States domestic law.829  Legal scope is witnessed by the 
constitutional positioning of the applicable principles of international law 
pursuant to the United Nations Participation Act as well as the War 
Powers Resolution.830  This gave President Bush both statutory and 
constitutional authority to enable the United States to participate in and 
support United Nations peace operations, under Section 6 of the United 
Nations Participation Act.831   
 
The application of both statute and constitutional provisions was relevant 
given the language that governed high-level concern and input from 
upper level government officials in the decision-making process.  This 
level of input was enhanced by the United Nations Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali, who incorporated humanitarian needs and human rights 
language in his reports,832 a factor which clearly influenced how the 
language of foreign policy on the conflict was constructed.   









When read together, the Security Council resolution and applicable U.S. 
laws provided the legal basis for U.S. military action under international 
law in its application of use of force because the United States, through 
the Security Council, interpreted the relationship between violations of 
human rights within another state and the threat to international peace 
and security as sufficient grounds for ordering humanitarian intervention.  
Moreover, the framing of humanitarian intervention in foreign policy in 
this case was significantly supported by the fact that the United Nations 
ruled that violations of human rights as well as the violence and 
instability in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and 
security.833  Thus the violation of human rights, a fundamental U.S. 
constitutional principle, was recognised as a threat to international peace 
and security.  In this way the United States was able to extract specific 
constitutional rules to support humanitarian concerns in its decision for 
use of force (as established in chapter two). 
 
Of significance in the case of Somalia is the fact that the application of 
the international legal principles was legitimated and presented for 
authorisation at the state level not by state legal precedent, but by the 
necessity to first identify the principles represented by the humanitarian 
situation and then determine how these legal principles could be 
translated into policy to invoke policy action.  This was because at the 
time there was no existing law or consensus which defined humanitarian 
intervention and thus there was no obligation at either state or 





international levels for intervention decisions.  While it will always be 
argued that state interest, coupled with public opinion, plays a role in 
decisions concerning use of force, or whether or not to intervene, 
justification for intervention by the United States will require the 
interaction of and balancing of domestic concerns with international 
concerns.  These concerns create significant practical challenges to 
interpreting the responsibilities of protecting human rights, even if those 
rights are interpreted and applied by reference to human rights violence.  
In this regard it will also be necessary to identify those rights as well as 
determine what effect the use of force may have on the character of the 
conflict.   
 
International law, and thus the United Nations, may govern the legal 
relations between states and actors who comply with the rules of 
international law, but it does not provide a legal mechanism for 
determining intervention decisions (see section one and chapter 7).  The 
United States, and the international community as a whole, may have 
been bound by the existence of certain international legal principles - use 
of force and human rights – that would not otherwise be legally binding 
upon them outside of state interest.  Clarity for the enforcement of these 
principles was only found in the domestic legal framework because it 
was necessary to identify applicable law, and more importantly to allow 
the United States to determine its own legal obligations.834  As a result, 
the effect brought about by U.S. legal behaviour was a key factor for 
                                                          




determining its intervention decision(s) in Somalia.  As the thesis 
predicted, in utilizing neoclassical realism state and international law 
interacted simultaneously by interpreting humanitarian concerns through 
its domestic legal framework.  The U.S. therefore did theoretically 
provide an enforcement mechanism for international authority at the state 
level in its use of force decision.   
 
In addition, the decision to intervene in this case promoted the decision-
makers’ perceptions of security which had the effect of strengthening the 
influence of humanitarian concerns in the domestic environment and as 
such become an essential element in establishing foreign policy.  This 
was based on information received at both the international and domestic 
levels.  In Somalia the policy decision was supported by the need to 
secure peace and security.   
 
Norm expansion is also evident since the principle of human rights, 
similar to non-intervention, was recognised as having the status of jus 
cogens.835  This status was reflected in The Humanitarian Situation in 
Somalia (Hearing 17/12/92) and in consultations with the United 
Nations, wherein it was debated whether the question of sovereignty 
should prevent the International Community from taking a sustained and 
concerted effort to protect civilians in Somalia.  Following this rationale, 
again recall that the relationship between a state’s domestic law and 
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international law has two aspects.  The first of which is the underlying 
limitation of sovereign rights.  However, if a sovereign state obtains its 
authority from the rights of its citizens and if it fails to recognise the 
rights from which its power is obtained the sovereignty, in effect, 
undermine its own legitimate authority.836   
 
This reiterates whether the use of force during humanitarian action is in 
fact an act against the sovereign integrity of a state as was discussed in 
chapter seven.  Since intervention in the case of Somalia was not an 
attack on the state but rather an operation involving a humanitarian 
situation, the primary factors in the decision to intervene are the main 
focus of the action; including action within a state which may mitigate 
the humanitarian situation.  Consequently, in this case the decision to use 
military force in connection with human rights issues, in effect, 
weakened the sovereign non-intervention principle.   
 
In addition, two further possible rationales based upon the United State’s 
domestic legal sources and reasoning for intervention can be explained 
when interpreting the causal factors.  First, the perception of Somalia 
exclusively as a humanitarian instead of military concern influenced the 
attitudes of the executive branch policymakers.837  Second, foreign 
policy conformation with Security Council resolutions refers to the legal 
standing at issue at the state level - thus identifying sources and process 
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of the strategic use of interpretation and legal reasoning for policy 
purposes.838 
 
 Perceptions of Somalia as a humanitarian instead of military concern 
influenced the attitudes of the executive branch policymakers 
 
In the policy disputes within the executive branch agencies, claims based 
upon the relevant international rules of human rights raised the burden of 
justification necessary to overcome the objections of military 
involvement.  The framing of Somalia as a humanitarian instead of 
military concern influenced the attitudes of the executive branch 
agencies in their perception of the conflict.  This is evidenced by the 
numerous congressional hearings and language used to describe the 
‘catastrophic human rights condition’.839  Congressional hearing 
language was further strengthened by the United Nations incorporation 
of humanitarian needs and human rights language.  In this instance 
humanitarianism became a crucial strategic legal instrument of foreign 
policy.  Particularly as no threat to national security existed or was 
referenced in the foreign policy.  As such both principles – use of force 
and human rights – are legally reasoned and legitimately implemented in 
policy construction. 
 
Also, the positioning of the facts and the interpretation of those facts had 
a significant impact on judgments arising from the application of use of 
force in the decision making process.  For example, the nature of the 
                                                          





civil war and attacks on civilians impacted the perceptions of the United 
States and the United Nations (as well as the international community).  
The perception of the conflict in Somalia was clearly framed by 
Congress as humanitarian yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior 
officials regarded Somalia in military terms.  This point is significant in 
that communicating a humanitarian perspective within the Bush 
administration was problematic for foreign policy decision-making (as 
well as security) because no threat to national security existed and 
national interest was rather narrowly defined.  Although executive 
policy-makers found no guidance concerning precedent in case law or 
legislative history for humanitarian intervention, they interpreted human 
rights language as an indication of humanitarian liability (legal 
responsibility) under both domestic and international law.   
 
Therefore rationale for this difference in perception was important when 
evaluating the risks associated with the conflict in Somalia to the 
humanitarian consequences.  Moreover, the use of human rights 
language provided substantial leverage in the interpretation of this 
principle within the constructs of foreign policy relevant to domestic 
sources of law.  It is also apparent that there was a change in perception 
regarding the United State’s intervention and the efforts by Congress to 
invoke use of force in Somalia from Operation Restore Hope in 
December 1992 to the US withdrawal in 1993.   
 
Foreign policy conformation with Security Council resolutions refers to 




and process of the strategic use of interpretation and legal reasoning for 
policy purposes 
 
Concerning the actions of the United States, when read together Security 
Council Resolution 794 provided the legal basis for US military action 
under international law.840  The legal framework for international law 
within domestic law is one of cooperation and obligation under a treaty; 
therefore Security Council resolutions provide authority for US action 
under international law.  However, congressional authorization is 
required under domestic law as governed by the US Constitution, the 
United Nations Participation Act, as well as by the War Powers 
Resolution.  In this case the application of the use of U.S. forces to a 
potential combat area was substantiated by Joint Resolution 45 
authorizing the President to use United States armed forces in 
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 794.   
 
The Joint Resolution constituted specific statutory authorization within 
the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (S.J. Res 45) 
as necessitated by existing United States statutory law and the basic 
principles of policy-making.  In this instance, the War Powers Resolution 
provided a mechanism for legislative consideration underlying such 
authorizations and afforded legitimacy and strength to the foreign policy.  
Legislative consideration was further shaped by the executive decision-
makers perception and interpretation of the humanitarian situation within 
the Somalia conflict.  Moreover, Section 6 of the United Nations 
Participation Act authorized the President to negotiate and implement 





proposed policy to support United Nations peace operations.  This 
provided the process through which Congress sought to implement the 
war powers balance, based upon its reliance on specific legal statutory 
authority for domestic enforcement and effective application of the 
principle on use of force involving human rights. 
 
In establishing the humanitarian catastrophe and human rights abuses as 
a guideline for use of force in humanitarian intervention, the United 
Nations ruled that the violations of human rights as well as the violence 
and instability in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and 
security.  This is reiterated by the United States in its rationale for the 
protection of human rights, etc.  In the opinion of this author, it should be 
construed as a redefinition of both domestic jurisdiction and the threat to 
international peace and security as prescribed under Chapter 7, Article 39 
of the United Nations Charter, given the degree of harm and destruction 
incurred.  (This confirms the aim/originality of this research project.) 
 
Unlike Operation Provide Comfort following Desert Storm, which 
provided humanitarian and security assistance to the Kurds in Northern 
Iraq,841 Operation Restore Hope established a unique precedent.842  What 
began as a United Nations humanitarian assistance mission (UNISOM I) 
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in December 1992 was unopposed since there was no Somali 
government to resist entry.843  From a legal point of view, it could be 
said that Somalia, though retaining legal capacity, had for all practical 
purposes lost the ability to exercise that legal capacity.  A key element in 
this respect was the fact that there was no governmental body which 
could have committed Somalia in an effective and legally binding way.  
In addition, Operation Restore Hope was considered a humanitarian 
rescue requiring assistance not an intervention.  This is documented in 
the congressional hearing records presented in United States Policy 
toward the Somalia Conflict above.844 
 
When considering that the intervention occurred during a transitional 
period in the international order, new standards for international action 
might have been established and would have alleviated contemporary 
arguments surrounding the contradictions between use of force and 
sovereignty (non-intervention), a contradiction highlighted by the United 
Nations Charter.845  From a legal perspective expanding the scope of 
international law and therefore its interpretation within the domestic 
framework would justify legal change.  Drawing on this legal change 
could have provided a clear development toward a changed scope of 
state sovereignty with respect to the state and human rights abuses.  
Especially if the principle of human rights is impartially applied (of 







course a definition for impartiality would have to be applied as well as 
who would make the decision to define it. 
 
Humanitarian Intervention as a Legal Instrument for Foreign Policy 
 
Humanitarian intervention in Somalia was clearly recognised within the 
United State’s legal structure and can therefore be interpreted as an 
instrument of foreign policy.  Legal analysis of the issues surrounding 
humanitarian intervention appeared to be refined in the Somalia policy 
decisions.  As determined by policy-makers, the ‘idea of humanitarian 
intervention as an element of post-cold war United States policy’ ... 
‘provided valuable insights into factors that should guide 
policymakers’.846  Consequently, presentation of the relevant facts and 
the necessity of interpretation of the humanitarian situation allowed 
‘norms to be adapted to unforeseen situations.’847   
 
In the case of Somalia there was a need to interpret international legal 
rules within an existing domestic legal framework to construct foreign 
policy to effect humanitarian concerns.  This interpretative process 
operated between humanitarian concerns and foreign policy in order to 
necessitate military action.  However, it is questionable whether Somalia 
establishes the norm of humanitarian intervention as a part of the U.S. 
domestic legal framework.  Somalia may have established precedent at 
the international level, in that the humanitarian circumstances concerning 
human rights abuse was recognised and positioned within the U.S. 
                                                          





domestic legal framework, which therefore interacted with the decision-
making process.  However, in Somalia, the policy disputes within the 
executive branch agencies, its claims based upon the relevant 
international rules, raised the burden of justification necessary to 
overcome the objections of military involvement.  In addition, the 
decision was further justified in that Operation Restore Hope was 
considered a humanitarian rescue requiring assistance, not an 
intervention.   
 
While it may be a given that international law contributes to the 
obligation of the stability of the international order, but as this thesis puts 
forth, the interpretation of the legality of humanitarian crises at the state 
level will depend upon the interpretation of the circumstances at issue in 
any given case.  In early 1992, no clear precedent had been established 
for post-Cold War humanitarian interventions.  Furthermore, and as a 
general rule, only a few members of the United States executive branch 
agencies, as well as the United Nations, had much interest in or 
understanding of the events surrounding civil conflict in Africa (or any 
other international civil conflicts at the time).  As a result, humanitarian 
crises lacked a legal organizational framework and mechanism for 
legitimate implementation outside the Security Council (the ongoing 
legality-legitimacy debate discussed in chapter eight outlines this 
problem).   
 
As expressed above, expanding the scope of international law and 




legal change and could have provided a clear development toward a 
changed scope of state sovereignty with respect to the state and human 
rights abuses.  Although it would still be necessary to question whether 
the use of military force is justified in the case of humanitarian crises, 
recognising the potential for a humanitarian catastrophe will no doubt aid 
in establishing its application.  Of course a problem which instantly 
arises would be framing its accountability aspects, particularly if no 
threat to national security is established.   
 
Summary   
Although Liberia and Somalia were very different interventions, it is 
appropriate that they are considered together as they had significant  
impact on the status of humanitarian intervention and its function within 
the United States.  Liberia revived the controversy concerning the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in the domestic affairs of a 
sovereign state.848  As discussed in Section Three, the right to 
intervention or le droit d’ingerence was frequently challenged as 
violating the principle of non-interference in a state’s domestic affairs,849  
but following the end of the Cold War the international community 
began to assist and protect people at risk within their own state.  Somalia 
represented the first time human rights violations were interpreted as a 
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threat to international peace and security and a Chapter 7 intervention 
was authorized for explicitly humanitarian purposes.850   
 
As with any legal framework, domestic or international, and as a matter 
of law, politics are relevant to perceptions surrounding security and how 
it shapes a state’s foreign policy (as emphasised in chapters three, four 
and five).   From a policy process perspective Congress had a great deal 
more interest in Somalia than in Liberia concerning the threshold 
necessary for policymakers to focus on humanitarian issues.     
 
Underlying causal factors also played a role in the varying degrees of 
implementation of international law with state law and the decision-
makers formulation of foreign policy.  The United Nations and various 
NGOs were also contributory factors in the intervention decisions.  
Therefore the legal rationale behind the framing of policy decisions 
concerning both conflicts stems from the interpretation of the 
information provided and identification of the principles represented by 
the humanitarian situation within domestic law.  However because 
during this period there was no existing law or consensus which defined 
humanitarian intervention, it was necessary to determine by legal 
reasoning and applicable legal sources how those legal principles could 
be translated into policy to invoke action.  This is not to say that the 
United States interpreted human rights differently from the international 
community.  It was necessary though for the United States to identify 





those rights and seek applicable law to provide an enforcement 
mechanism for the legitimate use of military force. 
 
This application of domestic law is essential when the interpretation of 
international legal principles is dependent on a state’s interpretation for 
application.851  Liberia and Somalia are excellent examples of the 
interplay between international law and state domestic law in the 
formation of foreign policy and how the rules of international law, and 
therefore effectiveness, often compete when analysed from the domestic 
legal perspective.  In this way, the state’s legal interpretation acts as a 
mechanism for the effectiveness of international law.  In that the effect of 
international law on foreign policy allocates the rules of international law 
to rely on domestic law for implementation and affords those 
international rules political authority at the state level.  This is evident 
given that international organizations do not have a mechanism for 
enforcement capacity.   
 
Therefore as this thesis contends the interpretation of international legal 
rules is dependent on a state’s interpretation of those rules for application 
as prescribed within the domestic legal framework.  This corresponds to 
Dworkin’s argument on the role of sources in law and Tomuschat’s 
dependent legitimacy theory on international law, corroborated by 
Besson with regard to the ‘so-called dependence condition of 
                                                          




legitimacy’852 discussed in chapter one.  It is also compatible with 
neoclassical realism’s assertion on the interaction between the state and 
its position in the international system as discussed in chapter five of this 
thesis.  
 
Lastly, the consequences of Somalia were reflected subsequently in the 
events in Rwanda.  By May 1994, when the genocide in Rwanda began, 
Clinton enacted PDD25,853 wherein the United States maintained its non-
intervention policy for which it was criticised on two counts.  First, the 
United States allowed France to take the lead in the Rwanda intervention 
and second, violated its own domestic and international legal obligations 
by not intervening in the genocide.854 
 
Furthermore, the death of the United Nations peacekeepers in Somalia 
also had a restrictive effect on the United Nations, specifically 
concerning the risks that could be assumed during peacekeeping 
operations and in respect to the interpretation of mandates. This was of 
particular importance to the conduct of UNAMIR, the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda.  An analysis of the conflicts in Rwanda 
in 1994 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 follows.   
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  France: Rwanda & Côte d’Ivoire 
Beginning in the 1800s, France had viewed post-colonial Africa as an 
exclusive sphere of influence or pré carré.855  After colonial 
independence in 1960 France maintained an influence on francophone 
African leaders and continued its pré carré relationship.856  France’s 
foreign policies in Africa have been considered constant since the 
government of Charles de Gaulle.857  The significance of de Gaulle’s 
policies is the extent to which they generated a set of norms that have 
shaped French behaviour toward Africa.858  President de Gaulle fought 
for a strong military presence and political influence in many African 
states imposed through both bilateral cooperation and defence 
agreements.859  Most of these agreements still exist today, although some 
remain state secrets.860  This influence was garnered to not only generate 
support in the international arena but to also secure privileged access to 
natural resources and key markets.861  In many ways it has therefore 
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“often proved difficult to draw the (local-international) line clearly 
between French and African institutions.”862  Two events demonstrate 
the political and material price of these policies, the conflicts in Rwanda 
in 1994 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2002.   
 
                                                          




10. Rwanda: Opération Turquoise (1994) 
 
France Relations with Rwanda 
 
Rwanda, as a French-speaking state, enjoyed a very privileged 
relationship with France.  Civilian cooperation between France and 
Rwanda started in October 1962 with the signing of the general 
agreement of friendship and cooperation in cultural, technical and 
economic fields.863  In December 1962, three further definite agreements 
were signed, specifying the nature of the French intervention in each of 
these fields.864   
 
In 1975, with the signing of a special military assistance agreement 
(Accord Particulier d’Assistance Militaire)865 between President Juvénal 
Habyarimana and President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Rwanda entered 
into its pré-carré relationship with France.  The main goal of the 
agreement was to offer technical assistance in the development of a 
national police force. The agreement included one key clause that 
explicitly prohibited French involvement in military and police affairs.866   
 
In 1983, the agreement was revised and the clause was removed during 
Christophe Mitterrand, son of President Mitterrand, position as head of 
the African Cell in the Elysée.867  The Elysée is considered the most 
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powerful institution on French African policy.868  The agreement was 
again amended in 1992.869  As a result, and aided by various co-
operation agreements, both military and non-military, France was able to 
establish a permanent French presence in Rwanda.870   
 
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda marked a turning point for French foreign 
policy in francophone Africa.871  Subsequent reports and hearing records 
have stated that despite knowledge of human rights abuses France 
continued to support the Rwandan government under the 1975 military 
assistance agreement (as amended in August 1992).872   In 1997 France 
established a non-intervention policy towards Africa and folded many of 
its African missions into multinational operations.873 
 
Background to the Rwanda Civil War and Genocide (1990-1994) 
Colonized by Germany in 1899, Rwanda became a Belgian colony after 
the First World War (1916-1961).874  The Germans and, especially the 
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Belgians, transformed Rwanda’s royal governing structure to suit their 
administrative needs, creating a Tutsi rule and a rigid ethnic 
classification system.875  This caused division amongst the Rwandan 
population.  In 1933, the Belgians introduced compulsory ethnic identity 
cards.  In 1959 the Hutu majority rebelled against the Tutsi.  The Hutu 
elite then came into power.876  In 1961 Rwanda was to finally gain 
independence from Belgium.  The transition was not peaceful however 
due to the fact that Belgian colonial rule had created resentment and 
inferiority among the Hutu towards the Tutsi population.  Following 
independence from Belgium relations with France developed with the 
friendship of French President Mitterrand and the Hutu Rwandan 
President Habyarimana.877   
 
Despite ethnic violence, the Hutu’s dominated Rwanda until 1990.  In a 
coup attempt in October 1990 the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
crossed the border from Uganda.878  The assault was stopped when a 
French commando unit sent on the instructions of Mitterrand, reinforced 
the Habyarimana government’s army.  Civil war ensued.879  From 
October 1990 Rwanda endured three and one-half years of violent 
conflict.  France continued to provide political and military support for 
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Habyarimana’s Hutu government as it increased the number of advisers 
sent into Rwanda.880 
 
In early 1993 the RPF and the Rwandan government met to negotiate a 
peace settlement.  The Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993.881  
As part of the Accords and at the request of both parties to the Accords, 
the United Nations Security Council agreed in October 1993 to establish 
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR, 
Resolution 872).882  UNAMIR, commanded by Roméo Dallaire, was 
mandated to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire and oversee 
implementation of a transitional government and the merger of the two 
armies.883  Despite the Accords ethnic violence increased, further fuelled 
by Hutu extremists who opposed the power-sharing arrangement.884 
 
After the victory of the RPF, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
918 which authorized the expansion of UNAMIR forces to 5,500 
(officially UNAMIR II) and remained in Rwanda until 8 March 1996.885  
Despite international assistance and political reforms, including 
Rwanda's first local elections held in March 1999, Rwanda continues to 
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struggle.886  In 2001, the government began the genocide trials.  During 
this period the United Nations set up the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, based in Arusha, Tanzania.887   
 
The Genocide  
 
In April 1994 the peace process broke down when Habyarimana’s 
personal plane, a gift from Mitterrand, was shot down upon its return to 
Rwanda, killing Habyarimana and all aboard.888  Habyarimana’s 
assassination set off a violent reaction and fighting broke out within 
hours.  The next day the prime minister was murdered in her home along 
with ten Belgian peacekeepers.  The peacekeepers were tortured before 
they were killed.889  On 8 April 1994, the extremist forces turned their 
attention to civilians.   Over a three month period, nearly one million 
people were massacred in a planned genocide.890  This count does not 
include the gender-targeted crimes which included rape and other forms 
of sexual violence.  Tutsi women in particular were targeted with the 
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intent of destroying their reproductive capabilities.891  This strengthened 
the Hutu’s concept of ethnic cleansing.892 
   
The genocide proved too dangerous for the United Nations.  This led to 
the evacuation of all foreign nationals and the European component of 
UNAMIR.893   The African division remained.   On 17 May 1994, the 
United Nations finally accepted that “acts of genocide may have been 
committed.”894  In late June 1994, the French government launched 
Opération Turquoise to provide a safe zone for Hutu refugees.895  
Opération Turquoise saved thousands of lives yet it has also been 
considered controversial due to accusations that its mandate undermined 
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and was 
considered a failed attempt to support the Hutu regime, which France 
had been supporting against the RPF.896   
 
The local Rwandan news media played a crucial role in the genocide 
while the international media either ignored or seriously misconstrued 
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events during the conflict.897  From the beginning, Rwanda’s government 
understood the significance of using the media to unite Rwandans with 
the government.898  This was particularly important given that a large 
number of Rwandans could not read or write.899  The Rapport de la 
Commission Internationale established in March 1992 that Radio 
Rwanda was used to directly promote the killing of Tutsi for propaganda 
by the president's party, Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le 
développement (MRND).900  Supporters of the MRND and of the 
Coalition pour la défense de la République (CDR) ”relied on both 
[Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines] and Radio Rwanda to incite 
and mobilize, then to give specific directions for carrying out the 
killings,” after the Arusha Accords were signed.901  
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The humanitarian crisis finally garnered international attention once 
Hutu refugees began to pour out of Rwanda into neighbouring countries. 
This was followed with verified reports of the genocide.902   
 
The Humanitarian Situation of the Rwandan Conflict and Genocide 
Over the course of approximately one hundred days, nearly one million 
people had been brutally killed, and approximately two million refugees 
had crossed Rwanda’s borders in the largest exodus of displaced persons 
in modern history.903  Large numbers of the population had been tortured 
and wounded and many women, as well as children, had been raped and 
tortured, some becoming infected with AIDS.904  Survivors of the 
genocide were scattered throughout the state and severely traumatised.905  
Approximately two million Hutus, fearing anticipation of Tutsi 
retaliation, fled from Rwanda, dying in refugee camps.906  In 1994, the 
Government of Rwanda began rebuilding the collapsed state.907  
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French Policy toward the Rwandan Conflict 
 
It has now been generally acknowledged that the French intervention in 
Rwanda was predominantly an attempt by France to keep the 
francophonie intact and was indicative of military intervention towards 
Africa in its foreign policy.908  Pursuant to existing formal bilateral 
agreements and informal security commitments towards the 
Habyarimana regime, France intervened to protect French nationals and 
other foreigners.  France also intervened to prevent a victory of the 
rebellion as it had on other occasions in Francophone African states of its 
pré-carré.909   
 
Even though France engaged in diplomatic pressures in order to prevent 
military escalation and violations of human rights, discrepancy in policy 
indicates that the most controversial point was the decision to maintain a 
guarantee of security (emphasis added).910  This was done by generally 
dismissing the increasing reports of serious human rights abuses, despite 
the drift towards genocide.911  These discrepancies coincide with 
declassified government memos and diplomatic telegrams revealing 
Mitterrand's support for the Habyariaman government.  The documents 
confirmed that the French government was aware of ethnic cleansings 
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committed by Hutus extremists as early as February 1993, one year 
before the assassination of Habyarimana which triggered the genocide.912 
 
In October 1990, following the RPF invasion from Uganda into Rwanda, 
French policy towards Rwanda was committed to support the 
Habyarimana regime against an “Anglophone conspiracy and in defence 
of the French role in Africa.”913  As the military weakness of Rwanda’s 
government became apparent the Africa Unit in the Elysée and the 
Military Assistance Office in the Ministry of Cooperation embarked on a 
policy to build up the Forces Armées Rwandaise (FAR).  Officially 
France sent more than twenty-five million francs worth of arms to 
Rwanda between 1990 and 1993 and the French military assistance unit 
in Kigali provided training and operational guidance to Habyarimana’s 
army.914   
 
When later questioned about the supply of arms, the French government 
argued that the supply of arms was legal.915  That in accordance with 
French policy, and as specified under the 1975 Accord Particulier 
d’Assistance Militaire, and as amended in August 1992, France was 
following customary alliance politics.  Moreover, pursuant to the Accord 
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and other informal security commitments, France considered itself to be 
legally bound to support an ally.916 
 
Following the RPF invasion Mitterrand began to by-pass parliamentary 
procedure regarding all decision-making.917  To do this he continuously 
downplayed and restricted information received.  This began in the early 
days of the conflict when the Defence attaché stationed in Kigali, 
Colonel Jacques Galinié, sent several messages which requested 
increased military support for the Rwandan army and also mentioned the 
possibility of genocide against Tutsis.918  Other military dispatches 
protected by defence confidentiality also show that France knew the risk 
of mass massacres against Tutsis had occurred.  In addition some of the 
violations were documented in the French parliamentary report itself.919   
 
Despite reports submitted to the French Government by Amnesty 
International (1992) and five major Rwandan human rights associations 
(1993) describing the ‘ongoing cycle of violence’,920 France announced 
in February 1993 that it was sending more troops to Rwanda.  This was 
quickly followed by Bruno Delaye and the director of African Affairs at 
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the Quay d’ Orsay, Jean-Marc De La Sablière, departure  to Kigali.  
Upon their return from Kigali, Delaye reported “on the position and 
differences in opinion between the president and his Prime Minister.”921 
 
During the crisis situation (the genocide) the Elysée cell met every 
day.922  Pierre Joxe (former defence Minister) stated “that considerable 
more information about the tensions and risks associated with the civil 
war were discussed. Written documentation attests to this.”923  During 
these daily meetings Mitterrand continued to restrict information and 
policy advice put forth concerning the information gathered on the 
situation.  He was also informing decisions that were not agreed upon, 
including the Arusha Accords and Opération Turquoise.924   
 
France was important in pushing Habyarimana to negotiate the Accords. 
The French government concluded that “a negotiated settlement was the 
best way for France to salvage its interests in Rwanda.”925  Edouard 
Balladur (former Prime Minister) writes that “Mitterrand stated that it 
was necessary for the French government to intervene pursuant to its 
responsibilities.”926  However, Balladur made it clear to Mitterrand that 
he opposed the objectives of the French military intervention in 
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Opération Turquoise.927  Balladur further specified that there was never 
an accepted collective decision by the Elysée regarding the 
intervention.928  From this point France’s foreign policy was shaped by 
competitive internal tension among the decision-makers.  The result was 
a dual policy that supported the Arusha negotiations but simultaneously 
built up the Rwandese armed forces and accepted the regime 
politically.929 
 
Of further concern was the role of the international community.  The 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), granted 
under Chapter 6,930 was mandated to monitor the ceasefire and oversee 
the implementation of the Arusha Accords; but had no authority to act in 
a peace enforcement role, to impose the agreement, or to protect human 
rights.931  From a French legal and policy perspective, by positioning 
itself between the two warring parties and by monitoring the border 
between Uganda and Rwanda, UNAMIR would restrain the RPF and 
provide breathing space for the Rwandan government.  This allowed 
France to exercise some influence after its own troops were gone.  The 
government of Rwanda, which had been elected to the Security Council, 
supported France on this issue.932   
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Despite early warnings from human rights organizations and witnesses in 
Rwanda, France a permanent member of the Security Council, never 
discussed the potential genocide with other Security Council members.933  
Records indicate that no deliberations were held concerning the potential 
genocide “although there was considerable evidence available that if the 
level of intervention was not increased, the result would be a major 
genocide.”934  On 21 April 1994, the Security Council voted to withdraw 
all but a few troops of UNAMIR.  In addition, France, as well as Britain 
and the United States, as members of the Security Council, vetoed the 
implementation of the 1948 Genocide Convention that would have 
allowed UNAMIR to be expanded.935 
 
In 1994, under José Ayala Lasso, the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission was instrumental in beginning the process of establishing 
facts and qualification of the genocide.936   This was followed by the 
report of René Degni-Sgui, the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, which 
confirmed the genocide.937  During this same period reports from 
international organisations and those from UNAMIR corroborated the 
facts revealed in other reports and affirmed with no ambiguity that the 
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regime was implicated in the organisation of the massacres.938  The 
United Nations began to respond to the Rwanda conflict and “called 
upon the Security Council to take forceful action in Rwanda.”939  
 
The Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations reported that the 
Security Council overtly omitted genocide from its proceedings because 
it did not wish to engage directly in Rwanda (this is reflected in 
Resolution 918).940  It was not until Resolution 925 that the Security 
Council used the term genocide for the first time.941  In spite of this 
recognition the Security Council did not translate the use of force into 
practice nor were there any acts of immediate assistance.  The diffusion 
of hate propaganda in Rwanda was also an indicator of increasing 
tension and the mounting genocide.942 
 
Opération Turquoise  
 
Faced with delay from the Security Council following Resolution 918, to 
send UNAMIR II and increase its troops, and concerned with its image 
in aiding the Habyarimana regime, France announced on 15 June 1994 
that it would intervene to stop the killing.943  The French-led Opération 
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939 1999 Report of the Independent Inquiry [online]; see also Statement made by the 
President of the Council on 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21). 
940 Ibid.; S/RES/918 (1994) 17 May 1994 (https://undocs.org/S/RES/918(1994)). 
941 S/RES/925 (1994) 8 June 1994 (https://undocs.org/S/RES/925(1994)). 
942 1993 Rapport de la Commission Internationale [online]; 1999 Report of the 
Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda [online]. See also The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, Case no. ICTR-99–52-T: Judgement and sentence, 





Turquoise was a mission conducted with the authorization of the 
Security Council, although not under United Nations command.944   
 
The decision to launch Opération Turquoise was the result of various 
pressures placed upon the French executive, both internally and 
externally.  Externally was the issue of the effect on French public 
opinion concerning the Government’s role in the genocide.945  Internal 
pressure centred on the decision to intervene which was in the context of 
a political debate between Mitterrand, Balladur the Prime Minister and 
Juppé the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Balladur opposed Mitterrand’s 
aggressive option for deployment of Opération Turquoise.946 
 
In his hearing, dans le Mission d’information parlementaire sur le 
Rwanda, Balladur stated that “it is correct that some leaders envisaged a 
military intervention in the form of interposition [which] may have 
involved an act of war led by the French troops on foreign soil.”947  
Balladur specified that he had opposed it and felt that “he was not 
responsible for punishing the Hutu perpetrators of the genocide nor was 
he responsible for allowing the latter to take shelter in Zaïre.”948  
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Juppé aligned himself with Mitterrand.949  African pressures were also 
exerted upon France and especially on Mitterrand, regarding France’s 
African policy.  Conversely, for French purposes, the mission was to put 
an end to the massacres as an incentive for the Forces Armées 
Rwandaise to restore their authority (the Forces Armées Rwandaise were 
the actors responsible for the genocide).950 
 
Foreseeing the possible problems Opération Turquoise (Resolution 929) 
might cause UNAMIR II, The UN Secretary-General intervened in 
support of authorization for Opération Turquoise.  “One such difficulty 
was the perceived imbalance between the mandate of UNAMIR, which 
remained a Chapter 6 operation throughout, and the Chapter 7 
authorization given to Opération Turquoise”951 (Resolution 929), which 
France itself wrote.952 
 
According to the United Nations mandate, any hostile military contact 
between soldiers of Opération Turquoise and FPR was to be avoided.  
France was ordered to remain neutral between the parties to the 
4conflict.953  The intervention succeeded in saving thousands of Tutsi 
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lives “but it also provided for the safe exit of many of the Hutu allies of 
France involved in the genocide.”954 
 
Causal Factors Affecting International Law on the Policy Process 
The Decision-makers’ Arguments for Foreign Policy Rationale:  Based 
upon its historical relationship with Rwanda, France assumed a basic 
position of intervention in Rwanda.  This position was adopted for 
several reasons.  First, Africa is integrated into the French Constitution 
and as such was a high priority issue area.955  Second, defence of 
France’s African sphere of influence was (until recently) a key pillar of 
French foreign policy.956  Third, the general foreign policy approach was 
one of intervention pursuant to existing formal bilateral agreements and 
informal security commitments towards the Habyarimana regime.957  
Discrepancy in policy indicates that the most controversial point was the 
decision to maintain a guarantee of security despite the genocidal nature 
of the civil war.958   
 
The Domestic Legal Framework:  Both the constitutional and legal 
framework on human rights existed but was overlooked given that 
Mitterrand restricted information on behalf of Habyarimana’s 
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government.959  Aside from the Constitution and Civil Code there were 
also existing formal bilateral and defence agreements, including informal 
security commitments gave France legally sufficient reason to 
intervene.960   
 
Actions of the United Nations:  Although reports citing the humanitarian 
crisis were first issued in 1992, the United Nations did not address the 
Rwanda crisis as genocide until early 1994.961  Prior to this UNAMIR 
(1993) was mandated to monitor the ceasefire and oversee the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords but had no authority to protect 
human rights.962  More troops were requested but in April 1994 the 
Security Council voted to withdraw all but a few troops of UNAMIR.  
Taking this vote, and others concerning Rwanda, as a Rwandan 
representative of the Habyarimana government sat amongst them as a 
non-permanent member.963  Finally the Security Council gave Opération 
Turquoise a Chapter 7 authorization (June 1994) to provide a safe zone 
in the southwest corner of Rwanda.964 
 
Legal Analysis of the Causal Factors  
As anticipated in Chapter Two, the Rwanda crisis presented a legal 
conflict for France between human rights and its ties to Africa.965  In 
analysis of the causal factors influencing the policy process on the role of 
                                                          
959 Thesis:284-85. 
960 Thesis:268-69. 








international law, the research finds that international law’s effectiveness 
determined military operations as mandated by the United Nations.  At 
the same time however, because international law and intervention were 
part of French constitutional and civil law, implemented though its 
foreign policies, the decision-makers until 1994 and particularly 
Mitterrand, instigated intervention in an opposing fashion.  
 
In the case of Rwanda, France interpreted human rights protection with 
the Habyarimana regime to protect its sphere of influence.966  While 
making its case for intervention, France recognised the legal nature of 
the underlying international principles at issue but basically overlooked 
information due to French policy in safeguarding francophone regimes.  
Mitterrand, as well as the international community, would have 
considered this position legally legitimate because it was based on prior 
defence and cooperation agreements with Rwanda.  This rationale 
corresponds to France’s pre-existing law at the time.  This oversight was 
further exacerbated by the United Nations and the Security Council’s 
failure to address the Rwanda crisis as genocide until early 1994, a factor 
which clearly influenced how the language of foreign policy was 
constructed.967  This is illustrated in Resolution 929, Opération 
Turquoise, which France itself wrote in an attempt to restore authority to 
the Forces Armées Rwandaise.  As a result, France basically interpreted 
                                                          





international law in a way that matched French, as well as United 
Nations’, interests at the time.968   
 
As in the case of Somalia, there was no existing law or consensus at the 
international level which defined humanitarian intervention and thus 
there was no obligation for intervention decisions.  Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
of 1948 would have substantiated legal authority, although at the time 
there was no precedent for the use of Chapter 7 in circumstances 
concerning genocide at the international level.  (This does not place the 
genocide into a non-legal status.)   
 
Based on these observations, its historical relationship with Rwanda and 
because humanitarian intervention is a core mission for French foreign 
policy, French decision-makers adopted a basic position of military 
intervention in Rwanda throughout the civil conflict.  In that, France 
maintained its legal formalist approach by insisting on the primacy of its 
domestic law.  In doing so its legal scope and limitations were in 
conflict, which significantly coloured the obligations of France to 
Rwanda and the rights of civilians in the armed conflict. 
 
France’s legal scope is witnessed pursuant to the 1975 Accord Particulier 
d’Assistance Militaire, and other informal security commitments.  The 
1992 amendment to the agreement later provided the legal justification 





for direct French military assistance to the Rwandan army,969 which in 
essence exacerbated the nature of the conflict.  In formulating these 
agreements both France and Rwanda were guided by their own interests 
and needs.  As a result, the establishment of the agreements and security 
commitments did not always correspond to the actual objective 
requirements of the relevant international legal principles.  Due to the 
extent of the agreement France considered itself to be legally bound to 
support an ally.970   
 
In an opposing fashion, the agreement also established a limited legal 
effect in that France was bound in its support of an ally which led to 
internal Ministry arguments.  In addition, constitutional positioning of 
the applicable principles of human rights was underscored because 
human rights protection is placed with the Habyarimana regime, which is 
significant given France’s failure to discuss the potential genocide with 
Security Council members.971   
 
Specific limitations call attention to Mitterrand whom by-passed 
parliamentary procedure and informed decisions that were not agreed 
upon.  This was highlighted by internal Ministry debate on Opération 
Turquoise which the Prime Minister viewed as inappropriate to French 
law, arguing that it was based in colonialism.  It is further evidenced by 
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accusations that Opération Turquoise’s mandate undermined the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).972   
 
Rwanda’s francophone status during Opération Turquoise reflected the 
increasing frustration of France’s inability to deal with pending political 
reforms, and its own legal status within Rwanda.  The frustration rested 
on the fact that Rwanda’s rebel force was free to determine independence 
through means of internal conflict.  To intervene in Rwanda would have 
necessitated a level of neutrality on France’s behalf.  Instead the tension 
between humanitarian intervention and sovereignty, sovereignty as 
defined by France’s (Mitterrand) defence of its pré-carré status, created 
political problems for France’s policy-makers and operational dilemmas 
on the ground for its military.  A tension which underscores the theme of 
this thesis, discussed previously in section four.   
 
This tension was witnessed in France’s necessity to intervene pursuant to 
what France considered to be its legal responsibilities in Rwanda.  Thus, 
what appears to have mattered most were not the particulars on the 
human rights abuses, but rather the legal-political culture of the 
policymaking process in the French government based upon traditional 
sphere-of-influence politics and the legality of bilateral cooperation and 
defence agreements.  France’s earlier actions in Rwanda may have been 
guided by a will to bring stabilisation to the state, but the purpose behind 
Opération Turquoise was to maintain an army in Rwanda.   
                                                          





Whether the decision to intervene hindered or promoted the perceptions 
of the decision-makers’ concerning security is difficult to determine, 
since both international law and Africa are incorporated into domestic 
sources of law in France.  While the Rwandan media sources played a 
crucial role in the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the media had little effect on 
France’s decision-making.973 Although humanitarian intervention created 
an agenda of reference for its policy makers, France’s security 
perceptions were not based on its attention to the need for human rights 
issue at hand but instead were based on the protection of the 
Habyarimana government.  This protection was enhanced by France’s 
legal right to intervene as previously established.   
 
Norm restriction is particularly evident since the issue of human rights 
was compromised due to the failure to incorporate the facts of the 
conflict and place those facts in the necessary context for use of force.  A 
key element in this respect was the decision to maintain a guarantee of 
security despite the genocidal nature of the civil war.974  The guarantee 
of security operated between Rwanda’s humanitarian concerns and 
France’s foreign policy, which in effect constrained the principles of 
international law toward the civil war.  While at the same time, the 
guarantee of security also allowed France to maintain some degree of 
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control over the situation in Rwanda based on the military weakness of 
Rwanda’s government as determined by France.975 
 
As determined by neoclassical realism, in France’s interpretation of 
human rights protection, French laws effectively weakened the influence 
of humanitarian concerns in the course of foreign policy.  This is not to 
say that state interests did not play a role, but without application of 
French legal sources and what France deemed appropriate legal 
reasoning, foreign policy objectives – military intervention - could not 
have been met.  Again, French justification is witnessed in l’Accord 
Particulier d’Assistance Militaire and rationale in its continued support 
of the Habyarimana government.976  Right or wrong, and as hypothesised 
in chapters two and six, French foreign policy obeyed fixed legal rules 
regarding the course of action to be taken during the Rwanda crisis.   
 
As with the United States case studies in the previous chapters, several 
additional possible rationales specific to Rwanda are considered to 
further verify how international law becomes legally applicable in its 
interaction with state law to inform foreign policy.  An analysis of 
Rwanda shows two further rationales for intervention can be explained 
relative to the causal factors.  First, it is unlikely that France could have 
prevented the Rwandan genocide given its history of intervention in 
Africa, established in France’s legal sources and strategic use of legal 
reasoning for policy purpose.  Second, the United Nations was unable to 
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authorize any action because it avoided any contextualisation relating to 
the genocidal accounting of human rights abuse;977 thus allowing France 
to position itself between state and international levels of law.     
 
 It is unlikely that France could have prevented the Rwandan genocide 
given its traditional history of intervention in Africa, established in 
France’s legal sources and strategic use of legal reasoning for policy 
purposes 
 
It has been established that Africa is incorporated into the 1958 French 
Constitution and defence of France’s African sphere of influence was 
(until recently) a key pillar of foreign policy.978  This can be witnessed in 
constitutional positioning and existing formal bilateral military and 
cooperation agreements.  As previously stated, although there were 
earlier warnings suggesting genocide, policy rationale based upon French 
legislature and its Civil Code determined that Habyarimana sought 
French military protection due to aggression considered as foreign.   
 
Foreign policy also included the protection of French nationals.  In 
providing military assistance to the Habyarimana government during a 
time of war, France was following customary alliance politics, although 
there was no international arms embargo on Rwanda at the time.979  The 
use of force through training and arms transfers from France to Rwanda 
was based upon bilateral agreements as set forth in 1975 and as 
amended, and thus, as France argued, was technically legal.  Until the 
signing of the Arusha Accords France argued that it employed the right 
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of sovereign states to give military aid to an ally’s government facing a 
rebel force.  The bilateral agreements, Constitution and Civil Code 
provided France with the necessary legal justification to interpret 
intervention into its domestic policy and as a legal basis to intervene.  
Moreover, as provided by legislature, military assistance was not 
exceptional practice in the overall context of French involvement in 
Africa at the time.   
 
The assertion of the right of sovereign states to provide military aid to a 
friendly government facing a rebel force also provided France with the 
necessary principle of international law to sustain its domestic 
intervening presence.  For France the necessity of upholding its legally 
binding military agreements was based upon the fact that France 
(Mitterand) felt it had to be vigilant against a perceived rebel force 
against a francophone zone.980  This sovereign state position resulted in a 
dual policy that supported the Arusha negotiations but simultaneously 
built up the Rwandan armed forces; as well as support for 
Habyarimana’s regime.  The duality in policy also led to policy 
discrepancy concerning the reports of genocide.981  As a result, the way 
foreign policy was expressed, through France’s own legal perspective, 
compromised the human rights issues because of the failure to interpret 
and incorporate the facts of the conflict in an appropriate manner.   
 






The United Nations itself was unable to authorize any action because it 
avoided any contextualisation relating to the genocidal accounting of 
human rights abuse; thus allowing France to position itself between state 
and international levels of law. 
 
Despite the foundation of “international peace and security”982 both 
France’s foreign policy and the United Nations (amongst others) 
compromised the human rights issues in Rwanda due to failure to 
incorporate the facts of the conflict and place those facts in the necessary 
context to use force.  The United Nations and the Security Council 
carefully avoided contextualisation of the term genocide.983  This had the 
affect of separating the actual severity of the crime of genocide as a 
contributory factor necessary for a decision to use force.  In addition, the 
actions undertaken during the civil war were neither criticised nor 
condemned.  While it could be argued that the mechanisms for 
intervention relevant to genocide were not expressly articulated, the 
situation as expressed qualified as genocide in terms of Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
of 1948.  As a consequence the use of force would have been justified, 
despite the fact that there was no precedent for the use of Chapter 7 in 
circumstances concerning genocide.   
 
The failure to recognise the genocide at the international level (and vis-à-
vis the state level) can be determined by several underlying factors.  
First, there was the refusal to accept the facts of the case based upon its 
legal principles.  Although the United Nations had been alerted to the 
                                                          





impending genocide by various international human rights organizations, 
the United Nations did not address the Rwanda crisis as genocide until 
early 1994.  Much like Mitterrand, the United Nations and the Security 
Council continuously downplayed information received regarding any 
form of genocide, although human rights abuse was acknowledged.   
 
Thus, the Security Council condemned the massacres of civilians by 
using legal terms which define genocide, without actually identifying 
genocide.  This had the effect of isolating the violations of genocide from 
the civil war and destabilising legal principles of law, both domestic and 
international.  This also had the effect of substantiating France’s 
established domestic legal position.  An underlying rationale for this was 
preceded by the deaths of United States soldiers in Somalia and the 
Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda.984  When the Security Council was 
finally called upon to take action in Rwanda, it was cautiously supportive 
but notably made no mention of the genocide.  The Security Council 
took this vote, and others concerning Rwanda, at the same time as a 
Rwandan representative of the Habyarimana government sat amongst 
them as a non-permanent member.   
 
Whatever the role of the Security Council, there could have been no 
illusions about the situation in Rwanda.  As General Christian Quesnot, 
then head of military affairs for the French Presidency, told the French 
internal parliamentary legislative inquiry following the genocide in 
Rwanda: “political as well as military leaders understood immediately 
                                                          




that we were headed towards a massacre far beyond any that had taken 
place before.”985 
 
Second, the fact that Rwanda was represented by the Habyarimana 
government and was a member of the Security Council from January 
1994, constituted a conflict of interest in the Security Council’s handling 
of the Rwanda issue.986  That a party to the civil war in question was on 
the agenda of the Security Council and the host state of a peacekeeping 
operation, which was later subject to an arms embargo imposed by the 
Security Council, shows the effect of France’s membership on the 
Council.  For all intent and purposes Rwanda had full access to the 
discussions of the Security Council and as such had the opportunity to 
attempt to influence decision-making on its own behalf.   
 
This conflict of interest is evident in the duality of the sovereign non-
intervention principle and its attention to human rights, i.e., UNAMIR, 
which remained a Chapter 6 operation throughout, and the Chapter 7 
authorisation given to Opération Turquoise.  Two operations in the same 
conflict area with the authorization of the Security Council but with 
diverging powers could only be viewed as problematic given the nature 
of the factors presented and the course of Security Council votes.  This 
allowed France to position itself between state and international law by 
monitoring the border between Uganda and Rwanda.  UNAMIR would 
restrain the RPF and Opération Turquoise would provide a safe zone for 
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refuges while at the same time facilitate the safe exit of the Rwandan 
government.   
 
Third, a final rationale may have been the inability to establish genocide 
in the required legal context.  Separation of the severity of the crime of 
genocide from the facts of the case, discussed previously in this chapter, 
would have clouded issues surrounding the necessity of establishing 
intent, pursuant to the guidelines established in the Genocide 
Convention.  This factor may also have been strengthened by Rwanda’s 
seat on the Security Council, which hindered responsibility for law and 
order and the security of civilians in areas under its control.  Similarly, 
however, if intent had been established it would have legally obligated 
the international community to take action since genocide is codified as a 
legitimate reason to override United Nations Article 2.7. 
   
Of further importance are issues of legality concerning international 
law’s inability to support the Genocide Convention on its own.  The 
Genocide Convention does not impose a legal requirement to take action 
to stop genocide.987  Article 8 interpreted states that a contracting party 
may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take action 
to suppress genocide, but that is not legally required.988  Therefore, it 
only requires interpretation and passage by state legislation to prohibit 
genocide.  Based upon this interpretation, lack of enforcement, by 
Security Council members, had the effect of weakening international 
                                                          






law’s effectiveness within the international and domestic decision-
making process because legal structures both restrained and empowered 
each state.  Once again this establishes, as set out in chapter one, that 
international legal principles are dependent upon the state’s legal 
interpretative process and operates between humanitarian concerns and 
foreign policy as defined by neoclassical realism.  Consequently, as this 
thesis argues the allocation of power in the decision-making process is 
witnessed within a state’s domestic legal structures.  This allocation of 
power supports the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of international law 
in foreign policy. 
 
Humanitarian Intervention as a Legal Instrument for Foreign Policy 
In France the recognition of humanitarian intervention as a legitimate 
practice and, therefore, its legal status is part of the decision-making 
process.  Consequently interaction is commonplace.  Rwanda represents 
a case where the foreign policy objective was to provide humanitarian 
assistance and security.  Based on this objective a foreign policy decision 
to support a United Nations mandate recognised and legitimately applied 
military assistance (use of force) to the principle of human rights.  
However the interpretation and application of genocide within the 
domestic decision-making process did not happen.  As a result, the way 
policy was expressed compromised the protection of human rights at 
issue due to the failure of the decision-makers to incorporate all the facts 
associated to the civil war.  This lack of application reduced the legal 




level of military participation relating to the gross violations of human 
rights abuses.  In effect the allocation of the rules of international law 
reliant on domestic law for implementation was not afforded political 
authority at the state level.   
 
In Rwanda there was a clear need for France to interpret the international 
norm of genocide within its domestic legal framework for enforcement 
purposes.  As expected however this reflects that change or interpretation 
in the French legal system will only be made where disparities are 
present.  In this case, France adhered to legal principles established in the 
French Constitution and bilateral agreements.  France’s legal structures, 
based on its established legal tradition and sources of law, made the 
interpretation and application of genocide difficult. Consequently the 
legal status of humanitarian intervention as a domestic concern and thus 
an instrument of foreign policy relied upon its francophone status in 
Rwanda.  In addition, Rwanda necessitated a level of neutrality on 
France’s behalf but instead the tension between humanitarian 
intervention and sovereignty created problems; a tension which 
underscores the theme of this thesis, and was discussed previously in 
chapter seven.   
 
Finally, as in Liberia, evidence would suggest that both international law 
and domestic law could be interpreted as insufficient to protect core 
human rights values. When assessing the interpretation of human rights 




must consider deliberate non-enforcement regarding the aspects of 
genocide. 
 
11. Côte d’Ivoire 
France Relations with Côte d’Ivoire   
 
Based upon its Françafrique status, France had held a long-standing 
relationship with Côte d’Ivoire since 1893 when Côte d'Ivoire was made 
a French colony.989  From 1904, Côte d'Ivoire was run as an overseas 
territory by the French Third Republic.990  Governors appointed in Paris 
administered the colony of Côte d'Ivoire until 1958, using a centralized 
administration that restricted Ivoirian participation in policy-making.991  
Following independence in 1960 France and Côte d’Ivoire maintained 
positive relations.  These relations later deepened based upon the 
friendship of Presidents Houphouët-Boigny and Mitterrand.  This 
resulted in the 1961 agreement of cooperation entitled l’ Accord 
d'Assistance Militaire Technique, outlining French-Ivoirian relations and 
securing a permanent presence for France in Côte d’Ivoire; as well as  a 
Defence Pact signed in 1970 and additional cooperation agreements 
which included judicial affairs and technical and military assistance.992  
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Like his predecessor Charles de Gaulle, Mitterrand had retained foreign 
affairs as part of the “pré carré” status of the President.993 
 
The Rwandan conflict however significantly affected France’s credibility 
in Africa and in 1995 on the instruction of President Jacques Chirac;994 
France established a non-intervention policy towards Africa.995  From 
thereafter France’s strategic approach to Africa was built upon 
RECAMP, le Renforcement des Capacités de Maintien de la Paix, a 
French peacekeeping agenda for Africa.996  Nevertheless following the 
coup attempt of Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo, France, under 
Chirac’s instructions, deployed troops to protect French nationals in 
September 2002.  This was followed in 2004 by Force Licorne 
(Opération Licorne), independent of the United Nations.997   
 
Background to the Côte d’Ivoire Conflict (2002 - ongoing) 
After achieving independence from France in 1960 Côte d'Ivoire enjoyed 
political stability and economic success.998  Following the death of 
Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 and predicated upon policy decisions 
initiated by his successor, Henri Konan Bédié, Côte d'Ivoire experienced 
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two coups, one in 1999 and another in 2001.999  The ongoing conflict 
began in 2002 and has caused destabilisation and instability throughout 
the state.  Although most of the armed conflict ended in 2004, the current 
phase of the conflict remains unpredictable.  The ongoing instability 
relates to the definition of citizenship (who can stand for election as 
President) voting rights and representation in government.1000 
 
Under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny (1960 to 1993) Côte 
d'Ivoire’s religious divide was united and the country developed a 
thriving economy.  In 1990 political opposition parties were legalized in 
an effort to democratize the state.  Houphouët-Boigny won the first 
contested election, beating the candidate from the Ivoirian Popular Front 
(IPF) Laurent Gbagbo.1001 
 
Following Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993, and as written in the state 
constitution, Henri Konan Bédié President of the National Assembly, 
took over the presidency.1002  Bédié created the concept Ivoirité, used to 
differentiate between real Ivoirian citizens and the others, which 
increased ethnic tensions in Côte d'Ivoire.1003  In 1995 Bédié added a 
clause to the constitution that Ivoirian presidential candidates must be 
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Ivoirian citizens and requiring both parents to be Ivoirien.1004   In 1999, 
economic pressures resulted in a coup attempt and Bédié was forced to 
flee to France.1005   
 
After the 1999 coup, under the government of General Guei, a new 
constitution was drafted and ratified in 2000.1006  The new constitution 
retained a number of clauses which emphasised the ethnic, religious and 
territorial divisions within Côte d'Ivoire.1007  Elections were scheduled to 
take place in the autumn of 2000, but tensions increased when Guei's 
“introduced new eligibility criteria for presidential candidates.” 1008  This 
disqualified Alassane Ouattara and his party Rassemblement des 
Republicaines (RDR).1009  When early polling results showed Gbagbo in 
the lead, Guei stopped the election process and declared himself the 
winner.  Within hours street demonstrations and fighting began.1010  
Gbagbo was declared President but the RDR called for new elections in 
which their candidate (Ouattara) could stand.  More violence erupted 
when on “29 October the massacre of Yopougon was uncovered” in 
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Abidjan.1011  Hundreds were killed before Ouattara called a truce and 
recognised the Gbagbo presidency.1012   
 
Another coup was attempted on 7 January 2001 to overthrow Gbagbo, 
but failed and those involved were forced into exile.1013  In August 2002 
Gbagbo formed a de facto government that included the RDR party; 
thereafter violent armed conflict ensued in September 2002 and incurred 
the split in party ties.1014  In order to limit the violence and resolve the 
political differences, France and ECOWAS mediated between the 
government and the rebel forces.  In late October 2002 French troops 
were dispatched into the region.1015  Following diplomatic lobbying by 
the French government and the international community, the warring 
parties signed a compromise Agreement in Linas-Marcoussis on 23 
January 2003.1016  The Agreement was not respected and intense fighting 
broke out again.   
 
The bombing of France’s peacekeeping force (Opération Licorne) by 
Gbagbo’s army in November 2004 and the necessary reaction of France 
to ensure protection, strained relations between France and Côte d’Ivoire 
significantly.1017  Although most of the fighting ended in 2004 the state 
remains divided in two, with the Forces Nouvelles ruled by the north and 
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Gbagbo’s government controlling the south.1018  Efforts to advance a 
peace process have still not met with success.  In November 2006 
Security Council Resolution 1721 extended the transitional government's 
mandate and tasked it with completing the peace process by October 
2007.1019  In 2011 “the polarisation effects over the debates between 
humanitarian intervention ... produced a further divide between 
international and local actors, thus reproducing discursive strategies of 
interpretation of military intervention as either humanitarian or 
imperialist.”1020  As of June 2014 the Security Council continues to 
mandate the UNOCI operation.  The renewed 2014 mandate reinforces 
the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
concerning the political processes underway in Côte d’Ivoire.1021  It 
further notes that the security situation remains fragile as well as threats 
to civilian safety.1022  Finally, pursuant to the UN website, in January 
2015 the Security Council is scheduled to hold further consultations on 
Côte d’Ivoire.1023   
 
The Humanitarian Situation of the Côte d’Ivoire Conflict 
To date, the humanitarian issues remain unresolved and are attributable 
to both sides of the conflict.1024  Government forces and French 
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peacekeeping troops were both reported to have used excessive force 
against demonstrators and civilian populations.1025  In July 2007 the 
United Nations “suspended a Moroccan peacekeeping unit in Côte 
d’Ivoire following an investigation into allegations of sexual abuse.”1026  
One of the worst atrocities of the civil war was the mass deaths of dozens 
of gendarmes and their families.1027  Human Rights Watch reported the 
continued subjection of women, girls, and boys in unreported incidents 
of sexual violence.1028   
 
Xenophobic hate speeches on public radios and news media continue to 
increase the ethnic tension between Ivoirians and foreign nationals.1029  It 
has been reported that at least 700,000 people are currently displaced in 
government-held areas in the south and 1.7 million people are estimated 
to be internally displaced nationwide.  Tens of thousands more have fled 
Côte d’Ivoire for other countries in the sub-Saharan region and 
beyond.1030   
 
French Policy towards the Côte d’Ivoire Conflict   
 
The Rwandan conflict significantly affected France’s credibility in 
Africa.  Because of this in 1997, on the instructions of President Jacques 
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Chirac, France established a non-intervention policy towards Africa and 
folded many of its African missions into multinational operations.  
France’s strategic approach to Africa thereafter was built upon le 
Renforcement des Capacités de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), the 
French peacekeeping agenda for Africa.1031  RECAMP was developed to 
prevent the French army from being implicated in any intricate civil and 
ethnic wars.1032  Based upon its new policy of non-intervention and until 
the second attempted coup in 2002, France’s position was to consider the 
crisis an internal issue for Côte d’Ivoire.1033 
 
Subsequently, in September 2002 following the outbreak of violence and 
requested assistance from the United Nations, France deployed troops in 
an attempt to rescue French and western citizens from the Ivoirian 
territory.1034  French troops were again dispatched in October 2002 to 
monitor a cease fire and to mediate reconciliation between the parties to 
the conflict.1035  On 18 October the rebels agreed to a ceasefire and 
Gbagbo called on the French to monitor the ceasefire citing the 1961 
cooperation agreement and 1970 defence pact.  Similar to the agreements 
instituted between France and Rwanda, Gbagbo insisted that France was 
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legally obligated to militarily defend its former colony from any external 
invasion.1036  The French government however hesitated to commit to an 
explicit agreement to protect Côte d’Ivoire from an external invasion on 
the basis of which the conflict came from within the state.1037   
 
France’s approach was also based on its peacekeeping agenda for Africa.  
Gbagbo’s government called it a question of semantics and considered 
France’s approach an insult to Ivoirian sovereignty.1038  Gbagbo began to 
publicly insist that France should activate the 1961 bilateral defence 
accord.1039  Regardless of its intentions France did monitor the ceasefire.  
France “cited the reason as the protection of French nationals” as 
rationale for monitoring the ceasefire and not the legal obligations 
Gbagbo insisted upon.1040  France saw its position in Côte d’Ivoire as one 
of necessity since the alternative would be considered a policy of 
neglect, as well as a threat to national security.1041 
 
The lack of knowledge towards the rebellion was mutually shared at the 
international level, but following the attempted coup the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened 
immediately.1042 This was in an attempt to mediate the political 
differences between the government and the rebel forces.  Likewise, the 
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United Nations was also quick to acknowledge the human rights 
situation as it could not ignore the possibility of another genocide 
occurring in Africa and began monitoring the situation.1043  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross also responded to the human 
rights violations and informed parties to the conflict to comply with the 
rules of the international humanitarian law.1044  This was followed by 
reports in December 2002, that French troops had discovered mass 
graves.1045 
 
Following reports from the United Nations the international media began 
to sporadically feature the violence in Côte d’Ivoire.  Reporters without 
Borders repeatedly stated that the Western media gave biased reports 
based upon a lack of knowledge on Africa that had dangerous 
consequences.1046 
 
In November 2002, in furtherance of France’s policy towards Côte 
d’Ivoire, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Dominique de Villepin, 
visited Côte d’Ivoire and held talks with the Ivoirian government.”1047  In 
January 2003 Minister de Villepin met again with Gbagbo and expressed 
the French government’s concern about the increasing crisis and 
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humanitarian issues.1048  He further stated to Gbagbo that France was not 
supporting either side in the conflict.1049 
 
After significant diplomatic advisement by de Villepin and ECOWAS, 
the warring parties signed the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement on 23 
January 2003 in Paris.1050  The principle provisions of the Agreement 
were “the creation of a government of national unity, the request for a 
joint France-ECOWAS peacekeeping force and the establishment of an 
international follow-up commission”1051 (le Comité de Suivi).1052  In its 
foreign policy, as stipulated pursuant to the 1961 cooperation agreement 
and 1970 defence pact, France maintained troops to monitor the ceasefire 
along with a force of troops through ECOWAS.1053  On “4 February 
2003 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1464, 
which legitimized the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement” and supported the 
continued French military operation Opération Licorne.1054   
 
Due to Gbagbo’s unwillingness to fully implement the Linas-Marcoussis 
Agreement, Franco-Ivoirian relations again began to deteriorate.1055  The 
Forces Nouvelles were not compelled to follow the Agreement either, 
particularly if the fundamental provisions as set out in the Agreement 
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were not met.1056  The ceasefire was broken repeatedly.  This angered the 
French.  By February 2003, there were three thousand troops in 
Opération Licorne, which began initially in September 2002 independent 
of the United Nations to honour the 1961 agreements signed between 
France and Côte d’Ivoire.1057   
 
The mission of the Opération was in compliance with stated objectives in 
French policy and was substantiated by the Legal Council of the French 
government.  The mission was also supported by Security Council 
Resolution 1479 on 13 May 2003, which established the Mission des 
Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI).1058  The French force was 
mandated, among other things, to participate in the formation of security 
within the border zone (with Liberia) and to provide security for 
foreigners and evacuation when deemed necessary.1059  On 27 February 
2004, the United Nations Security Council established a peacekeeping 
mission in Cote d'Ivoire, the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI).1060  In addition to United Nations peacekeepers and police 
officers, the mission was supported by French troops belonging to 
Opération Licorne, acting under Chapter 7 of the United Nations 
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Charter.1061  Opération Licorne effectively underscored the division of 
Côte d'Ivoire into two parts as armed conflict ensued throughout.1062 
 
It was also during implementation of the UNOCI mandate that anti-
French demonstrations were taking place in Abidjan based upon 
accusations that France was taking sides. Gbagbo interpreted this as a 
non-implementation of the agreements of defense made with Côte 
d'Ivoire.  This position contrasted with the rebels (Forces Nouvelles) who 
insisted France was preventing the capture of Abidjan.1063  The media 
also played a role at this point, as scenes of French citizens forced from 
their homes in Cote d'Ivoire and French soldiers shooting at 
demonstrators were televised in both states.1064  The situation grew worse 
with military actions carried out by the government in November 2004.  
Thereafter the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Cote 
d'Ivoire.1065   
 
In response to France’s assistance to the United Nations in protecting the 
Forces Nouvelles delegates, “the Ivoirian Air Force attacked a French 
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military base.”1066  France interpreted this as a threat to national security 
and French forces destroyed Ivoirian aircraft under the rules of 
engagement.1067  Chirac’s order was to stop any further attacks against 
the French army and its citizens, and to prevent any further attacks by the 
government’s army against the Forces Nouvelles; which were contrary to 
the signed Agreement.1068 
 
Gbagbo’s supporters promptly turned on the French community.  The 
Ivoirian 'hate media' spread continuous messages inciting the militias to 
attack French civilians.1069  Efforts to resolve the conflict between the 
government and the rebels resulted in a succession of unfulfilled peace 
agreements.  Although French peacekeeping forces remain in the state 
under a United Nations mandate, France is unwilling to organize another 
peace conference.1070  As stated above, France is connected to Côte 
d'Ivoire through its governmental relations and cooperation and bi-lateral 
agreements, including military assistance in the form of defence treaties, 
which include secret clauses.1071  Since the agreements have not been 
officially absolved, this means that neo-colonial Françafrique continues 
to function even when government officials claim Françafrique status no 
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longer exists; notwithstanding France’s approach to Africa with regard to 
RECAMP. 
 
In 2007, according to Radio France International, France has “yet to 
officially revise or renegotiate the ‘secret’ and public defence treaties 
signed with a select number of African countries.”1072  Policy critics 
allege that France uses this secrecy, as well as ambiguous definitions of 
what defines internal or external threats, to develop policy to intervene 
according to its own interests; even within an international framework.  
However, France sees its foreign policy position on Côte d’Ivoire as one 
of keeping Côte d’Ivoire out of the ranks of failed states since the 
alternative would be considered a policy of neglect.  Consequently, 
France remains in Côte d’Ivoire under a United Nations mandate.1073 
 
Causal Factors Affecting International Law on the Policy Process 
The Decision-makers’ Arguments for Foreign Policy Rationale:  Despite 
Chirac’s policy of non-intervention, France’s strategic approach with le 
Renforcement des Capacités de Maintien de la Paix, and its initial 
decision to not intervene in Côte d’Ivoire, France adopted a basic 
position of intervention.1074  This position was adopted for several 
reasons.  First, policy centred on the enforcement of the 1961 
cooperation agreement and defence pact; and second, the fear of a 
possible repeat of genocide similar to Rwanda.1075   
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The Domestic Legal Framework:  In hindsight following the Rwanda 
crisis, the interventions were deemed permissible given the particulars of 
the French Constitution and legal framework on human rights and use of 
force.  Although employed initially pursuant to the existing bilateral 
cooperation and defence agreements.  This proved to be a key aspect of 
Ivoirian-French legal cooperation on the use of force and gave France the 
necessary just cause (legal responsibility) to intervene.  Policy also 
included legislature as developed through the Civil Code relevant to 
Chirac’s non-intervention policy towards Africa. 
 
Actions of the United Nations:  Like France, the United Nations could 
not ignore the possibility of genocide and because of this was quick to 
acknowledge the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire.1076  Although 
the United Nations repeatedly deferred to France on legal-political and 
military matters, it played a significant role in the conflict.  As outlined 
in France’s policy towards the conflict in Opération Licorne, Resolution 
1464 authorized the deployment of an international peacekeeping 
force.1077  To facilitate the implementation of the Agreement, United 
Nations Resolution 1479 was adopted (2003) which established the 
Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI).  Finally, 
Resolution 1528 (2004) determined the situation in Côte d’Ivoire to be a 
                                                          





threat to international peace and security in the region and established the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).1078 
 
Legal Analysis of the Causal Factors  
In analysis of the three causal factors influencing France’s 2002 and 
2004 interventions in Côte d’Ivoire the research finds that the principles 
of international law effectively determined military operations as 
mandated by the United Nations.  Yet prior to this and based upon the 
1961 bilateral cooperation agreement and the 1970 defence pact, the 
decision-makers in the early part of the civil war acted outside the basic 
international legal framework.  This is observed in Opération Licorne, 
which began independent of the United Nations and was initiated to 
honour the defence agreements between Côte d’Ivoire and France.   
 
In consequence, although intervention policy was constructed on 
principles of international law (human rights and use of military force) it 
was determined by the legal interpretation of Chirac’s non-intervention 
policy and the cooperation and defence agreements at issue.  Thus while 
making its case for non-intervention France identified the relevant 
underlying principles at issue but interpreted international law in a way 
that matched its own legal interests at the time, as one would expect.  
However as indicated, later policy decisions to use military force when 
read together with Security Council Resolution 1528 provided the legal 
                                                          




basis for French military action under international law.1079  As a result, 
France adopted a basic position of intervention in Côte d’Ivoire given the 
ongoing nature of the civil conflict.1080   
 
As in Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire presented a legal conflict for France.  In 
this case however the conflict was between old legislature concerning 
protection of its pré carré and intervention and the development of the 
new legislature concerning non-intervention which suffered from a lack 
of clarity given the legislatures’ dual agendas.1081   
 
In an attempt to disengage from Côte d’Ivoire, France found itself in a 
perpetual power struggle in its former colony based upon intervention 
policy rationale.1082  France was further driven by traditional sources of 
international and French laws and the principle of self-defence.  Based 
on traditional French sources of law, the interpretation of the use of force 
and/or human rights relied upon statutes as written for different 
administrations and when applied both statutes presented different 
functions during the application process.  This produced inconsistency in 
foreign policy.  It also created significant practical challenges to 
interpreting the responsibilities of protecting human rights in policy 
rationale.  This was clearly observed when France assisted in facilitating 
the principles of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement which escalated the 
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conflict and further exacerbated the xenophobic attacks on the French 
community by Gbagbo’s supporters.1083 
 
In the positioning of traditional sources of international and French laws 
and its legal obligations to militarily defend its former colonies, France 
identified both its legal scope and its limitations.  Legal scope lies with 
France’s traditional method of interpretation of international law in 
French policy, given its authorization by long-standing domestic statute 
requirements.1084  This was conditioned on several reasons:  first, Africa 
is incorporated into the French Constitution and France sees its foreign 
policy position to Côte d’Ivoire as a sense of responsibility and domestic 
concern.  Hence, France felt it was its responsibility to keep Côte 
d’Ivoire out of the ranks of failed states.1085   
 
Second, in France international law is treated the same as domestic law.  
In this regard, concerns of a possible repeat of genocide similar to 
Rwanda extended beyond the traditional legal scope of human rights and 
sovereignty.  Although this gave a strong indication that France 
continued to reserve the right to unilateral action.  France’s legal scope is 
further witnessed pursuant to the 1961 Accord d'Assistance Militaire 
Technique, 1970 Defence Pact, and other informal security commitments 
which provided the legal justification for direct French military 
involvement.1086   
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Unlike Rwanda, the decisions for use of force were developed in close 
collaboration with the Legal and Political Council of the French 
government.1087  Meaning that interpretation of the intervention followed 
required procedure based upon existing treaties and was put before the 
Constitutional Council as part of the decision-making process to 
intervene in Côte d’Ivoire.1088  This decision-making process gave the 
French executive, constitutional (statutory) authority to participate in and 
support United Nations peace operations.  The policy also included 
legislature as developed through the Civil Code relevant to Chirac’s non-
intervention policy and French peacekeeping agenda for Africa 
(RECAMP).1089  This legislature does however call attention to specific 
limitations.   
 
In an attempt to buffer its legal obligations as outlined in the cooperation 
and defence agreements between France and Côte d’Ivoire with new 
legislature, France was unable to deal with its own legal status in Côte 
d’Ivoire.  This is reflected in France’s inability to sustain legitimate 
authority to broker the ceasefires, the initial protection of French 
nationals or reduce the level of humanitarian suffering.  Due to 
ambiguity in policy there was no clear or uniform understanding of how 
international humanitarian concerns applied to French law in Africa and 
therefore foreign policy and state interests.  Indeed, remember the 
cooperation and defence agreements were created during the de Gaulle 
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presidency and maintained during the Mitterrand presidency as part of 
the pré carré status and the preservation of France's special relationships 
with its former African colonies.1090  Thus, de Gaulle and Mitterrand 
produced legislature that Chirac did not consider applicable to state 
interests during his presidency.1091  These ambiguities in legislature 
created significant practical challenges to interpreting the responsibilities 
of France to Africa under international law because both presented as 
different functions during the application process in the formulation of 
foreign policy.   
 
Whereas it is possible as a matter of law to determine what a state’s legal 
obligations are, to be binding those legal obligations must be able to 
withstand the rigor of a consistent and uniform application.  In that this 
will constitute specific statutory authorization for state law and 
international law in foreign policy.  To create state legislature that is ill-
suited to direct pre-established and defined legal obligations however 
diminishes the legal credibility of the foreign policy.  Again, this is 
illustrated in the exacerbation of the conflict.   
 
Norm expansion is also evident inasmuch as the principle of human 
rights was recognised alongside the principle of genocide for legal 
application, although, as stated above, initially outside the basic 
international framework.   Moreover new legal standards associated with 
humanitarian interventions and complicity may have been established in 
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French domestic law concerning state obligations at the international 
level.  Likewise, the United Nations was also quick to acknowledge the 
human rights situation as it could not ignore the possibility of another 
genocide occurring in Africa, illustrated in Security Council Resolutions 
1479 and 1528.1092  The International Red Cross also responded to the 
human rights violations and informed parties to the conflict to comply 
with the rules of the international humanitarian law.1093   
 
However, although France and the international community recognised 
the issue of genocide and as such inferred standards as to when use of 
force during humanitarian catastrophes applies - the question of how it 
applies was not addressed.  What is more, it was not addressed in either 
the Danish Institute Report or the Responsibility to Protect both of which 
preceded the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.  This is an ongoing problem the 
study identifies in chapter seven and one which the study makes 
reference to throughout the thesis.    
 
Whether the effectiveness of international law hindered or promoted the 
decision-makers perception of security is complicated given the 
inconsistency in legislature and thus foreign policy.  Although 
humanitarian concerns created an agenda of reference for France’s 
decision-makers, domestic law itself posed a problem.  The problem was 
situated in the legitimate expectation of Gbagbo for France to protect 
Côte d’Ivoire from an external invasion which conflicted with the 






existence of Chirac’s strategy of non-intervention and on the basis that 
the conflict came from within Côte d’Ivoire.1094  In the early stages 
foreign policy was unable to translate for interpretive purposes the 
relevance of the international legal principles into practice.  Thereafter 
France’s perception changed as it saw its position in Côte d’Ivoire as one 
of necessity since the alternative would be considered neglect, as well as 
a threat to national security concerning French citizens.1095   
 
Like Somalia, human rights a fundamental Constitutional principle, was 
represented as a threat to international peace and security.  Relevant state 
legal obligations and principles of international law clarified where 
humanitarian intervention and its interests interacted in the formation of 
foreign policy.  Consequently while French law included international 
legal principles and standards applicable to Africa, the applicable laws, a 
function of domestic legislation, and although ambiguous in character, 
were state‐specific.  This follows the logic behind the Danish Institute 
Report in its acknowledgment that states may need more than 
humanitarian motives to intervene as noted in chapter seven.1096 
 
As in the previous case studies, two possible rationales for intervention 
can be interpreted when analysing the causal factors.  However, unique 
to the case of Côte d'Ivoire the rationales put forth are conflicting in 
nature due to France’s domestic legal structure.  First, the implications of 







Rwanda and the fear of a possible repeat of genocide in Côte d'Ivoire and 
second, the civil war constituted a threat to France’s national security.   
 
In light of the fact that an objective of this thesis is to determine the 
importance of interpretation and its ability to justify or affect legal 
change, particularly when there is a need to integrate different legal 
norms and policy within a state’s existing legal framework, it is 
appropriate to consider these two rationales given that they substantiate 
this contention.  Moreover, while both rationales demonstrate the 
recognition of international legal rules, they also make clear that the 
interpretations of these norms within the domestic legal process can be 
conflicting because different interests may be inconsistent with 
another.1097 
 
The implications of Rwanda and the fear of a possible repeat of genocide 
in Côte d'Ivoire – observations from the case of Maurice Papon. 
 
Until recently the issue of state responsibility for genocide had been 
unaddressed in the study of international law and foreign policy 
analysis.1098  Since the Nuremberg Trials and the passing of the 
Genocide Convention in 1948, the potential criminal responsibility of 
individuals for acts of genocide has been generally recognised.1099  The 
allegations and documented reports associated with France’s role in the 
Rwandan genocide have not gone unrecognised in France.  
Responsibility connected to state action concerning genocide and the 
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failure to intervene has been noted in the Elysée.1100  The allegations 
against France are also fashioned with future legal action, including the 
indictment of French officials and a possible legal “suit brought against 
France by Rwanda at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which 
handles disputes between states.”1101    
 
Understanding the limitations and potential precedent of the Rwandan 
case in future legal matters against states for genocide, and for purposes 
of this study the implications it may have on Côte d'Ivoire when 
establishing humanitarian concerns within foreign policy.  The 
implications of which will be indicative of the state’s legal behaviour to 
affect and/or justify legal change, and a determining factor in how 
domestic law shapes foreign policy toward international law to effect 
humanitarian concerns.   
 
Bearing in mind, that the politics of xenophobia in Côte d'Ivoire were 
proliferated by the government, and the experience of Rwanda, France 
chose to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire.  As cited previously, initially France 
sent troops to protect citizens of Côte d'Ivoire and French nationals.  This 
was followed by intervention in compliance with the 1961 bilateral 
cooperation agreement and the 1970 defence pact to monitor the 
ceasefire.  Following recorded incidents of widespread violations of 
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human rights, substantiated by various human rights agencies and the 
United Nations’ request to comply with the rules of international 
humanitarian law, France intervened to prevent, what it interpreted as 
further attempts of genocide.  To not intervene in the civil war in Côte 
d’Ivoire would have found France complicit, as was the case in 
Rwanda.1102  Particularly since  the United Nations had recognised the 
violations of human rights as well as the continued violence and 
instability, and ruled both a threat to international peace and security.  
Consequently, humanitarian intervention was based upon France’s 
interpretation of human rights abuses within the domestic context.1103   
 
France’s involvement can be further viewed in connection to French 
leadership in francophone Africa, which is situated in its legal and 
foreign policy traditions. This is evident given that France, and the 
international community, recognised that the mass killings and mass 
graves in Côte d'Ivoire represented the possibility of genocide when 
coupled with the xenophobic behaviour.1104  In its acknowledgment of 
genocide under municipal laws of individual jurisdictions, and as 
statutorily prescribed in French law regarding crimes against humanity, 
France enacted and implemented the international rules associated with 
genocide into its domestic law.1105   
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When interpreting the definition of genocide France recognised as did 
the United Nations, not that the killings had been committed on a 
systematic basis, Article 7 (1), but that the killings were one of a number 
of acts.  Violent acts which included torture and rape, and that these acts 
together were committed on a widespread and systematic basis, which 
were substantiated by various human rights agencies.1106  In France, the 
enactment of the rules of genocide into its domestic framework, affirmed 
the identification of the international human rights principle, and based 
upon its legal structure situated the rules in its foreign policy.1107  This 
reiterates the fact that an international principle must meet the criteria of 
effective legality from within a state’s legal structure to be applicable.1108   
In doing so, France identified how a particular rule of international law is 
recognised within its legal structure.   
 
If we consider the complexities associated with the genocide in Rwanda, 
as it concerned France, and the particulars determined in the case of 
Maurice Papon,1109 reasonable interpretation of the rules of international 
law and established French law will link France to responsibilities 
associated with its former colonies as outlined in the French 
Constitution.  As discussed previously, non-involvement on France’s 
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behalf pursuant to its African sphere of influence would imply 
complicity in violation of the Genocide Convention.  This is especially 
true if one considers that the crime of genocide in domestic law and the 
domestic prosecution of persons committing genocide are subjects of 
both state and international significance.  Correspondingly, the failure of 
France to have enacted the laws against genocide domestically would 
have suggested acceptance and therefore contradiction with an 
international rule, which acts in tandem with recognised French 
legislature, particularly as its domestic law is comprised of international 
law.1110   
 
This expectation and the formulation proposed herein make sense when 
applying the principles of the court decision in Papon together with the 
merits to the case of France in Rwanda in 1994.  Papon also establishes 
legal precedent in French domestic law concerning legal standards 
associated with humanitarian interventions and complicity.  Furthermore 
Papon and the special cooperation laws that provide France with 
jurisdiction on offenses falling within the competence of genocide 
establish benchmarks of accountability.1111  They also produce direction 
for legal change, essential for legislature and policy, which may be 
construed as outdated and therefore lacking relevance to the situation at 
issue.  Accordingly, although the rules of France’s legal structure were 
forced to change regarding crimes against humanity, its foreign policy 
obeyed domestic rules as statutorily prescribed in French law, acting as a 
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framework to regulate state behaviour, which is in accordance with the 
findings of this thesis.1112  It is how we understand the sources and 
processes of the strategic use of interpretation and legal reasoning for 
policy purposes. 
 
Notably, in March 1994 and following the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),1113 the French 
parliament adopted special cooperation laws that provide for French 
jurisdiction over all offenses falling within the competence of genocide 
tribunals if the perpetrators are found in France, this includes French 
citizens and nationals.   
 
 The civil war constituted a threat to France’s national security 
In contradiction to the above and based upon French decision-makers’ 
perception of security issues another rationale can be interpreted – that 
the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire constituted a threat to France’s national 
security in November 2004.  When it became evident that Côte d'Ivoire 
was becoming a humanitarian situation France intervened with the 
deployment of troops in an attempt to rescue French nationals and 
citizens from the Ivoirian territory.1114  The intervention was based on 
French security strategy and legislative intervention policy rationale, 
which as stated previously, emphasizes humanitarian missions together 
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with requirements for territorial defence and maintaining defence 
agreements.1115   
 
In this case domestic law usurped international law given that the French 
deployment effectively underscored the division of Côte d'Ivoire into two 
parts as armed conflict ensued throughout.  Thereafter, France found that 
it was in a position of defence resulting from issues that France found 
unable to control.  As a result, despite its extensive engagement in Côte 
d'Ivoire, use of military force was initiated.  “The rules of engagement 
were clear and unambiguous, to protect the civilian population and 
prevent an escalation of the conflict.”1116  French forces also acted in 
self-defence for civilian protection as well as their own protection, which 
was in accordance with international law as well as French constitutional 
legislation (domestic law).1117   
From 22 September [2002], French military reinforcements 
were deployed in order to ensure the safety of foreign 
nationals, under the principle of international law which 
allows a state to protect its own nationals abroad ... 
designated Opération Licorne.1118 
   
Therefore, contrary to rationale established previously (the implications 
of Rwanda and the fear of a possible repeat of genocide in Côte d'Ivoire), 
it could be argued that the violence against France had more to do with 
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the ineffectiveness of its intervention than it had to do with France’s 
commitment to the intervention.  This is clearly reflected by France’s 
inability to deal with its own legal status concerning the broken 
ceasefires.  It is also evidenced in France’s failure to provide a viable 
strategy to reduce the armed conflict and level of humanitarian suffering 
within a former colony.  A colony accustomed to reliance upon France as 
a safeguard, despite françafrique/francophone status.1119  
 
Paradoxically, the few developments achieved under French diplomatic 
pressures, like the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement wherein Gbagbo felt he 
had been compromised, seemed to strengthen the rebellion and increase 
anti-French rhetoric. Arguably France engaged in diplomatic pressures in 
order to prevent military escalation and violations of human rights, but 
the inconsistency in established French legislature and policy indicates 
France’s unwillingness to abide by the defence agreement as recognised 
and which Gbagbo interpreted as a non-implementation.1120   
 
Also, during the course of Opération Licorne, French policy appears to 
have changed in that France maintained a position of neutrality both 
during diplomatic proceedings and use of force deployment.  It seems 
that in an effort to establish a new paradigm to suit its non-intervention 
policy towards Africa, France failed to negotiate its bilateral agreements, 
which held full legal standing to meet the changing internal environment. 
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This was no doubt further exacerbated by the development of RECAMP, 
to prevent France’s army from being implicated in intricate civil and 
ethnic wars following problems associated with Rwanda.  This new 
strategy provided a dual policy problem because RECAMP created an 
imbalance given France’s prior long-standing unilateral polices while at 
the same time attempting to incorporate multilateral policies, both based 
in domestic law.   
 
Although humanitarian concerns may have created an agenda of 
reference for policy makers, France’s security perceptions stemmed from 
domestic security concerns and legislative requirements.  In an attempt to 
deviate from traditional alliance politics and legal agreements, France 
found itself in a perpetual power struggle in its former colony based 
upon intervention policy rationale, and driven by traditional sources of 
international and French law and the principle of self-defence.  
Consequently, in this rationale, although legal interpretation is situated in 
human rights protection and threats against French nationals, the power 
struggle appears to undermine the effectiveness of international law in 
foreign policy.  
 
Humanitarian Intervention as a Legal Instrument of Foreign Policy 
In this case, as in Rwanda, the recognition of humanitarian intervention 
as a legitimate practice and therefore its legal status is part of the French 
decision-making process.  Hence, interaction between state and 




within France’s legal structure.  This confirms the traditional method of 
interpretation of international law in French policy, which is recognised 
by the authorization of France’s statutory requirements.  In essence 
however the situation in Côte d'Ivoire led to different interpretations and 
applications of the humanitarian concerns at the domestic level due to 
France’s inability to abrogate its old rules concerning protection of its 
pré carré and intervention with its new rules of non-intervention.  This is 
witnessed in the French government’s hesitation to commit to the 
protection of Côte d’Ivoire despite its legal obligation as established in 
pre-existing alignment agreements.1121   
 
Furthermore the international principle of human rights may have been 
positioned within the domestic legal framework but its representation 
relevant to the Côte d'Ivoire crisis was not initially interpreted to protect 
fundamental human rights in foreign policy decisions.  Instead France’s 
foreign policy objective was to secure peace between two warring 
parties.  If you consider that the intervention policy during the early part 
of the civil war was not constructed based upon legal principles of 
international law1122 (human rights and use of force) but was instead 
determined by indecisiveness in interpretation of the cooperation and 
defence agreements at issue, humanitarian intervention may not have 
interacted with the decision-making process at all.  Nevertheless 
France’s foreign policy did support the United Nations on use of force 






and attention to human rights and was therefore legitimately applied in 
its foreign policy decisions.   
 
Moreover analysis of the conflicting rationales for intervention indicate 
that France’s legal sources of law had a central influence on the course of 
action taken in the overall similarity of the intervention decisions.  
Consequently while both rationales created an agenda of reference for 
policy makers (the fear of a possible repeat of genocide in Côte d'Ivoire 
and/or the civil war constituted a threat to France’s national security) the 
rules of international law (human rights, the use of force) remained the 
same.  The underlying difference was, of course, how the rule met the 
criteria of effective legality1123 from within France’s domestic institution 
and how it was interpreted to create legal-political authority.  
 
In the first rationale France’s interpretation of human rights abuses is 
complicated by the rules of complicity and the norm of genocide.  This 
was advanced in that the United Nations had recognised the violations of 
human rights as well as the continued violence and instability and ruled 
both a threat to international peace and security.1124  The rules of 
complicity and the norm of genocide were further considered in Papon 
and the special cooperation laws that provide France with jurisdiction on 
offenses falling within the interpretation of genocide.  As this thesis 
points out, expanding the scope of both international and state law and 
therefore its interpretation within the domestic legal framework justifies 
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legal change and provides a clear development for legislature and policy 
that may be considered outdated and no longer relevant.1125  In this sense 
clarification of the relationship between France’s foreign policy and 
international law is witnessed in the allocation of power in the decision-
making process to interpret and execute the principles of international 
law.   
 
The second rationale offers no complications because it is perceived as a 
threat to France’s national security evidenced by increasing human rights 
abuses and threats against French nationals.  France intervened in an 
attempt to rescue French nationals and citizens based upon French 
security strategy and intervention policy rationale which, as previously 
discussed, emphasizes humanitarian missions together with requirements 
for territorial defence and maintaining defence agreements.1126 
 
Thus in this case, and in accordance with neoclassical realism, the 
actions of France in the international system can be explained by the 
legal power dichotomy facing its decision-makers, determined by the 
bilateral defence and cooperation agreements at issue and human rights 
protection.  This also affirms chapter three in that the conduct of states 
will differ from the expectations of the international system due to 
limitations inherent to any state’s legal institution and which cannot be 
overcome at the international level. 
 







The conflicts in Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire illustrate the inherent 
problems in France between the principles associated with human rights 
and its ties to Africa as identified in chapters two and six.  France 
maintained an interventionist foreign policy in francophone Africa until 
the 1990s and both Africa and humanitarian intervention are 
incorporated into the French Constitution.1127  As such France considered 
foreign policy rationale on Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire a domestic 
concern based on established legal policy and responsibilities.1128   
 
Accordingly France’s decision-making process is shaped by its legal 
framework, sustained by Constitutional implementation, Civil Code, and 
bilateral cooperation and defence agreements; as well as extensive shared 
historical backgrounds, economic and political ties.1129  This presented a 
legal conflict for France between human rights and its ties to Africa.  
Since this legal conflict was situated at the domestic level both conflicts 
arrived at different interpretations of the same principle of international 
law.  This is consistent with the underlying problem identified in this 
thesis which is not whether a rule of international law is legally binding 
but rather how states translate into practice a rule of international law 
that claims the protection of human rights and permits the use of military 
force for that protection.1130 
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In Rwanda France interpreted human rights protection with the 
Habyarimana regime to protect its sphere of influence.1131  In doing so, 
the recognition and application of law coloured the obligations of France 
to Rwanda and the rights of civilians in the armed conflict.  Contrary to 
the Rwanda approach, France’s initial position in Côte d’Ivoire was one 
of non-intervention but this position was contrary to its legal obligations 
as cited in the bi-lateral cooperation agreements and defence pact.1132 
France later interpreted human rights protection to include the fear of a 
possible repeat of genocide similar to Rwanda, the stability of a previous 
French colony and the protection of French nationals.1133   
 
Underlying domestic factors also played a role in the varying degrees of 
implementation on the use of force with state strategies and the decision-
makers.  At the Executive level, Parliament had a larger role in Côte 
d’Ivoire than the role afforded it during Rwanda.1134  The United Nations 
and various interdepartmental agencies and NGOs were contributory 
factors in the Côte d’Ivoire intervention decisions and a later influence in 
Rwanda.  In that the international organizations afforded each case an 
element of reference at the systemic level for identification within French 
domestic sources of law necessary for interpretation and legal reasoning 
for policy purposes. 
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The legal rationale behind the framing of policy decisions concerning 
both conflicts stems from the differences in information and the 
interpretation of the information provided, including use of humanitarian 
language or the absence thereof towards the conflict.  This absence of 
language was clearly visible in Rwanda.1135  While making its case for 
intervention, France recognised the legal nature of the underlying 
international principles at issue but basically overlooked information due 
to French policy based on prior defence and cooperation agreements with 
Rwanda.  In Rwanda the interaction between France’s foreign policy and 
international law reveals that certain norms of international law 
(specifically genocide) may be both an instrument of legitimacy as well 
as an obstacle to its exercise in the course of decision-making.   
 
The scope of the legal protections of human rights afforded by the 
French government is defined by statute, and its domestic law is 
comprised of international law.  The French Constitution therefore 
ensures effective legislation of a basic principle of international law.  In 
France this enactment procedure identifies issues consistently within the 
domestic framework on human rights concerns and allows for a legal 
standardization between effectiveness and the construction of foreign 
policy.  French foreign policy therefore obeyed fixed legal rules 
regarding the course of action to be taken during the foreign policy 
process.  Consequently, as determined by neoclassical realism (and 
established in chapters one, two and five) in France’s interpretation of 





human rights protection, the direct effect of international law on state 
law allows for the principles of international law to rely on legislation for 
interpretation and implementation.  Therefore, although states may agree 
that the principle of human rights exist the justifications and obligations 
under this principle are translated differently and will affect the 
protection of civilians, which is in accordance with the findings of this 
thesis.   
 
To conclude this section, a comparative approach is applied to the causal 
factors that influence foreign policy in the United States and France to 
evaluate the variances between each state’s decision-makers in light of 
the empirical evidence provided.  The comparative research determines 
whether states interpret international law differently to create legal-




12. The Comparative Analysis of France  
and the United States 
 
Do states arrive at different interpretations of international law to create 
legal authority concerning humanitarian intervention?  How can states 
agree that a particular international legal rule exists, but then understand 
the rights or obligations imposed by that rule in different ways?  To 
respond to these questions, the foreign policy decisions of France and the 
United States, in four regional conflicts - the Liberian civil war (1989), 
Operation Restore Hope (1992, Somalia), Opération Turquoise (1994, 
Rwanda), and the ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-current) have 
been analysed.  The research has assessed the degree to which the 
interpretation of international law at the domestic level affects how states 
act in shaping the structure of authority and legitimacy underlying a 
principled approach to humanitarian concerns. 
 
This comparative analysis revisits the foreign policy decisions of France 
and the United States to clarify the extent to which, in the context of the 
African interventions, international law was interpreted within the 
domestic legal framework to justify or affect legal change, if any.  As 
stated earlier, this allows for an original perspective which helps to 
inform and develop an understanding of how state and international law 
interact simultaneously to effect humanitarian concerns within the 
decision-making process.  To do this, a comparative approach was 
applied to the causal factors proposed as affecting the influence of the 




the decision-makers’ arguments for foreign policy reasoning; 2) the 
domestic legal framework, which includes legal tradition and sources of 
law; and 3) the actions of the United Nations.  For purposes of this 
chapter, the underlying influence of the United Nations will be discussed 
before the legal framework.  
 
In comparative analysis of both states’ legal-political and strategic 
reasoning in the formulation of foreign policy, France emerged from the 
Cold War with a well-established mechanism for intervention decision-
making in Africa, along with a foreign policy process that had regular 
practices characterised by presidential exclusivity and interventionism.  
In contrast, the status of humanitarian intervention in the United States 
was in a state of development within the domestic process.  There were 
no formal policy guidelines for intervention in place at the time.  
Decisions to intervene by the United States were idiosyncratic and 
situation specific, and often diminished by ad hoc pluralism.    
 
This decision behaviour was evident in both Liberia and Somalia.  A 
basic position of non-interference was the guiding principle for United 
States’ foreign policy initially because neither conflict was considered 
relevant to the United States’ national interests.1136  When force was used 
in Somalia the United States did not claim military intervention based on 
threats to its security but cited human rights, a principle of international 
law.1137  In contrast, the French executive’s foreign policy centred on 
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intervention and security concerns and both played an important role in 
policy rationale.1138   
 
In Rwanda, French intervention was based on France’s relationship in its 
official capacity (pré-carré) as well as personally.1139  When intervention 
was required France’s foreign policy was based on perceptions of an 
external threat shaped by the bilateral cooperation and defence 
agreements between the two countries so to affect intervention according 
to its own interests; despite the international framework afforded within 
the French Constitution.1140 Côte d’Ivoire, much like Somalia, was 
disregarded initially.1141 As the situation became increasingly 
problematic, intervention was necessitated by concerns of the possibility 
of genocide and followed by attacks on French citizens which were 
considered a threat to national security.  Moreover, to not intervene 
would have been considered a policy of neglect by France.1142 
 
In both France and the United States, the president is the ultimate 
decision-maker and the office of the president is the key source of 
intervention policymaking.  The presidency is highly institutionalized in 
the United States yet Congress has a large influence as observed in both 
U.S. cases.  In this context, it is easy to account for non-intervention in 
Liberia as there was a lack of high-level concern among the top 
leadership in the Bush Administration to focus on the humanitarian 
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issues.  Despite the significance of the historical ties with Liberia, the 
Bush administration was reluctant to use military force.1143  Somalia on 
the other hand was on Bush’s desk early in the crisis,1144 and Bush 
encouraged staff to examine additional diplomatic efforts to enhance the 
United Nations efforts in Somalia.1145 
 
By contrast, in France although constitutionally it is the president who 
has the final word on intervention and defence issues, it is the prime 
minister who nominates the ministers in charge of implementing foreign 
policy decisions.  With regard to Rwanda however Mitterrand made all 
the intervention decisions.1146 Despite information received from 
interdepartmental agencies and opposition from Prime Minister Balladur 
to his intervention policies, Mitterrand bypassed parliamentary procedure 
regarding all decision-making.  This included decisions regarding the 
Rwandan Opération Turquoise.1147  Rwanda should also have 
necessitated a level of neutrality on France’s behalf but instead, the legal 
tension between humanitarian intervention and sovereignty created 
political problems for France’s policy-makers and operational dilemmas 
on the ground for its military.1148  A tension which underscores the theme 
of this thesis as set out in section three.   
 
In Côte d’Ivoire, although Chirac took the direct lead, decision-making 
was developed by the top policymakers within the Executive and 
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Parliament, which included Prime Minister de Villepin.1149  As such, 
concerns over intervention were put before the Constitutional Council as 
part of the decision-making process.  Even though France, during 
Chirac’s presidency, maintained a non-intervention policy in Africa, de 
Villepin’s decisions centred on the authorization and legality of 
enforcement of the 1961 cooperation agreement and detailed rules of 
engagement regarding decisions to use force.1150  This had the effect of 
substantiating France’s established domestic position in Côte d’Ivoire, 
and Rwanda respectively. 
 
The United Nations also had an underlying influence on the effectiveness 
of international law in the decision-making process.  The research 
gathered on the United Nations concerning the four conflicts is mixed.  It 
is clear that the peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwanda 
overshadowed the peacekeeping success in Côte d’Ivoire.  The United 
Nations’ position in the international community should have demanded 
impartiality yet the research shows there was clearly a lack of 
impartiality concerning Rwanda.  This is notably in that Rwanda had a 
seat on the Security Council while the genocide was occurring.1151  As 
the voice of impartiality and the central instrument through which 
international action is taken to prevent or mitigate gross violations of 
human rights, the United Nations Security Council’s standing on this 
would seem to have had the adverse effect.1152  Although this draws 
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attention to the existence of a rule of international law, it also highlights 
the inherent conflicts regarding the rights or obligations of states 
concerning human rights and the interpretation of those rights from 
within a state’s legal framework.  A factor established in chapter four, 
given that the United Nations Charter itself highlights the confusion 
between sovereignty and peace and security from within the international 
legal framework.   
 
The implementation of United Nations Chapter 7 rulings in Somalia and 
Côte d’Ivoire signified that violations of human rights (incorporated with 
violence and instability) constituted a threat to international peace and 
security and in these instances superseded state sovereignty, thus 
securing a legal balance between sovereignty and permissible means of 
intervention to ensure peace and security.  To secure this balance, the 
relationship used to govern legal behaviour between international law 
and foreign policy required interpretation of the rules of international law 
within both France’s and the United States’ domestic legal structures for 
effectiveness. 
  
Analysis of the domestic legal framework of both France and the United 
States illustrate adherence to the rules of international law.  Notably that 
the effectiveness of international law is a result of interpretation and 
application as prescribed within the state’s domestic legal framework.1153  
As the empirical evidence shows, both states develop their legal 
interpretations through individual state norms and by means of the 
                                                          




political bodies which apply those norms.  Although both states legal 
systems have similar principles, the main difference is in application 
(methodology) and the way in which legal standards are established, 
grounded in the differences between their normative legal structures.  As 
set out in chapter one, the United States tradition is founded on common 
law which is based on precedent.  It is developed by court decisions, 
legislation, and texts.  Because of this, legal sources in the United States 
are always subject to legal interpretation.   
 
By contrast, France is a civil law state, its legal decisions are based on 
written text (the Civil Code), which the courts are obliged to uphold not 
interpret.  Sources of law may only be changed or modified through 
amendment by Parliament, although the actual content of the laws can 
vary among civil law, just as it can in common law.  For instance, 
France’s attempt to change its unilateral policies toward Africa proved 
controversial compared to the United States’ interpretation of human 
rights in Somalia.1154   
 
In both France and the United States this produced a justification 
mechanism for legal change in both the legal framework and domestic 
policy, including change at the international level.  As a result, in two of 
these instances interpretation allowed for ‘essential change within a 
broader framework of continuity’.1155 
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Thus as hypothesised, each state’s domestic legal behaviour established 
the way decision-makers interpreted international law concerning 
interaction with foreign policy as regards the interventions in the four 
conflicts in two ways.  First, each state’s legal tradition represented how 
the decision-maker perceived and interpreted the principles of 
international law (human rights and use of force) at the domestic level; 
what that principle was intended to achieve; and how the state’s legal 
framework and sources of law could be used to meet the required foreign 
policy needs for the respective humanitarian crisis.  As with any general 
understanding of law, legal structures shaped the decision-making 
process by clarifying what constituted legitimate action from within the 
states’ established legal sources and its normative system of rules.  As 
evidenced in both France and the United States, the domestic decision 
making environment acts as a filter to meditate the tension between the 
international system and foreign policy.1156  In that the intervening 
variables at the domestic level had the effect of strengthening and/or 
weakening the influence of systemic factors (of the international system), 
as explained by the thesis legal and theoretical framework.1157 
 
Second, not only did state legal behaviour and its sources shape foreign 
policy toward international law but interpretation also affected state 
obligations.  This was particularly demonstrated in France on issues 
associated with its bilateral cooperation and defence agreements versus 
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documentation on genocide and national security.1158  It was also 
evidenced in the United States on its non-intervention decisions in 
Liberia and Rwanda.1159  As previously discussed in chapter one, while it 
can be assumed that the content of the rules of international law is the 
same (human rights and use of force), the underlying difference was 
whether the rule met the criteria of legality effective in the relevant 
jurisdiction; and how that criterion was interpreted during the 
formulation of foreign policy.  
 
The empirical evidence illustrates that decision-makers in both the 
United States and France base their decisions on internal legal resources 
and relative sources of law that individual decision-makers will 
unquestionably understand as correct and valid.  Legal traditions are also 
reflected in the tasks of the political branches in the interpretation and 
application of international law as witnessed relating to the perceptions 
of decision-makers and the relevance of the role of the state to the 
conflict in question.  It can therefore be said that states interpret 
international law differently relating to decisions to use force or to 
intervene or not to intervene in foreign policy. 
 
In France, as hypothesised, the effectiveness of international law resulted 
from its conservative approach and France utilized a traditional 
interpretation of existing international law in both Rwanda and Côte 
d’Ivoire.  As the cases illustrate, interpretation was initially applied as a 
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result of existing bilateral cooperation and defence agreements between 
France and its francophone state.   
 
Surprisingly in the United States where the thesis expected a more liberal 
interpretation, the United States did not move forward with an 
interpretation of the human rights principle in Liberia as its traditional 
manner would suggest.  Whereas intervention in Somalia moved beyond 
national security interests with the suggestion of humanitarian 
intervention as an element of post-Cold war foreign policy.  Furthermore 
the intervention in Somalia is unique because there was no sovereign 
authority within Somalia to oppose intervention and the United States 
had no direct economic or strategic interests within Somalia.  The fact 
that the United States withdrew troops only partially takes away from an 
unexpected change in non-intervention policy. 
 
As observed in chapters ten and eleven, international law is a recognised 
part of French law and because of this is considered a binding source of 
law in the same way the constitution or civil codes are considered 
binding.  This creates a strong relationship between understandings about 
domestic law and the purpose of international law, and affords 
international legal principles a place in the French legal system.  
Therefore the interpretation of an international legal rule is regulated by 
law.  This same regulation also determines the legal interpretation of the 
cooperation and defence agreements at issue in both Rwanda and Côte 




policy regarding use of force as mandated by the United Nations in 
Rwanda, but at the same time intervention was construed as part of 
French foreign policy.  The same is true in Côte d’Ivoire and the later use 
of force decisions when read together with Security Council Resolution 
1464.1160   
 
Similarly, however, in France new meanings or interpretations of 
international law may have been suppressed by the legal-political 
decision-making process located within the legislative branch.  Such was 
the case between Mitterrand and Balladur and their disagreements over 
Constitutional positioning and the existing formal bilateral military 
agreements in Rwanda.1161  This was also visible regarding complicity 
and non-involvement on France’s behalf pursuant to its African sphere of 
influence on the question of genocide in Côte d’Ivoire.  The failure of 
France to have enacted laws against genocide domestically would have 
suggested acceptance of the genocide in question, and would be in 
contradiction to an established international rule; rules which act in 
tandem with recognised French legislature.  Particularly as France’s 
domestic law is comprised of international law.1162 
 
In the United States the application of international law depends upon a 
decision by the domestic legal system and the scope of the legal 
protections of human rights afforded by the U.S. government as defined 
by case law.  This addresses the necessary issues of procedure and legal 
                                                          
1160 Thesis: 11: 307, 317. 
1161 Thesis: 10:249, 252. 




substance.  In this manner, the domestic legal framework links authority 
and effectiveness in its consideration of legal principles of international 
law, particularly when there is a need to integrate different legal norms 
and policy within an existing legal framework.  Within the United States’ 
government the debate about what may or may not be an emerging rule 
of law is held in two forums: the United States Congress who may 
enumerate these rights and the Supreme Court who may articulate rights 
not recognised and thus afford the rights direct effect and legal obligation 
under state practice.  However as evidenced in Liberia it is often clear 
that direct effect alone is not enough because international rules, even if 
they succeed in entering into the United States legal system, are still 
subject to possible restrictions.1163   
 
During the Liberia conflict there was no established case law to justify 
intervention for humanitarian reasons.  The particulars of Liberia 
correspond to an assertion addressed in section three, there were no 
formal legal guidelines or legal mechanisms at the state level associated 
with defining the principles (both domestic and international) that 
comprised humanitarian intervention.1164  The contradictory nature of 
humanitarian intervention made it difficult to determine not so much 
which international rules to apply, but how the rules apply, and how to 
best resolve the complex relationship between the international legal 
principles at issue and domestic law.  In the cases particular to the United 
States the principles of humanitarian concerns were translated through 
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the US domestic legal system and decision-making process and became 
binding as a matter of domestic law.1165   
 
Consequently, the domestic legal framework established the relationship 
between international law and foreign policy. Because many 
international rules, such as those pertaining to human rights, have their 
origins within a state’s domestic structure, contextualisation of 
humanitarian intervention in foreign policy will carry the weight of 
domestic significance despite its obviously international focus.  In this 
sense foreign policy will obey certain legal rules which act as a 
framework to regulate state behaviour, often predisposed by the interests 
of the international community.   
 
It is also clear in light of the empirical evidence provided that differences 
within each of the legal and political institutions are as important as 
differences between each legal and political institution.  The differences 
within each state involve legal and political institutional processes that 
interact simultaneously in foreign policy.  Both of which are dependent 
upon sources of law associated with the capabilities of states to interpret 
the principles of international law, the perceptions of decision-makers 
and the relevance of the role of the state in the context of humanitarian 
intervention as understood within the state. 
 
For France, the differences are articulated in domestic law (the French 
Constitution and Civil Code) and foreign policy that attempts to explain 
                                                          




from a legitimate standpoint the problems associated with its colonial 
history in Africa.  This ties the development of national identities with 
certain cultural characteristics in francophone Africa and is viewed as 
part of a larger context relating to French leadership in francophone 
Africa.  This leadership also led to internal debate within the French 
government.  Mitterrand, Balladur, Chirac and Juppé each attempted to 
regulate their own foreign policy, with each following their individual 
personal and electoral agenda.  Mitterrand in particular was given to 
informing policy decisions that were not agreed upon.1166 
 
Moreover, as Mitterrand’s decisions in Rwanda illustrated, what a 
decision-maker thinks about a situation often has more influence on 
foreign policy than what is actually happening.  Since that opinion will 
define foreign policies regardless of whether or not the opinion is valid.  
This perception was also articulated in Bush’s policy regarding non-
intervention in Liberia and reaffirmed during the Clinton 
administration.1167  In the United States, post-Cold war Africa was 
perceived to be marginal regarding global security issues and geo-
strategic interests.  Bush pushed for intervention in Somalia in response 
to the increasing pressure to do something in Somalia and also in 
response to the political backlash on Bosnia.  Clinton ended intervention 
in Somalia amid the decline of congressional support.1168   
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It goes without reason to conclude that intervention decisions based upon 
humanitarian concerns are tied to a state’s willingness to intervene and 
how the state legally develops the case for intervention.  For the United 
States (and France post Chirac) inasmuch as there was no consensus on 
reasons for action in humanitarian intervention, the focus was to 
construct binding, enforceable policy that provided legitimate authority 
to the ambiguities that created significant practical challenges to the 
responsibilities of humanitarian intervention.  Ambiguities of which the 
United Nations Charter itself highlights.  This corresponds to the Danish 
Institute Report, which assumes that the question of legitimacy is 
determined primarily based on moral or political considerations but also 
involves legal considerations which may have important political 
consequences.1169 
 
France links authority in much the same way.  In France the principles of 
international law are binding because they are recognised in domestic 
law and do not require re-evaluation in the policy process.  Problematic 
in this institutional structure however was the existence of a Franco-
African legal framework of cooperation which coincided with France’s 
constitutional legal framework.  This included existing formal bilateral 
agreements and informal security commitments.  In addition, because 
Africa is incorporated into the French Constitution, Africa was an 
element of France’s legal structure and provided legitimate authority (for 
France) to intervene based upon these legal obligations.    
                                                          





The obligation underlying humanitarian intervention remains subjective 
and is therefore based upon the values the state associates with the rules 
of international law – the protection of human rights and the legitimate 
use of military force for that protection, in the context of this thesis.  In 
both Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire, France intervened with an emphasis on 
humanitarian missions together with requirements for territorial defence 
and maintaining defence agreements.  French forces acted in the way 
they believed was in accordance with their mandate in international law 
as well as French law.   
 
Rationale for the United States’ intervention varies.  In Liberia rationale 
was based upon non-intervention and was devoid of any security strategy 
or intervention policy rationale. In addition, foreign policy decisions 
compromised the human rights issues in its failure to incorporate the 
facts of the conflict with the human rights language.  In Somalia, the 
United States moved beyond national security interests with the 
suggestion of humanitarian intervention as an element of post-Cold war 
foreign policy, citing human rights as justification for intervention.  In 
Somalia there was a need to integrate international legal rules to 
construct policy within the United States’ existing legal framework.  This 
allowed the rules of international law to be adapted to an unforeseen 
situation within the domestic framework.1170  In doing so the policy 
allowed for norm expansion to meet the requirements necessary to effect 
humanitarian concerns.    
                                                          





In concluding this chapter and as determined by neoclassical realism, the 
thesis’ emphasis on the domestic level of analysis has explained the 
effectiveness of international law on foreign policy outcomes because 
each case study identified the relationship between international law and 
foreign policy through distinctive state domestic legal institutions.  
While the legal structures of each state had a central influence on legal 
behaviour subject to the rules of international law, resulting in different 
perspectives regarding the course of humanitarian action to be taken or 
not taken, the legal obligations afforded international law as interpreted 
through the state’s domestic legal framework, regulated the interaction 
between each state and its position in the international system and 
consequently each state’s foreign policy decisions.   
 
As predicted, in allocating space to the interpretative process the thesis 
was able to analyse how humanitarian pressures were translated through 
different domestic state laws to regulate the interaction between the state 
and its position in the international system.  In that the domestic legal 
framework positioned how the interpretative process was established and 
operated between humanitarian concerns and foreign policy by 
identifying the legal scope and/or limitations of the international 









Events are not negotiable but their interpretation can 
generate debate. (author unknown) 
 
 
While we would like to believe that society operates by 
morality, it does not – it operates by law.  The moral 
justification of humanitarian intervention is not hard to 
find.  However, to prove the intention of a situation it is 
necessary to consider, not: was it wrong? But: was it 
legal? And, how is that legality interpreted?  
Moreover, was it legal in established law or by the 







Although written within the framework of twentieth century thought on 
legal study and human rights many aspects of humanitarian intervention 
currently remain litigious.  The author found that the cases in this study 
of humanitarian intervention illustrate not only that differences in 
interpretation exist, but that the conceptualisation of international law at 
the domestic level is crucial to understanding a state’s legal behaviour 
concerning humanitarian intervention.   Although causal factors such as 
the United Nations may have influenced policy, the responses of both 
France and the United States to humanitarian concerns were in 
accordance with the parameters of their individual domestic legal 
structures at the time.  This had the effect of limiting policy decisions on 
whether to intervene or not intervene for humanitarian reasons because 
legal structures both restrained and empowered each state.   
 
While it can be argued that the interpretation of international principles is 
a reflection of state interests that lends legitimacy to intervention/non-
intervention decisions, it will remain necessary for that international 
principle, together with state interest, to meet the criteria of effective 
legality from within the state.  These legal parameters demonstrated in 
the adaption of neoclassical realism, with its emphasis on the domestic 
level of analysis illustrated that state power can no longer be limited to 
military factors.  This was witnessed in the four cases in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Legal capability ran parallel to military capability.  As a result, 




important in the decision-making environment because legal institutions 
exert power.  Therefore, the findings of this research challenge the 
traditional meaning of power and rule structures inherent in realist 
theory, which has traditionally measured power in terms of military 
capabilities.   
 
While challenging the traditional approach of realism is itself a 
contribution to research.  This thesis also adds value to the 
interdisciplinary dialogue between international legal study and 
comparative foreign policy analysis, and, in two ways, has informed the 
ongoing debate about how principles of international law are translated 
into practice when cases of humanitarian concerns arise.  First, it has 
considered an approach that is capable of analysing the interpretation and 
application of international law at the domestic level during policy-
making.   
 
Second, it has generated a better understanding of the domestic process 
and mechanisms by which international law regulates the interaction 
between the state and its position in the international system.  It has done 
this by drawing attention to different institutional processes (law and 
politics) that interact together in foreign policy and by illustrating how 
essential differences in a state’s legal framework, its sources of law and 
strategic use of interpretation, affect how each state shapes the structure 
of authority and legitimacy in its foreign policy.  This allowed the thesis 




understanding of how state and international law interact simultaneously 
in foreign policy to effect humanitarian concerns.  In particular, 
humanitarian concerns related to the contestation over the protection of 
human rights. 
 
When this research began its aim was to identify how differences in the 
interpretation of international law at the domestic level affect how states 
act in shaping the structure of authority and legitimacy underlying a 
principled approach to humanitarian concerns.  It also sought to 
determine how decision-makers understand the role and purpose of law 
and how this determines foreign policy decisions.  Specifically when 
there was a need to integrate different legal norms and policy within a 
state’s existing legal framework.  This allowed the analytical focus to 
centre more on what international law does on a particular issue in 
foreign policy and less on what international law is.  This established 
how international legal rules are actually used during the formation of 
foreign policy.  Furthermore, the research wanted to explore how 
international and domestic law interacted by exploring the complex and 
sometimes contradictory nature of international legal principles and of a 
state’s legal institutional responsibilities, when deliberating foreign 
policy concerning humanitarian intervention for the time period 1989-
2002.   
 
To answer these questions an interdisciplinary methodology was needed 




interests interacted with foreign policy formulation.  Consequently the 
research located itself at the intersection of international legal study and 
foreign policy, using comparative foreign policy analysis and 
neoclassical realism in its theoretical approach.  By setting out an 
explicit legal and theoretical foundation to underpin this research, a 
framework was created that posited the need to focus on the domestic 
decision-making environment between the international system and 
foreign policy, and then analyse how humanitarian pressures were 
translated through a state’s legal structure and its decision-makers.  This 
focus enabled the research to locate the importance of law in the 
domestic decision-making environment because legal institutions exert 
power.  The domestic legal framework positioned how the interpretative 
process operated between humanitarian concerns and foreign policy.  As 
explained in chapter one, the effect brought about by the domestic legal 
environment is therefore a key factor for determining intervention 
decisions.  In practice this is observed in the strategic capabilities of legal 
behaviour involved in the interpretation and application of international 
law which controlled foreign policy outcomes in both France and the 
United States.   
 
When conditioned with issues of legality associated with humanitarian 
intervention, the power of international law’s effectiveness was clearly 
witnessed in the state’s normative domestic use of familiar internal legal 
resources that the individual decision-makers unquestionably understood 




two issues: information received at both the international and domestic 
level and which information received was relevant to the decision and 
which was not.   
 
In both France and the United States it was necessary to first identify the 
principles represented by the humanitarian situation and then determine 
how those legal principles were to be translated into practice.  This was 
based upon the fact that the legal authority of a state carries with it the 
authority to impose fixed legal rules, including those based upon the 
principles of human rights (section one).   
 
In the United States, there was no existing law which defined 
humanitarian intervention and because of this it was necessary to extract 
specific constitutional rules to support its non-intervention decision in 
Liberia; while in Somalia the policy decision for the use of military force 
was coupled with the need to secure peace and security.  The actions of 
France in the international system can be explained by the legal power 
dichotomy facing its decision-makers, determined by the bilateral 
defence and cooperation agreements at issue and human rights 
protection.  Again, this is not to say that state interests did not play a 
role, but without interpretation of the applicable legal sources, as well as 
what each state deemed appropriate legal reasoning, foreign policy 
objectives – whether to intervene or not intervene - could not have been 
met.  Therefore this gives confirmation to the fact that states develop 




means of the legal-political bodies applying those norms to provide legal 
rules with certainty and predictability (chapters one and five).  This 
satisfies the question of how we understand the importance of the 
application of sources of law and the strategic use of interpretation and 
legal reasoning for policy purposes regarding the course of action to be 
taken in conflict situations (security threats).   
 
As determined by neoclassical realism, emphasis on the legal domestic 
level of analysis explained the effectiveness of international law on 
policy outcomes because it was able to identify the relationship between 
international law and foreign policy through distinctive state domestic 
legal institutions.  These domestic institutions determined the extent to 
which international law imposes a legal duty upon states to use military 
force when necessary to prevent or stop human rights abuses and how 
the state uses that legal principle within foreign policy.  In this way the 
state, by utilizing its domestic legal and political structures as a 
mechanism for constructing international authority, allows for structures 
of hierarchy absent in the international system.  (This proposed function 
was discussed in chapters one, three, four and seven). 
 
In advancing this methodological approach the research was able to 
address bias in contemporary foreign policy and legal literature 
(Introduction and chapter six), and it also contributes to the debate 
concerning power in the realist schools of international relations theory.  




new form of analysis will emerge from the thesis’ empirical studies that 
will focus on how domestic legal institutions identify the legal scope 
and/or limitations when establishing international principles for 
humanitarian concerns within foreign policy though neoclassical realism.  
As a result, the strengths of this methodology are visible within this 
research and have proved essential in its empirical focus and findings.   
 
Notably, comparative foreign policy analysis and neoclassical realism 
were able to theorise the differences in the effectiveness of international 
law in shaping the structure of authority (legality) and legitimacy within 
the French and the United States decision-making process when 
addressing the four cases of humanitarian intervention in Africa.  
Accordingly section four of this research demonstrated how the 
outcomes of the decision-making process, in large part, depends upon a 
state’s interpretation of a principle of international law that involves the 
simultaneous application of the protection of human rights and permits 
the use of military force for that protection.  Understanding the process 
through which international concerns involving humanitarian 
intervention, specifically the use of military force and human rights, 
(these being the systemic pressures/independent variables) are filtered 
through domestic structures or institutions, legal and political (the unit 
level/intervening variables), to produce foreign policy behaviour (the 
dependent variable) identifies how decision-makers themselves 
understand the role and purpose of law in the formulation of foreign 




tension between the international system and foreign policy.1171  In this 
sense, foreign policy will obey certain legal rules which act as a 
framework to regulate state behaviour, often predisposed by the interests 
of the international community.   
 
When addressing the question of how states can agree that a particular 
international legal rule exists but then understand the rights or 
obligations of that rule in different ways so that the rule arguably 
functions within the international system.  The facts and/or 
circumstances that resulted in the protection of human rights differed 
between France and the United States and were based upon the 
interpretation of the facts provided, including the use of humanitarian 
language or the absence of such language in the application process 
relevant to each conflict.  While states may agree that a particular 
international legal rule exists as illustrated in the four empirical cases, 
the United States and France established foreign policy with their own 
approaches and understandings to the humanitarian situations under 
discussion and therefore looked to different legal interpretations and 
methods toward international law to legitimate its foreign policy.   
 
As suggested in the study’s hypotheses, these differences stem from each 
state’s legal framework, the values ascribed to each state’s interest 
position, and on the substantive limits that legislatures have enacted or 
on which courts have ruled.  Since law (domestic and international) is 
                                                          




dealt with through a state’s legal institutions, decision-makers base their 
decisions on the appropriate form of interpretation based upon their 
beliefs about the role of law and the way law is created within each state; 
this would include sources of law.  Thus while the content of the rules of 
international law (human rights, the use of force and even sovereignty) is 
the same, the underlying difference is whether the rule meets the criteria 
of effective legality from within the relevant state and how that criterion 
is interpreted through the state’s legal institutions (chapter two).     
 
As established in chapter two and section four, France and the United 
States operate within a legal framework that requires legal principles and 
concepts to act as a framework or guideline, which influence policy and 
limits the state’s choices of whether or not to intervene.  In this way, the 
normative power structures based in the legal traditions of France and the 
United States constitute how decision-makers interpret international law 
concerning intervention in the four conflicts.  This accounts for how the 
differences in security [conflict] perceptions impacted the intervening 
variables concerning interpretation and application relevant to sources of 
law. 
 
For France, the differences are articulated in domestic law (the French 
Constitution and Civil Code) and foreign policy that attempts to explain 
from a legitimate standpoint the problems associated with its colonial 
history in Africa.  Moreover, as Mitterrand’s decisions in Rwanda 




has more influence on foreign policy than what is actually happening, 
since that opinion will define foreign policies regardless of whether or 
not the opinion is valid.  This perception was also articulated in Bush’s 
policy regarding non-intervention in Liberia and was reaffirmed during 
the Clinton administration.  In the United States, post-Cold war, Africa 
was perceived to be marginal regarding global security issues and geo-
strategic interests.  Bush pushed for intervention in Somalia in response 
to both the increasing pressure to do something in Somalia and also in 
response to the political backlash on Bosnia. Clinton ended intervention 
in Somalia amid the decline of congressional support.  This demonstrated 
that although the structure and the rules of domestic and international 
institutions will sometimes force change as a result of unforeseen crises 
or situations, foreign policy will obey certain legal rules which act as a 
framework to regulate state behaviour.  Because many international rules 
such as those pertaining to human rights have their origins within a 
state’s domestic structure, contextualisation of humanitarian intervention 
in foreign policy will carry the weight of domestic significance despite 
its obviously international focus.  For the reason that the justification of 
human rights is based on information as received while the legitimacy of 
the rights requires authority.   
 
This was clearly the case in both Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire.  Somalia 
represented the first time that human rights violations had been 
interpreted as a threat to international peace and security and a Chapter 7 




case of Côte d'Ivoire in particular illustrates the importance of 
interpretation that could lead to benchmarks of accountability given that 
Papon established legal precedent in French domestic law concerning 
legal standards associated with humanitarian interventions and 
complicity.  Moreover, although the scope of the rules of France’s 
domestic institution was forced to change France’s foreign policy obeyed 
the legal rules as statutorily prescribed in French law regarding crimes 
against humanity; as hypothesized and subsequently confirmed by 
Dworkin’s position on the importance of the legal sources.  As 
previously discussed in chapter one, Dworkin’s position is that legal 
interpretation is primarily the interpretation not of the law, but of its 
sources and to understand why interpretation is central to legal practice 
requires an understanding of the role of sources in the law; that is, of the 
reasons for the legal sources in both domestic and international law, 
which is in accordance with the findings of this thesis.   
 
Similarly however, this thesis does maintain that the case of Somalia 
lacks established precedent given that consistency in humanitarian 
actions was not developed.  As chapter ten intimates, the Somalia 
intervention occurred during a transitional period in the international 
order yet new standards for international action, at both domestic and 
international levels, were not established.  The development and 
implementation of new standards would have alleviated contemporary 
arguments surrounding the contradictions between the use of force and 





From a legal perspective expanding the scope of international law and 
therefore its interpretation within the domestic framework would justify 
legal change; thus representing a development toward a changed scope of 
state sovereignty with respect to the state and human rights abuses.  This 
is a legal change that neither the Danish Institute Report nor the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine is able to address.  Although there is 
agreed international acceptance that human rights violations should be 
protected by a responsible international community, these documents do 
not identify how these principles are to be translated into practice.  
Indeed, while some states may be willing to intervene to stop atrocities, 
the international system is reluctant to establish a norm that involves 
protection under the responsibility to react which may or may not 
involve the use of force (chapter 7.a.).1172  Moreover if these documents 
were intended to act as enforcement mechanisms, then the strength of 
their enforcement has not been institutional designed to promote 
consistent standard practice.  In reality this reinforces the divide between 
the implementation of international norms and how to implement those 
norms by means of the state.  As a consequence protection for civilians 
caught in intra-state conflict remains uncertain. 
 
In examining the dependent characteristics of international law based 
upon Christian Tomuschat’s assertions, and as concurred by Samantha 
Besson, noted in chapters one and seven, the research was able to 
                                                          




identify how states construct international law politically within foreign 
policy relating to humanitarian intervention, and how they decide 
whether or not to use force.  This dependency matters since in the case of 
both states, their legal structures and perceptions of security ultimately 
determined whether or not they used military force in the course of 
decision-making.  As was demonstrated in section four, the rationale 
behind the framing of the policy decisions relevant to each conflict 
stemmed from the differences in information and in the interpretation of 
the information provided, including use of humanitarian language or the 
absence of such language.  Therefore interpretation compelled both 
authorization and influence from within each state’s distinctive legal 
framework on the substantive limits the legislature used for enactment of 
the policy decision.  Consequently, humanitarian intervention’s 
dependency on the state’s legal structures, on how a state can construct 
international law politically within its foreign policy, imposes a legal 
obligation about how authority is constituted and maintained.  As 
demonstrated in the research the failure to understand this dependency 
may obstruct the rule or norm’s effectiveness in the policy decision. 
 
Moreover within the framework of neoclassical realism this thesis has 
developed an approach by which the state, in utilizing its domestic legal 
structures as a mechanism for international authority, can allow for 
structures of hierarchy otherwise absent in the international system. The 
research has been able to show that through the use of neoclassical 




makers (humanitarian situations position international rules/norms in the 
domestic legal framework) to explain foreign policy.  However, these 
systemic pressures cannot assure relevance similar to a sovereign state’s 
legal and political structures because systemic pressures still have to be 
identified by decision-makers and codified into the domestic legal 
system (chapter three).  Consequently the codification of a legal norm, 
by itself, whether customary or conventional, has no meaning.  It takes 
its meaning, as well as its legal value, from the order producing it.  This 
once again draws attention to the function of law, which in any 
legislative or court system is the right and power to interpret and apply 
law as prescribed (chapter three).   
 
This gives explanatory power to neoclassical realism’s approach in that a 
state, by interpreting international law through its domestic legal 
framework, theoretically provides an enforcement mechanism by which 
international law attains political authority.  Given that the domestic 
legal framework positions how the interpretative process is established 
and operates between humanitarian concerns and foreign policy.  As 
such, the domestic legal framework will identify the legal scope and/or 
limitations when establishing international principles for humanitarian 
concerns within foreign policy.  This establishes how we understand 
sources of law and the strategic use of interpretation and legal reasoning 
for policy purposes, particularly since decision-makers tend to interpret 





In this way, neoclassical realism does what other international relations 
theories are unable to do.  Instead of simply positing a theory that does 
not, by itself tell us something about the processes of decision-making, 
neoclassical realism provides a viable mechanism for states to determine 
how domestic level processes are capable of assisting systemic 
information (in this study, humanitarian principles) through foreign 
policy.  Thus as this thesis proposed, in authorising the importance of 
systemic variables, neoclassical realism allowed for the consideration of 
systemic factors such as the distribution of capabilities (that is, the 
capabilities of states to interpret, apply and execute the principles of 
international law) which form the permissive environment for foreign 
policy, as argued in chapters one and three.  In this way international law 
regulates the interaction between the state and its position in the 
international system, through the state’s domestic framework.  This 
accounted for the effectiveness of international law within the decision-
making process.  This is confirmed through the four empirical chapters, 
in which humanitarian issues became part of the interpretative practice of 
France and the United States because – as indicated previously – such 
issues are ruled on from within, through interpretation, rather than from 
outside the state.  Neoclassical realism therefore allows the state, through 
its legal-political structures, to commit to the fixed limitations of 
legitimacy in the international legal system while affording the state 





As hoped this theoretical application moves beyond ‘anarchy is what 
states make of it’,1173 given that constructivism does not account for unit 
level factors in foreign policy decisions in the same way neoclassical 
realism does.  Consequentially, the applicability of norm assumption 
[from the constructivist’s viewpoint] at the international level would be 
unable to meet the requirements of the humanitarian principles at issue 
within a state’s decision-making process on its own.  This is because 
Wendt’s constructivist’s argument does not consider the specifics of 
regional (intra-state) conflict and violence which currently dominate the 
international system (chapter five).  Indeed, this is the theoretical 
contribution of this thesis.  In allocating space to the interpretative 
process through the state’s unit-level variables, neoclassical realism 
identifies the way in which a state manages systemic information (i.e., 
the rules/norms of international law) and how systemic information 
influences the state’s ability to interpret societal demands and respond 
effectively to them.   
 
Predictive Power   
Given that the subject matter discussed within this research deals with 
issues which have direct relevance to humanitarian concerns today, and 
when assessing existing conflicts and the risk of conflict arising in the 
future, this author is unsure whether the cases under study hold 
predictive power in decision-making.  What can be determined by the 
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case studies is how states perceive and interpret legal and security issues; 
as well as how the significance or impact of historical connections 
between countries will affect states that intervene or do not intervene for 
humanitarian concerns.    
 
In this same regard however when considering predictive power, one 
must also think of best practice.  Can best practice be predictive?   Can 
the international community, and thus states, be sure that what has been 
prescribed as effective for one conflict will be just as effective for 
another conflict.  Particularly since the focus on morality can conceal 
structures and practices that enhance further problems.  Conceivably the 
most that can be hoped for is specific awareness of the conflict under 
concern and understanding the cause of the conflict which is crucial for 
conciliation purposes.  Perhaps the case studies predictive power is best 
illustrated in highlighting how past decisions came about and still effect 
current humanitarian intervention concerns.  Such as Somalia where the 
development and implementation of new standards would have 
alleviated contemporary arguments surrounding the contradictions 
between the use of force and sovereignty.  The Côte d'Ivoire case study 
gives a glimpse of predictive power.  Wherein France had established 
strong legal behaviour yet illustrates how the importance of 
interpretation could lead to benchmarks of accountability given that 
Papon established legal precedent in French domestic law concerning 
legal standards associated with humanitarian interventions and 




established the question at the core of humanitarian intervention will 
remain - which is how to reconcile in the most productive way the degree 
to which force is used internationally to constrain illegitimate force 
domestically.   
 
Implications/Suggestions for Future Research   
The process of determining how humanitarian intervention as a 
legitimate practice interacts with the decision-making process, and if 
humanitarian intervention then becomes, to some extent, an instrument 
of foreign policy, poses an additional question.  If humanitarian 
intervention becomes an instrument of foreign policy, as this thesis 
suggests, then the debate concerning intervention changes from whether 
intervention is legitimate to whether it should be consistently applicable.   
 
As indicated in the findings of this research, although there is 
international acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P), 
how these principles are translated into practice has not been identified to 
ensure that international policy is implemented.  Nor are there any 
established mechanisms which create any legal obligations as to how the 
principles apply.  This has serious implications for R2P since its 
components continue to complicate intervention decisions.  As stated 
within this thesis, if there is an absence of language or ambiguity then 
the strength of enforcement has not been institutional designed to 
promote consistent standard moral or legal practice.  The current debate 




illustrates that R2P’s reliance on the legal framework of the United 
Nations may prove to be ineffective in its practical application since 
intervention decisions only obtain legitimacy from clear and predictable 
legal standards.    
 
While there may be justifiable benchmarks for humanitarian 
intervention, in effect a fundamental concern remains - which is to what 
extent has R2P contributed to the resolution of intra-state violence for 
humanitarian needs?  Moreover, how is the international community able 
to determine if success has been met if there are no parameters specified 
to measure success?  Certainly inaction into a humanitarian crisis would 
render Edwards Luck’s rationale on United Nations’ assistance ensuring 
a considerable degree of consensus and legitimacy for protection as 
arbitrary?  Luck’s argument may clarify and establish inferred standards 
for humanitarian intervention but it does refer to indeterminable legal 
obligations.  His argument neither explicitly creates nor alters any legal 
obligations as to how those inferred standards should be applied, 
particular with regard to the elements obliging the international 
community (i.e., states) to respond to mass atrocities.  Luck only reflects 
upon legal obligations and as such does not establish any form of legal 
precedent.  The balance between respect for humanitarian concerns and 
state sovereignty has still not been found. 
 
Consequently, it is not a matter for law to determine or even proscribe 




moral obligations of a state, to the extent that they are regulated by 
international standards, must be a part of other legal obligations which 
can withstand consistent and uniform applications.  It seems that the 
most contentious aspect of humanitarian concerns is the issues associated 
with morality.  While we would like to believe that society operates by 
morality, it does not – it operates by law.  The moral justification of 
humanitarian intervention is not hard to find.  However, to prove the 
justification or intention of a situation it is necessary to consider, not: 
was it wrong? But: was it legal? And, how is that legality interpreted?  
Moreover, was it legal in established law or by the laws established at 
the time? 
 
The problematisation of international law’s implications within foreign 
policy opens up possibilities for future research to determine whether 
these implications are a cause, or a symptom, of larger problems in the 
international order.  Further research possibilities also include whether 
the United Nations should be used as a legal tool to influence foreign 
policy or would this weaken the interaction between state law and 
international law when humanitarian issues arise?   
 
Samantha Besson’s work on justifications concerning international 
human rights and implications associated with religious and non-
religious justifications also presents future research possibilities. This is 
of particular relevance when considering the ongoing “troubles” in 




given that rape often goes unreported and thus undocumented, causing 
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